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This thesis contributes to the anthropological literature on the Anthropocene through an 
ethnography of coal mining communities directly affected by contemporary changes in 
the fossil fuel industry. It will argue that coal is a specific material around which historic 
and future collective imaginations pivot. Therefore, it is central to the theoretical 
discussion of the Anthropocene as well as national and international political debates. 
The political discussion around coal in Australia is stuck in a binary ‘jobs versus the 
environment’ discourse. However, this thesis will show how the issues facing coal 
communities are significantly more complex. Rather than diametrically opposed, 
concerns about ‘jobs’ and ‘environment’ are both implicated in questions of precarious 
livelihoods. This thesis will highlight the lived transition for those whose lives are 
embedded in an Anthropocenic past and present, but who face increasingly unknown 
futures.  
The thesis draws on twenty months of fieldwork within two coal mining 
communities in Australia: Moranbah in Central Queensland and Singleton in the Upper 
Hunter Valley of New South Wales. The findings from the first fieldsite describe the 
many changes to the labour force resulting from a weakening labour unionism, increased 
labour casualisation, and a growth of fly-in-fly-out workforces. Those from the second 
fieldsite direct attention to land-use conflicts and the anticipatory practices of the 
community as people imagine the future of their region beyond coal through the 
mechanisms of state planning bodies and landscape rehabilitation.  The two perspectives 
illuminate the interplay between precarious lives built around the Australian coal mining 
industry and complex moral debates about the future of coal in Australia.   
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ALP- Australian Labor Party 
BMA- The combined name of BHP and Mitsubishi in their joint mining operations 
CCC- Coal Community Conference (a community relations arm of the CLO) 
CLO- Coal Lobby Organization (the lobbying organization of which the CCC is a 
branch) 
CFMEU- Construction, Forestry, Mining, and Energy Union 
CSR- Corporate Social Responsibility 
CUB- Cashed up Bogan 
DIDO- Drive-in-Drive-Out 
FIFO- Fly-In-Fly-Out 
GFC- Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
NIMBY- Not in my backyard 
NSW- New South Wales 
OECD- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAC- Planning Assessment Commission 
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CONVERSION AND PSEUDONYMS 
 
Conversion note:  
1 Australian Dollar (AU$) equals approximately 0.57 British Pound Sterling  
1 Australian dollar (AU$) equals approximately 0.72 United States’ Dollars 
 
Pseudonyms are used to refer to all people in this thesis unless they are public figures or 
have spoken publicly about their circumstances. In the cases of individuals who have 
spoken publicly but whom I also encountered privately, I draw from publicly available 
information. 
I have also used a pseudonym to refer to the pro-coal lobby organization in which I did 
research. This is an attempt to protect the anonymity of the small group of people which 
would be too easily identifiable if the organization were named. Some identifying 






Figure 0.1 Peak Downs Highway in Central Queensland (Author’s photograph) 
 
When driving down the highway through the parched landscape of Australia’s Central 
Queensland in the dry season, it is hard to imagine that this land of dust and scrub was 
once a lush wetland forest. Today kangaroo corpses line the roadside, victims of large 
trucks as the roos’ desperate thirst draws them here to lick the dew that collects on the 
asphalt in the early morning. Once this land would have been thick with ancient ferns, 
some decomposing and buried in the marsh, others competing for sunlight in the dense 
wet forest. It is difficult to envision but my purpose in driving this route proves this 
ancient climatic past, for I am here travelling to the coal fields of Australia’s Bowen 
Basin.  
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Coal is buried organic life, ancient flora and fauna, that over hundreds of millions 
of years has been compacted and pressurized into the black rock we burn today. This 
particular coal basin is traced back to the late Permian Age around 280 million years ago 
when the area was a swamp and the dead plants and animals were buried under the water, 
preventing oxidation and allowing the build-up, compacting and transformation of these 
organisms into a fossil fuel (Van de Wetering, et al. 2013). Coal is thus deeply historical 
(Chakrabarty 2009). It is photosynthesised sunlight captured in biological organisms and 
preserved for millions of years; yet we have endowed it with a profound affiliation to 
modernity and progress. As the story goes, coal is the fuel with which modern industrial 
society was built; it powered the railways, the steam ships, and eventually the 
powerplants that brought reliable electricity to factories and homes, spreading 
development and improving humanity’s quality of life (Freese 2004: 8). However, its role 
in this narrative of progress is now being reconfigured. By burning this ancient energy, 
among other activities, we are drastically altering the composition of the atmosphere and 
causing anthropogenic climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2007).  
The increased global concern over climate change and coal’s significant 
contribution to it has shifted the moral framing of coal from a source of development and 
progress to a potential threat to the planetary future. For many white settler Australians, 
coal is a source of economic prosperity providing significant export revenue, cheap 
electricity, and employment for a number of regional communities. Coal is thus 
celebrated by many, given honorifics in the naming of businesses and landmarks in 
regional towns (cf. Scott 2010: 6). At the same time “Coal Kills” is becoming an 
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increasingly prominent phrase on protest signs, in green political rhetoric, and even 
mundane discourse as other Australians grow increasingly concerned about coal’s 
contribution to anthropogenic climate change. The current prime minister Scott Morrison, 
then Federal Treasurer in February 2017, infamously brought a lump of coal into 
parliament, yelling ‘Don’t be afraid’ as he waved it around to mock the demonizing of 
coal he associated with the Australian Labor politicians across the aisle (Murphy 2017). 
Despite the occasional rhetorical flourish, coal alone neither kills nor employs. Rather 
coal is enveloped in a complex socionatural world (Escobar 2008: 29) in which it is made 
meaningful as ambiguously productive and destructive. In this socionatural world coal is 
turned from an ancient sedimentary rock into a natural resource through a complex 
assemblage of materials, infrastructure, discourse, affects, and systems of value, all lived 
and contested through everyday lives (Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014).  
This thesis follows various threads of this resource assemblage across shifting 
terrain. Competing discourses attempt to frame coal in relation to opposed political goals 
and conflicting visions of Australia’s past and future. Pro-coal positions emphasize the 
economic contributions of coal and particularly its role as a provider of regional 
employment. Environmentalists emphasize the threat posed by coal through its 
devastating environmental effects. This ‘jobs versus the environment’ discourse results in 
a frustrating political impasse which obscures shared concerns over Australia’s future (cf. 
Scott 2010) and encourages a political divisiveness increasingly evident in the contest 
over climate change and the related rise of far-right populism. This thesis aims to expose 
this binary as too simplistic, by taking seriously the everyday and ordinary implications 
of life around coal in contemporary Australia. However, it is also guided by an analytical 
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gap created by the prominence of post-humanist perspectives on the Anthropocene, 
which have become the primary guiding framework for an anthropology of contemporary 
environmental crisis (Haraway 2016; Latour 2013, 2014, 2017; Povinelli 2016). This 
theoretical framework generates a similar impasse which overshadows differentiated 
responsibilities and operations of power within modernist ontologies. Instead, the thesis 
proposes an anthropological perspective that focuses on the Anthropocene as it is 
experienced, particularly through paying attention to the inherent mutuality of precarious 
labour and precarious lives.  
For my Australian informants, this experienced Anthropocene is felt through a 
multiple and compounding precariousness. As modernist progress narratives no longer 
offer stable futures, labour and environmental relations shift inexorably. Precarity for 
coal miners comes not only from the uncertain working conditions that threaten their 
future livelihoods, but also from the fact that the very material they extract through their 
labour threatens the planetary future (Weston 2012). Exacerbating this dynamic is that 
coal mining communities face a double bind.  The companies for which they work are 
systematically casualising the workforce and undermining privileged social values and 
community built around stable mining jobs. Yet their ability to critique the companies on 
which they depend for their (increasingly precarious) livelihoods is undermined by the 
rise of moral discourses around climate change that paint coal as murderous.  Miners, 
instead of criticizing their employment conditions, feel the need to defend the industry in 
which their lives are entwined and thus they, themselves, are morally implicated. This 
highlights how the commodification of coal resources involves more than the Cartesian 
division of society and nature—as ontological approaches to the Anthropocene imply 
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(Haraway 2016; Latour 2013, 2014, 2017; Povinelli 2016)—and instead derives from 
context dependent political and historic situations. This thesis will focus on the complex 
discursive, affective, material and institutional arrangements enable and maintain the 
unstable configuration of commodified coal in the context of Anthropocenic precarity (cf. 
Bear et al. 2015; Bell 2017; Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014; Tsing 2005, 2015; 
Weszkalnys 2013, 2016).  
This thesis draws on long-term fieldwork within two Australian mining towns. It 
puts those who work in and around the coal industry at the centre of the analysis, looking 
at their everyday lives and the challenges and paradoxes that they face as coal’s role in 
Australia’s future becomes increasingly questioned. It is therefore an ethnographically 
grounded perspective on the Anthropocene as a concept to describe the contemporary 
refiguring of human and environmental entanglements and the anxieties and 
precariousness provoked by disillusion with these modernist foundations. In contrast to 
what much social theory on the Anthropocene implies (Chakrabarty 2009; Latour 2013, 
2017; Latour et al. 2018), this is not some grand awakening or ontological restructuring 
of society/nature mutuality for my informants, but a local manifestation of political 
economic and social changes and their resultant experienced insecurities.  
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 Figure 0.2 Map of Fieldsites- annotations by author. 
© Commonwealth of Australia (Geoscience Australia) 2019. This product is released 
under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Licence. 
 
My first ten months of fieldwork (September 2015-July 2016) was conducted in 
the town of Moranbah, a mining town in Central Queensland focused on the production 
of coking coal, that is, coal used in the production of steel. The town was officially 
founded in 1971 and was built specifically to house the employees—and families—of the 
open-cut coal mines being built in the surrounding region. The town’s direct relation to 
the surrounding mines, with little other industry, makes it particularly vulnerable to 
swings in the commodity price as well as the employment strategies of the mining 
companies on which the town depends. The increasing casualisation of labour coupled 
with strategies of labour dislocation through long-distance commuting haunt the future of 
this emplaced mining community. Such precarity takes a very different form in my 
second fieldsite, the Upper Hunter Valley of New South Wales (research conducted 
Upper Hunter Valley 
Moranbah 
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September 2016-July 2017). This region focused on the mining of thermal coal, that is 
coal used for energy production, with numerous rural industries intermixed with large 
open-cut and underground mines. Although also facing workforce casualisation, the 
existence of alternative industries in the region buffers the effects of commodity price 
cycles and mining employment, but presents new challenges linked to land use conflict. 
Further, because the region mines thermal coal it is more directly affected by potential 
carbon emissions reduction policy and shifts to renewable energy generation. Many of 
those dependent on the coal mining industry recognize the vulnerability of their 
dependence in the context of anthropogenic climate change.  
This introduction, firstly, will discuss the recent political debate around coal in 
Australia in order to argue that coal represents a particular material around which 
national anxieties and affects revolve. These link climatic vulnerabilities to neoliberal 
economic dependencies. Central to the debate that surrounds the Australian coal industry, 
and the experience of those depending on it, is a multi-layered precarity that derives from 
the upsetting of modernist imaginaries and the associated reworking of historic 
socionatural relations. I will then describe my two fieldsites through which I have studied 
the local consequences of these dynamics. Subsequently, I will examine how this relates 
to the theoretical debate on the Anthropocene in anthropology; I propose an alternative 
anthropological project that focuses on how the Anthropocene is lived, made, and 
contested in the everyday through the precariousness of lives lived around coal in 
Australia. The introduction ends with a chapter outline.  
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The Climate Wars: The Political Centrality of Coal in Australia 
At the heart of the current debate over coal and Australia’s contribution to climate change 
are a number of competing concerns over national and regional vulnerabilities and 
responsibilities. Australia is a major contributor to global climate change as the OECD’s 
highest per capita carbon polluter (Butler 2017: 44). Of further significance, Australia is 
the world’s largest exporter of coal. In 2017 Australia exported 200 million tonnes of 
thermal coal worth AU$20.8 billion, and 172 million tonnes of coking coal worth 
AU$35.7 billion (Hosie 2018). This represents 36.6 per cent of all global coal exports 
(Workman 2018). Australia’s coal exports do not count towards its own emissions 
through the accounting mechanisms of international agreements, but its exports 
contribute to global carbon emissions regardless of the location of the carbon’s release. 
Not unlike the double bind faced by coal communities themselves, Australia as a nation 
thus also faces the double bind of having an economy heavily reliant on the continued use 
of coal domestically and internationally and of being very vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change (Eriksen 2016; Eriksen 2018a). 
No individual weather event can be directly attributed to climate change, but 
Australia has seen worrying trends. The Great Barrier Reef has been a particular focal 
point for witnessing these effects (Skadsheim 2017). During the summers of 2016 and 
2017 it experienced extreme bleaching events,1 which – alongside ocean acidification 
from increased CO2 concentrations – threaten its health. Australia is also the world’s 
driest inhabited continent facing regular droughts and bushfires. Even though these are 
not new phenomena the frequency of extremely hot days has increased in recent years, 
 
1 Bleaching occurs when as a result of rising ocean temperatures symbiotic algae release from the 
coral which can lead to the coral’s death through starvation. 
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which makes bushfires more likely and dangerous. Add to this a marked rise in sea levels 
and it is clear that the effects of climate change will be very noticeable in Australia - a 
country where the majority of the population lives along the coast (Butler 2017; Garnaut 
2008; Krien 2017; Pearse 2007). 
Despite the threat of climate change, Australia’s politicians have failed to unite 
behind a plan to reduce carbon emissions. Instead, Australia has faced political turmoil 
through a series of interparty leadership coups which has been popularly termed the 
Climate Wars (Butler 2017). This has seen Australia have seven Prime Ministers in the 
last eleven years. These ‘wars’ are far from over.  Debates over a carbon tax and a mining 
super profits tax, both of which were first introduced by Kevin Rudd’s moderate left 
Australian Labor Party (ALP) government in 2007, 2  saw Rudd replaced by Julia Gillard. 
Her place was then taken by Rudd in 2013, partially because of the backlash for her 
carbon tax. Rudd promised to replace this tax with a weaker emissions trading scheme in 
the ALP’s 2013 campaign. However, Rudd’s ALP government lost the 2013 election to 
the major party of the right, the Liberal party under Tony Abbott—in coalition with the 
National Party—who ended the carbon tax (Chubb 2014). Despite another interparty 
leadership challenge which saw Abbott replaced by the more moderate Malcom Turnbull 
in 2015, the conservative wing of the Liberal-Nationals rose again in relation to another 
energy policy, this time the National Energy Guarantee. The coal advocate, Scott 
Morrison—referenced earlier for bringing a lump of coal into Parliament—became the 
Prime Minister in August 2018. 
 
2 The Australian Labor Party uses American spelling, dropping the ‘u’ in 1912 (McMullin 1991).  
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 Although these leadership changes are about more than climate and energy policy, 
that policy is undeniably the common denominator that unites contemporary Australian 
political contests. More than anything else the Climate Wars involve contested 
understandings of the role of coal in Australia’s future (Crabb 2018). In the words of the 
ALP’s shadow minister for Climate Change and Energy, Mark Butler: 
Coal is the frontline in the Climate Wars. In part, that reflects the obvious point that 
coal is a major driver of carbon pollution and that there are now viable alternatives, in 
power generation at least. But it has also become a totem that mirrors the importance 
that you attach to action on climate change (Butler 2017: 114). 
The concern about coal in parliamentary politics inevitably filters into the everyday lives 
of coal miners and their communities, power bill-paying residents, retirees with savings 
held in mining shares, and the large population worried about the environmental effects 
of climate change. What may appear as simple disagreements over the proper level of 
mining company taxation or the settings of emissions reductions targets for Australia’s 
energy sector is, rather, a complex debate over competing visions of Australia’s past and 
future. Indeed, as this dissertation will show, coal serves as a particular material on which 
Australia’s increasingly contested modernization narrative converges and around which 
moral arguments about Australia’s role in a changing, increasingly global, world take 
shape (Skadsheim 2017).  
The scientific consensus on climate change and the development of viable 
alternatives to coal have been countered by growing concerns about protecting coal jobs 
and the communities which rely on them. This has created strong opposition to climate 
and energy policy as the interests of mining companies converge with the populist 
support of regional mining communities. This support derives from an extensive industry 
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lobbying effort but has traction because it draws on historically founded anxieties about 
mining’s centrality in Australia’s past and future place in the world (Knox 2013: xiii). 
The background to these concerns is discussed in the next section.  
 
The World’s Quarry: A Brief History of Australian Coal  
The first British ship to reach Australian shores, the Endeavour captained by James Cook, 
was a converted colliery ship that in its previous life had transported coal from Yorkshire 
to London (Comerford 1997: 6). Cook’s voyage of ‘discovery’ was followed by Arthur 
Phillip’s First Fleet, which arrived in 1788 to establish a penal colony and colonial 
outpost of Britain (Clark 2006[1963]: 17). The British Industrial Revolution, and 
associated economic and social upheaval, fuelled urbanization and a growing population 
of unemployed in the British cities, some of whom eventually found themselves 
convicted of minor crimes and sentenced to ‘transportation’ to the new colonies as a 
spatial fix to surplus labour, creating a new centre of capitalist accumulation by 
dispossession (Harvey 2003).  
 Australian history is thus intertwined with Britain’s Industrial Revolution. 
However, as many have pointed out, the story of coal that played out in both these 
settings predates the invention of the steam engine (Haraway 2015; Moore 2015, 2017a, 
2017b).  The structures of commodification and appropriation through the ever-
expanding colonial and capitalist frontier had been laid down in the metropole for 
centuries before the British arrived in Australia. Starting from the long 16th century, these 
were to enable the reproduction of a system of exploitation through the relations of global 
coloniality (Moore 2017a, 2017b; Quijano 2007). For example, although there may be 
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some truth to the claim that the textile industry in urbanizing England was energized by 
the invention of the steam engine and use of coal, it also required the cotton plantations 
of the New World and thus the earlier-established structures of Atlantic slavery and 
trade.3 And the establishment of Australia as a penal colony required the legal and 
epistemic foundations of coloniality, including those that legitimated the dispossession 
and genocide of Australia’s indigenous population (Povinelli 2002; Wolfe 1999, 2006).  
It was not long after the arrival of the First Fleet that coal was found in the new 
colony,4 and the colonial authorities ordered that a trade be developed between the 
Australian colonies and the British station at the Cape of Good Hope in which ships 
would exchange their loads of coal from Australia for South African livestock and 
contribute to Britain’s global colonial enterprise (Comerford 1997: 24). The British sent 
drilling equipment to develop coal mining. However, for a long time, coal was readily 
available and was collected from shallow seams visible from cliff edges and broken 
pieces which washed up on river beds and estuaries. The collection of these easy to 
access sources encouraged traders to develop a small trade which filled the market for 
coal in Sydney. In fact, despite the colonial orders to send coal to South Africa, 
Australia’s first international export was a shipment of coal that was purchased by the 
British East India Company and sent to Bengal (Comerford 1997: 32-33). 
 
3 Further as Malm (2013) has shown, the use of steam power to replace water in cotton mills was 
not about the cheaper price of steam energy or a lack of available waterways, but about the 
reserve army of labour in Britain’s cities which enabled labour control. I will discuss this spatio-
temporal organization of labour further in chapter one.  
4 The first recorded find was by a party of escaped convicts led by William and Mary Bryant who 
on 28 March 1791 stole a boat to escape Sydney. A later, although more officially recognized, 
discovery was made by Lieutenant John Shortland who found coal while pursuing another group 
of fugitive convicts in September 1797 (Comerford 1997: 16-19). 
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Coal was first mined in an official form by convict labour in the area around Newcastle, 
New South Wales, a name reflecting the region’s British counterpart. Convicts, Britain’s 
excluded poor, and the urban petty criminals spurred by the Industrial Revolution and 
shipped across the world as simultaneously prisoners, labourers, and colonizers, were 
Australia’s first miners. In due course they began agitating for better working conditions 
and would become central to Australia’s heritage of organized labour (Comerford 1997: 
117). Near the end of British transportation to New South Wales in 1840, coal mining 
became a company-operated process replacing the colonial state’s control.   
In 1851, the broad historical narrative of Australian mining centres itself on the 
goldfields of Victoria. Here, the goldrushes of the mid-19th century played a crucial role 
in the development of contemporary Australia, not only providing a significant 
proportion of the wealth with which cities like Melbourne were built, but also in crafting 
some of the major narratives about the ‘Australian character’ that echo in the more 
contemporary political issues around coal with which this thesis is concerned (Knox 
2013: 77).  
Of first concern is the connection between mining and the foundation of 
Australian democracy. The earliest goldfield unions were mutual self-help organizations 
in which collected dues would be distributed to members in times of hardship; thus, 
unions organized against the state rather than against companies, complicating labour and 
capital relations in Australia (Knox 2013: 164). The Eureka Rebellion is a particularly 
important narrative in Australian history in this regard. The Eureka Rebellion took place 
in the goldrush town of Ballarat in Victoria in December 1854. The gold miners were 
fighting the regulation and enforcement of a mining license system, which they felt was 
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an undue burden as well as a form of taxation without political representation. The 
rebelling miners burned their mining licenses and constructed a small stockade. The 
agitation broke out in violence in the very early morning on the third of December when 
colonial forces attacked. A ten-minute battle ensued before the stockade fell. However, 
the public support for the rebelling miners in the aftermath is said to have directly led to 
the introduction of colonial male suffrage in Victoria’s lower house of Parliament (Knox 
2013: 242-245). 
Secondly, and of particular importance, was that these early experiences in the 
history of the nation laid the conditions of the boom and bust and the gambling instinct of 
prospectors and mining-share speculators. The goldrush fuelled a mining share and 
property bubble, which eventually burst in the 1890s. This led to mass unemployment, an 
economic depression, and set the boom and bust pattern that would characterize the 
Australian mining industry to this day. For both miners and investors, prosperity is often 
only temporary (Knox 2013: 79, 165). 5    
After the depression at the end of the first mining boom—and recognizing the 
vulnerability that a quarry-based economy created—Australia embarked on an 
 
5 Further, the concept of gambling one’s savings on the mining industry is not limited to 
the elite high rollers. Most Australians indirectly own mining company shares through 
their superannuation. As part of the neoliberal economic reforms to be discussed shortly, 
superannuation was set up as a government mandated, but privately managed, form of 
investment for retirement savings. Employers are mandated to contribute a percentage of 
employees’ wages to privately managed superannuation investment funds (Barret and 
Chapman 2001). Through these funds, many ordinary Australians are shareholders of the 
Australian Securities Exchange listed mining companies, of which BHP Billiton 
represents ten per cent of the exchange’s market capitalisation. Rio Tinto, Origin Energy, 
Woodside Petroleum, and SOUTH32 (a 2015 spin-off of BHP) are also included in the 
twenty biggest listed companies (ASX 20 List 2018), making the vast majority of 
Australians indirect investors in the mining and energy industry. 
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industrialization project introducing protectionist tariffs in an attempt to develop 
secondary industry. The state encouraged and made investments in steelworks and 
factories. The intention was to take advantage of Australia’s comparative advantage of 
abundant and cheap energy in the form of its coal reserves to help shift Australia towards 
manufacturing. Thus Australia’s abundant coal resources were meant to facilitate the 
development of an energy-intensive industrial sector, alongside direct exports.  
During these protected industrialization years, the coal mining unions—
particularly influenced by the communist party faction—were active and militant 
(Bramble 2008). 1949 saw a particularly tense mining strike, in which miners fought for a 
35-hour work week, led by the communist factions of the labour movement.  The 
Australian Labor Party was divided and eventually chose not to support the miners and 
worked to break the strike. The Labor government of Ben Chifley passed the National 
Emergency (Coal Strike) Bill and broke the strike by calling in the military to mine, 
imprisoning strike leaders, and freezing union accounts (Knox 2013: 280). The 
communist faction of labour politics declined after this loss, but union membership 
remained high in the coal mining sector throughout the post-war period, and militant 
protests continued throughout the second half of the 20th century, even winning the 35-
hour work week in the coal industry in 1970 (Peetz and Murray 2010).  
However, such strong unionism was rolled back particularly due to the neoliberal 
reforms of the 1970s. The previous collective bargaining system involved a patterned, 
industrial-level system in which entitlements were secured in protected enterprises that 
were more amenable to labour demands. These awards were then leveraged to secure the 
same wages and entitlements in other firms, creating industry-wide entitlements. This 
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ended up leading to inflation when the economy stagnated in the mid-1970s but wages 
continued to increase through the unions’ strong bargaining power. The Hawke and later 
the Keating Labor governments worked with the unions to get inflation under control 
through a number of accords with the main trade unions.  Through these Prices and 
Incomes Accords, the government promised increases in the so-called social wage in 
exchange for cuts to real wages and decreased bargaining power (Bramble 2008). 6   
These labour accords were one part of the larger programme of economic reform in 
the Hawke-Keating years, which also floated the Australian dollar and reduced trade 
restrictions and tariffs. The post war opening of the Australian economy and the roll-back 
of the protectionist tariffs eventually saw the mining industry open up to full foreign 
ownership. As Knox notes: 
Integration into a more globalized economy at the end of the twentieth century saw 
the wheel come full circle, as the manufacturing dream failed through lack of 
international competitiveness and Australia again became a quarry of metal ores 
being dug up with foreign money, owned by foreign shareholders and sold to foreign 
users with no value-added (2013: 361). 
The particular role of coal’s integration in the transition from colonial extraction, through 
convict labour to protected industry with strong labour protections, and then to neoliberal 
de-industrialization and labour protection roll-backs illustrates that coal is entangled in a 
number of larger questions about Australia’s past and future. As Ferry and Limbert 
describe in an analysis relevant to the Australian case, “‘[n]atural resources,’ are 
 
6 Another major setback to union power came with the introduction of the WorkChoices 
legislation under the Liberal John Howard in 2005, which limited the ability to go on strike and 
emphasized individual agreements over enterprise agreements. Labor abolished this when coming 
to power under Rudd in 2007, replacing it with the Fair Work Act 2009, which returned 
enterprise bargaining but continued to outlaw the pattern industrial level bargaining of the past 
(Bramble 2008).   
. 
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intimately tied to the history of the nation-state as a modern political form” and “[n]ations 
often base claims to modernity on their abilities to manage their resources appropriately” 
(Ferry and Limbert 2008: 11).  Thus, historical narratives that emphasize mining’s role in 
the making and growth of Australia as a self-sufficient nation-state are contrasted to more 
contemporary uncertainties and dependencies. The return to primary commodity exports 
and the roll back of industrial protections in the era of neoliberal economic reforms 
reflect a retrogression. National projects of industrialization and their associated promises 
gave way to neoliberal imperatives of comparative advantage. This has affective 
consequences for those who have previously benefited from such industrialization and 
whose visions of progressive futures rely on such political economic conditions.  
These historic trends of resource dependency and their affective consequences are 
reminiscent of the dissolution of modernist dreams that have been more closely analysed 
by anthropologists in respect to the so-called Global South, which has long suffered the 
contradictions of development dreams and structurally adjusted neoliberal realities 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Ferguson 1999; Piot 2010). As these studies show, the 
foundational narratives of modernity have been called into question as they no longer 
seem to offer the promise of development and progressive futures as they once did. 
Critically, the particular conditions of increasing concern over anthropogenic climate 
change and environmental crisis add a complexity to the dissolution of modernist 
imaginaries and the resultant precarity.   
The hope and fear that centre on coal mining in Australia reflect what Weszkalnys 
has described as resource affects (2016). These are not merely after-effects of the 
commodification process of natural resources but are intrinsic to their making. Mining 
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has been and continues to be a fundamental part of Australia’s modern economy, yet this 
wealth is viewed with suspicion. Australia’s natural resources are part of what made it a 
‘lucky country’ as Horne declared in 1964 (2009[1964]). However, if Australia’s success 
depends on luck, there is always the threat that this luck will run out. Or as historian 
Malcom Knox puts it: 
Australians’ most primal fear is that we are on the end of the earth, leading a tenuous, 
chancy existence, at the mercy of forces beyond our control. If we are again to be the 
world’s quarry, what will be here after the rocks are gone, or after the world stops 
wanting them (2013: 78)?  
Australia exists as a nation that does not fit neatly into political economic typographies. It 
is a geographically southern member of the Global North, yet increasingly dependent on 
the growing economies of the emerging Global South as its trade partners. It possesses a 
complex racial history as a British settler colony with a long period of a White Australia 
immigration policy, which has now given in to a late liberal multiculturalism and linked 
economic reliance on Asia as a consumer of its commodities and financer of its 
development (Povinelli 2002: 21). The opening of the Australian economy in the 1970s 
through to the 1990s replaced the former socio-cultural attachment to Europe with an 
economic and geographic proximity to Asia, but with this came anxieties over the failed 
industrialization and protectionist policies of the first half of the 20th century (Knox 
2013).  This replaced industrialization dreams with a reliance on primary commodity 
exports and fuelled anxieties over a so-called resource curse (Cleary 2011, 2012; Pearse 
2009) which were further emphasized through the recent commodities boom and bust to 
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be described shortly. 7 Relatedly, Australia’s identity as a kind of dislocated European 
outpost is threatened by the contemporary world order as foreign immigration and foreign 
investment increase. This creates dependence on Asia’s growth and international 
decisions on carbon emissions reductions. Simultaneously technological changes and 
increased automation are decreasing mining’s labour needs particularly in male-
dominated positions. This conglomeration of factors means that coal mining, masculine 
labour, xenophobia, and climate change are entangled in a knot of anxieties which derive 
from the particular historical trajectory of Australian mining but also relate to global late-
capitalist trends (cf. Scott 2010). These entangled factors create an affective assemblage 
of precariousness experienced by those whose lives and livelihoods are implicated in 
these political economic conditions. 
 This similar set of dynamics has been associated with the rise of far-right 
populism in many locations across the globe, particularly the Brexit referendum and 
Donald Trump’s election. Briefly, the narrative around these political developments 
implies that as the working class reacts to a perceived loss of power, prestige, and an 
economic future, they have exchanged their previous labour support for far-right parties, 
retreating from globalism to new imagined nationalisms. While there are many 
 
7 The resource curse refers to an economic theory that emerged in the late 1980s to 
explain the contradiction of resource rich countries that suffered from poverty and low 
economic growth rates. The theory is thus used to link a whole host of conditions, as 
natural resource wealth is linked not only with financial conditions, but also corruption, 
conflict, environmental degradation, police suppression, dictatorship, and instability. 
Weszkalnys shows how hope becomes a negative externality through fears of the 
resource curse (Weszkalnys 2011). Although the worst violences of the resource curse 
have avoided Australia, the revolving door between lobbyists and regulators, and police 
crackdowns against anti-mine protestors, have social commentators concerned about the 
anti-democratic tendencies of resource dependence (Cleary 2011, 2012; Pearse 2007, 
2009). 
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connections to this broader trend which links conservative political consequences to the 
economic and social transformation of de-industrializing regions, it is critical to 
understand these movements in their particular context (Kalb 2009). This thesis will take 
the discussion beyond the simple and biased narrative of a revengeful white working 
class (Gusterson 2017; Mazzarella 2019; Smith 2017) and recognize the real anxieties of 
experienced change. I will show how this growing nationalism seems to take a particular 
relationship to the moral accusations around coal jobs and environmental responsibilities 
in Australia, deriving from the dependencies and paradoxes that arise through coal 
miners’ complex relationship to mining in contemporary conditions.  
 
Fieldsites and Methodology 
In order to study these dynamics, I conducted twenty months of fieldwork, split evenly 
between two coal mining towns in different regions of Australia. Australia produces three 
types of coal: metallurgical or coking black bituminous coal; thermal black bituminous 
coal; and lignite or brown coal. These three types of coal have different uses and are 
associated primarily with different regions. Lignite is primarily mined in the LaTrobe 
Valley of Victoria, which I do not discuss significantly in the thesis, but will briefly 
comment upon in the conclusion. Coking coal is used in the production of steel and the 
highest quantities of this coal in Australia are found in the Bowen Basin of Central 
Queensland, including around the town of Moranbah in Central Queensland, where I 
spent ten months from September 2015 to July 2016.  High quality black thermal coal is 
burned to produce electricity, and is primarily mined in the Hunter Coalfield, which 
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includes the town of Singleton, New South Wales, where I spent another ten months from 
September 2016 to July 2017.  
Both the coking coal from Queensland and the thermal black coal from New 
South Wales are primarily exported to Asia, although a small proportion is used 
domestically. Therefore, these regions are significantly affected by the cyclical 
commodities market. Mining only expanded into these regions from the early 1970s, and 
the coal mining industry experienced minor booms and busts throughout the 1980s and 
1990s related to the cyclical nature of global commodity markets (Cleary 2011; Pearse 
2009). However, this pattern was exacerbated with a more extreme boom that came in the 
early 2000s largely as a result of China’s accelerated economic development. The 
research for this thesis was conducted in the busted aftermath of this drastic mining 
boom.  
Beginning in the early 2000s, the rising economy of China led to an increase in 
demand for Australia’s commodities. The steel required to build China’s growing cities 
and infrastructure required not only the iron ore which Australia had in abundance but 
also the coking coal required to turn this iron ore into steel, of which Australia controlled 
60 per cent of global trade in 2014 (Cleary 2015). Even Australia’s thermal coal saw a 
massive increase as an energy-hungry world continued to burn it. The 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) only momentarily slowed down the booming minerals trade. It is 
widely held, and often repeated by my informants, that the mining boom allowed 
Australia to weather the GFC relatively unscathed (Krien 2017; Pearse 2009). 
Throughout this period, the towns under which these minerals lie, including my 
two fieldsites, saw a massive increase in activity. The high prices encouraged investment 
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in new mines and the expansion of existing ones and saw a rush to get as much coal out 
of the ground as quickly as possible in order to take advantage of these high prices. 
People flocked to these towns, making their fortunes in a modern-day gold rush. As they 
joined the communities around mining, demand for housing increased, prompting real 
estate bubbles and forcing some long-term residents out (Cleary 2011, 2012, 2015; 
Munro 2012; Pearse 2009). I will discuss these dynamics further, focusing on 
Moranbah’s real estate market, in chapter three.  
New populations brought with them the positive and negative aspects of growth. 
There was an increase in secondary economic activity but also larger numbers of single 
male workers, which it was commonly explained to me, was accompanied by heightened 
levels of violence, gambling, and alcohol abuse. There were greater demands on health 
and social services that were not easily met. This series of outcomes has popularly been 
described as Gillette Syndrome, after the town of Gillette, Wyoming. As Jessica Smith 
has argued following long-term fieldwork there, such pathologizing stereotypes 
underestimate the stability of lives in so-called boomtowns (Smith-Rolston 2013a).  I did 
not conduct research in the boom times, therefore I am not well positioned to diagnose 
the mining towns as suffering from Gillette Syndrome or not. However, I do agree with 
her that such pathologizing is likely to exaggerate the negative effects of demographic 
change.  Undeniably, however, mining towns did experience demographic changes 
during the boom with a growth in population and related pressures on housing stock and 
social services.  
The overproduction eventually led to a drop in prices. China’s growth has slowed, 
and the construction phase of the boom has given way to a slower operating phase 
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(Cleary 2015).  As a result, the once-thriving mining industry is cutting costs in a 
decreased price environment.  The price of thermal coal dropped from a 2012 peak of 
around AU$200 a tonne to around AU$70 a tonne at the time of my fieldwork in 2015. 
Coking coal prices have dropped even more drastically, from a high of AU$480 a tonne 
in 2011 to AU$100 a tonne at the time of my fieldwork in 2015 (Cleary 2015). The end 
of the mining boom has seen substantial lay-offs and workforce casualisation with flow 
on effects that have seen housing prices in coal communities fall drastically, local stores 
closing down, families moving away, and sports and community clubs struggling to keep 
members and funding. It was these conditions that mining towns like Moranbah and 
Singleton were facing when I arrived for fieldwork. The unprecedented boom had been 
followed by a prolonged bust and led them to face a new set of social pressures, which I 
will discuss shortly.  
-Moranbah, Queensland: Labour Precarity in Coking Coal Mining Town 
I moved to Moranbah (see figure 0.3 overleaf) in September 2015 with an interest in the 
social impacts of its dependence on the coal mining industry and guided by questions 
about how people managed and imagined their futures in the context of such boom and 
bust dynamics. Because Moranbah was founded in 1971 with the express purpose of 
housing the employees of the nearby mines and because there is very little secondary 
industry in the region, most people living in Moranbah are either employed in the mines 
or involved in service provision to the miners or their families. 
Soon after arriving, I came to learn that it was not directly the drop in the coal 
price that most affected the town, but the labour changes that are linked to such  
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This map, Figure 0.3 Map of Moranbah and surrounding mines (Aurizon 2018a) has 





conditions. That is, the biggest threat was not the closing down of mines or decreased 
coal production, but the employment practices of the mines that mining companies 
attempted to justify through the reduced price of coal. The primary concern in Moranbah 
was that, in the depressed economic conditions, the community was facing the increased 
casualisation of the workforce. Although this is part of a broader trend towards 
individualized contracts replacing unionized collective bargaining and trade unions in the 
mining industry, it took a particularly frustrating form locally through the increase in fly-
in-fly-out (FIFO) and drive-in-drive-out (DIDO) workforces.  I will discuss these long-
distance commuting practices more in chapters one and two of the thesis and describe the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between casualisation and long-distance commuting. 
However, for now it is necessary to note that these practices are widely felt to threaten 
the emplaced community, and thus they put the future of the town in question.  
I refer to the community as ‘emplaced’ to illustrate the physical town and the 
social life that exists within this relatively fixed boundary, in contrast to the long-distance 
commuters who inhabit differently place-based socialities. Emplaced community is my 
own phrasing. My informants would simply say ‘community’ when referring to the local 
social life. However, their use of community served as a symbolic marker to describe a 
broader set of values that included participation in social activities and a commitment to, 
at least temporarily, make Moranbah into one’s home (Cohen 1985:12).  As I will show 
throughout the thesis, this ideal ‘community’ drew on a range of shifting meanings 
including frontier developmentalism (chapter one), union collectivism (chapter one), 
physical labour (chapter three), nuclear family (chapter two), and employment provided 
housing (chapter three). This concept of community also served as a particular contrast to 
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long-distance commuters, particularly FIFO workers, who it was assumed did not 
contribute or belong to the community. My use of the phrase emplaced community then, 
is a short hand to refer the people who variably claim to share in such normative 
connections to this symbolic community that is attached to Moranbah as a physical town 
and social entity.  
Many living in Moranbah experience an increase in both the precarity of labour as 
well as the insecurity and vulnerability that such precarity generated for the emplaced 
community, particularly as fewer families chose to move to the mining town, preferring 
long-distance commuting (Allison 2012, 2016; Han 2018; Millar 2014, 2017; Parry 2018; 
Standing 2016; Stewart 2012). Because the emplaced community’s life was centred on 
the mining industry, with very few residents having no explicit link to it, I was able to 
study the social impacts of the industry without needing any specific affiliation to the 
mining industry itself. My fieldwork here was partially bounded by the geographic limits 
of the town with occasional outings to other regional towns, following research 
participants as they travelled.  I participated in numerous community activities in order to 
meet people with different life experiences and perspectives. These activities included 
those related to the local radio station, the labour unions, arts and music community 
groups, a local church, and an Australian Rules Football team. My main research method 
was participant observation in these spaces, accompanied by the development of more 
intimate friendships which revealed the experience of anxiety and insecurity that many 
faced regarding their life in the community. Occasionally such participant observation 
was supplemented with more formal interviews.  
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Because I was not directly involved with the mining industry, my relationship with the 
mines was through a social life built with those employed in them. One important 
limitation of my positionality within the community is that I was not able to observe the 
inner workings of the mine, and particularly engage more profoundly with those who 
were employed as fly-in-fly-out workers.  Although I did have some interaction with 
long-distance commuters, these were somewhat exceptional people who actively engaged 
in the community groups despite their mobility. As Jessica Smith has pointed out, this is 
a common problem with anthropology of contemporary mining, as spaces like gated mine 
camps where many FIFO workers live are often closed to researchers (Smith-Rolston 
2013b: 583). Therefore, my reflections on FIFO are not a study of FIFO itself, but on the 
perceived impact of FIFO on the town. My inability to access the mines on a regular 
basis means that my insights from this fieldsite derived from the perspective of those 
living in the community, and particularly those who are active participants in community 
groups and events. This enabled me to recognize the social and communal impacts of 
precarious labour conditions and, in particular, the tensions and insecurity that seemed to 
haunt the future of this mining town.   
Throughout my ten months in Moranbah, I also learned more about the national 
context of the debate over coal in Australia. I came to understand the central role played 
by coal, as a broader industry, in relation to the political debate in Australia and how this 
national discourse shaped the sense of precarity that I began to witness in relation to 
changing labour relations in Moranbah.  
I decided that broadening my focus would improve my research as the phenomena 
that I was studying were not limited to a singular location. As I described earlier, the 
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main issues around which the politics of coal revolved in national discourse were those of 
labour and the environment, particularly climate change. Although Moranbah was an 
interesting place to look at questions of labour, it was not as well-placed a location from 
which to ethnographically observe the broader environmental concerns directly linked to 
climate change and land-use conflicts. This is because the mines in Moranbah primarily 
produce coking coal. Coking coal is used in the production of steel and is not yet 
replaceable by renewable sources at scale. It, therefore, has a different relationship to the 
debate about climate change to, for example, thermal coal used for electricity production. 
Similarly, because there is little other industry or valuable farmland around Moranbah, 
there are far fewer land-use conflicts than in other regions. I came to realize that, even if 
not directly observable in Moranbah, these environmental concerns significantly shaped 
the broader discourse through which people in Moranbah related to the coal industry, 
particularly as they shifted the security and affective attachments to the broader industry 
and raised moral and ethical dilemmas to their own particular form of pioneering 
environmentalism. 
Of critical importance was the debate over the opening of the nearby Galilee 
Basin to thermal coal mining, and the approval of the Adani Carmichael Mine (to be 
discussed further in chapter 4).  The debate over whether or not this coal mining 
expansion should go ahead revealed to me the existence of a strong occupational kinship, 
which connected coking coal mining communities like Moranbah to the broader national 
debate about the future of a generic ‘coal’. This was partly about future job opportunities 
in an extractive industry characterized by ever-expanding fossil fuel frontiers, but also 
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about belonging to a broader industry, one which is often attacked in moral terms by 
environmentalists without distinction to coal typologies. 
-The Upper Hunter Valley: Land-Use Conflicts and Climate Concerns 
Therefore, I decided that my thesis would benefit from incorporating another fieldsite. I 
chose to move to a thermal coal mining community that faced numerous land-use 
conflicts in order to engage in these other crucial and interrelated issues. Despite the 
important debate over the opening of the Galilee Basin to mining, there was as yet no 
mining or developments to observe ethnographically. Therefore, I moved to Singleton in 
the Upper Hunter Valley of New South Wales in September 2016 where I spent another 
ten months and from which the ethnography for the second section of the thesis—
chapters four, five and six—is primarily drawn.  
The Upper Hunter Valley, northeast of Sydney, (see figure 0.4 overleaf) is a major 
producer of thermal coal. Coal has been mined from the Hunter Valley since the early 
years of the colony. The valley is generally divided into a Lower and Upper Hunter 
Valley. The Lower Hunter encompasses the area with this earlier coal mining heritage; 
primarily underground mines. Beginning in the late 1970s coal mining moved into the 
Upper Hunter Valley, near the towns of Singleton and Muswellbrook. These mines were 
large open-cut mines, similar to those found in Moranbah.  However, the Upper Hunter’s 
proximity to Sydney, longer settler history, and more fecund soils mean that it is also 
home to a number of regional industries, including wineries, thoroughbred horse-
breeding, and dairy farms. Because of the alternative land uses and a more diversified 
economy, the region is less dramatically affected by swings in the coal price than 
Moranbah. This diversification makes the Upper Hunter Region slightly less vulnerable 
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to cyclical commodity prices, but also means that there are alternative large-scale 
industries that lead to competition over land and a larger population that is concerned 
about the local environmental impact of mining on the landscape as well as coal’s 
contribution to global climate change. The depressed price of coal when I was in the 
Upper Hunter Valley also meant that more people were questioning the value of the 
region’s dependence on mining, particularly in the context of the politics of climate 
change. There was increasing concern that the thermal coal industry was not a reliable 
industry on which to peg the region’s future, and calls to further diversify the economy 
were often heard and debated.  Again, the post-boom conditions of my arrival meant that 
the coal industry was questioned much more openly in the Upper Hunter Valley and 
embedded in moralized understandings about the region’s past and future.   
Because of the greater diversity of livelihoods in the region, I had to position 
myself more directly in the coal industry in order to maintain the research focus on the 
commodity.  I managed to negotiate access to a community outreach arm of a pro-coal 
industry lobbying organization which operated in the area. Although the organization 
with which I worked is not usually open to researchers, a common problem with studying 
up (Nader 1972), I managed to secure access through this local community outreach arm, 
which had a small office and was run primarily by a single individual. Since the local 
office had only recently opened and was often quiet, he seemed to  
welcome my company. Over time my presence meant I was introduced to a number of 
formal lobbyists, protagonists in mine management, local and state officials, and  
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This map, Figure 0.4 Map of Hunter Valley Mines (Aurizon 2018b) has been removed as 
the copyright is owned by another organisation. 
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members of the community actively involved in mining issues. This saw me invited to 
participate and observe most meetings and events of the group.8  
In order to protect the anonymity of my informants, I refer to the community 
outreach arm as the Coal Community Conference (CCC), and the larger organization of 
which it was a part, as the Coal Lobby Organization (CLO). I did direct participant 
observation within this Coal Community Conference (CCC) which had an office in 
Singleton, NSW. However, I primarily used my affiliation with them to secure access and 
invitations to the various public meetings and events at which the coal industry interacted 
with the community in the broader region. My research, here, focused on community 
relations with the coal industry rather than the activities of the Coal Lobby Organization 
per se. Therefore, although in some sense I did ‘study up’ (Nader 1972) while located 
within a branch of the Coal Lobby Organization, the actions of the group itself are not the 
singular object of the research in this site. It is more accurate to say I studied across the 
relations of this group with other actors in the region, linked by the explicit connection to 
coal mining. I also developed relationships with the employees of the Coal Lobby 
Organization with whom I spent much of my time. Their moral and ethical positions 
further reveal the complex precariousness of lives and intergenerational relationality 
around coal mining in contemporary Australia, the subject of chapter four. These 
personal relationships, both with the coal miners in Moranbah and the coal lobbyists in 
the Upper Hunter Valley enabled me to see a different set of dynamics, which 
 
8 I was invited to observe all meetings that were held in the Coal Community Conference room 
during my fieldwork, with two exceptions: one was a meeting between the local council 
government and the mining companies in which they negotiated payments to the local council to 
compensate for the use of council roads and facilities.  Secondly, I was not invited to observe the 
meeting held regarding an accidental death that had occurred on a mine during my fieldwork.  
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complement existing studies of Australian extractive industry which tend to focus on 
mine and community conflicts (Askland 2018; Connor 2016a; Connor et al. 2009; De 
Rijke 2012, 2013; Sherval et al. 2018; Trigger et al. 2014). Sometimes, association with 
one group of people—be they community or company employees—can hinder access to 
another. The mining industry is notoriously tight-lipped and weary of ‘infiltration’ by 
environmentalists. If I had been involved with any Australian environmental groups, I 
would unlikely have been granted access within this pro-coal organization.9 
 Thus, my fortuitous access enabled me to focus on those who are quite directly 
involved in mining, as miners themselves, family members of miners, or management 
and lobbyists. This of course means that my ethnographic empathy rests with those who 
could be seen as more deeply implicated in the damaging effects of anthropogenic 
climate change. In the course of my fieldwork, my rapport, particularly with pro-coal 
lobbyists, often merged with complicity. Drawing on Geertz’s famous reflections which 
begin his “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight” (1972), in which his 
serendipitous complicity with the illegal cockfight establishes his rapport in the 
community, George Marcus calls complicity rapport’s “evil twin” (1997: 87) or more 
ethically troubling “shadow” (104). In the context of my fieldwork, my rapport with my 
informants, particularly pro-coal lobbyists, often led to surprising insights that were 
enabled through my complicity with their various projects. This partially mirrored the 
process of building rapport through which shared experiences and intimate encounters 
during fieldwork brought our understandings closer together and enabled our 
 
9 When I came in for my first meeting with the pro-coal lobbyist who would eventually grant me 
access to the Coal Community Conference, he had everything he could find on the internet about 
me printed out and sitting on the table.  
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communication across difference. However, more profoundly, my insights came from 
recognizing that we already had many overlaps in understandings and that my informants 
were not such extreme others. These insights mirror what Marcus finds, that complicity 
takes a different form and meaning in contemporary multi-sited fieldwork. In this 
context, complicity has its own particular methodological benefits, particularly when 
applied to studies of what he terms “vile informants” (1997: 104). The revelations come 
as “unexpected affinity/complicity—more cognitive than ethical” develops between 
researcher and informants (104). My “unexpected affinities” with pro-coal lobbyists or 
even coal miners do not discount my concern about anthropogenic climate change. Quite 
the contrary, the empathy I developed with my informants informed the political project 
of this thesis, that is to break the false political binaries of ‘jobs versus the environment’ 
which frame the moral and ethical debates on Australian coal.  I hope to show in this 
thesis how closer attention to shared concerns and mutual understandings can lead to a 
more successful political position which reveals the inconsistencies, gaps, and thus 
opportunities for resistance to Anthropocenic commodification.  
 These two fieldsites are not intended to yield a direct comparison. Rather I hope 
to build a framework for understanding the complexity of issues at play for the Australian 
coal industry and its associated communities as a contribution to a much larger project of 
a grounded anthropology of the Anthropocene, which I will outline further below. My 
methodology was guided by an attempt to understand a resource assemblage in a way that 
takes seriously the materiality of coal, as seen in the different issues deriving from each 
type of coal and its associated geography, but which does not see this materiality as over-
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determining but reflects the agentive lives and desires of those entwined in it (cf. 
Richardson and Weszkalnys 2014).  
In thinking through the linkages between these two fieldsites, I came to recognize 
that my informants were connected by an affective and discursive sense of precarity. In 
the case of Moranbah, this precarity was most directly articulated in terms of  the 
employment practices of the mining industry and the particular effects of such workforce 
casualisation and labour dislocation on the emplaced community. However, as I will 
show, this also threatened a particular form of environmentalism that derived from 
pioneering self-conceptions.  In the case of the Upper Hunter Valley, precarity—also 
linked to such workforce conditions—engaged more profoundly with issues of landscape 
destruction and environmental awareness including climate change as the future of the 
thermal coal industry is questioned. A sense of insecurity about the future of those who 
had built their lives in and around the coal industry was palpable in both sites, which 
helped me to recognize a shared condition of the Anthropocene as it is experienced in 
Australian coal mining towns.  
This is a rather different perspective to much of the previous anthropological 
work on the Anthropocene, particularly climate change, which has focused on those 
communities most vulnerable and often least responsible for environmental damage (Baer 
and Singer 2018; Crate 2008; Crate and Nuttall 2009). It may seem odd to argue that 
Australian coal miners—who are relatively high paid, living in a nation with a reasonable 
social security system, exceptional public health care, and the economic potential to 
avoid the worst and most immediate threats of environmental disaster—should be 
deemed precarious in the context of the global environmental crisis. However, the 
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condition of precarity, particularly as an experienced and existential condition of 
uncertainty (Butler 2009), seems to underlie the experience of living in the Anthropocene 
even if vulnerabilities are differentially distributed. Further, the political realities of 
differential responsibility and vulnerability for environmental damage means that critical 
scholarly attention to sites like Australia is crucial. Understanding the inner workings of 
the Anthropocene may also inspire a pragmatic politics of resistance.    
This thesis is thus inspired by the potential for the Anthropocene as an analytical 
concept which connects empirically intertwined phenomena but which places the 
environmental crisis as central in the working and un-working of the world today. 
However, guided by my experiences in the field, my perspective is that the conditions 
that created the crisis we now term the Anthropocene are not inevitable, nor are they 
uncontested outcomes of ontology. Rather, they are made and reinforced despite 
contestation through the complex assemblage that momentarily stabilises relations of 
power, regimes of value, and material infrastructures, and that these conditions are 
primarily experienced as layers of precarity. Following several of the elements of this 
assemblage and layers of precarity in different locations guides the organization of this 
thesis. I will now describe my theoretical perspective on precarity and show how this 
offers an opening for a theory of the experienced Anthropocene as one of precarity of 
labour and livelihoods that are inherently intertwined in the threatened planetary future.  
 
Layers of Precarity in the Anthropocene 
This thesis is inspired by works which call for increased attention to the role of affect in 
the workings of contemporary capitalism (Bear et al. 2015; Berlant 2011; Narotzky and 
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Besnier 2014; Narotzky 2018; Weszkalnys 2016). Precarity, in particular, has arisen as an 
analytic that connects the socio-economic changes of late capitalism, especially post-
Fordist patterns of employment, to the affective dimensions of life in this context (Allison 
2012; Han 2018; Hinkson 2017; Millar 2014; Parry 2018; Puar 2012; Stewart 2012).   
Precarity is linked to the increased casualisation of labour and the replacement of 
long-term employment with short-term contracts, alongside the loss of social provisions 
from the state through neoliberal and austerity measures. These changes most directly 
relate to post-Fordist societies because, as many have pointed out, precarity is not a new 
condition for much of the world’s population, particularly in the Global South (Han 2018; 
Harvey and Krohn-Hansen 2018; Millar 2014; Parry 2018).  Standing (2016) has 
identified ‘the precariat’ as an emerging class which shares some characteristics of 
Marx’s lumpenproletariat under new conditions (see also Han 2018). However, rather 
than following Standing’s argument that precarity has led to the emergence of a new 
class, this thesis uses precarity as a broader sociological category (Parry 2018) and 
analytic that links the political economic shifts of late-capitalism to the affective state of 
how these changes are “physically sensed, ordinarily experienced, and socially 
embodied” (Allison 2012: 350).  
The primary affective consequence of precarious labour is the loss of futurity, in 
which the present “no longer segues into the future that one was once encouraged to 
imagine” (Bruce O’Neil in Shaw et al. 2016: np). Precarity derives from the loss of 
progress narratives, as the future becomes increasingly difficult to imagine without such 
guiding stories. Precarity is thus a presentist perspective which highlights the experience 
of these socio-economic changes, drawing from the nostalgia for—or “ghostly presence” 
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of—stable Fordist employment (Muehlebach 2011) and the evacuation of near futures 
(Guyer 2007). The concept intends to connect the precariousness of labour to the 
generalized precariousness of life where security arises not just through employment but 
also the flow-on questions about “what makes a life worth living” (Narotzky and Besnier 
2014: S14). These questions are reflected in the experience of alienation and 
commodification of labour, nature, and money (Burawoy 2010; Polanyi 2001 [1944]). As 
I noted earlier, Australia has followed the trajectory of global neoliberalism in which 
social protections and particularly labour union collective bargaining has been rolled 
back in concert with the opening of the economy to global finance and the increase in 
coal exports over energy-intensive industrialisation. The growing precariousness of 
miners derives from the mining industry no longer offering secure or stable futures, both 
through the casualisation of labour and through the threat that the increasing global 
concern with climate change, and coal’s contributing role, mean for the future of the 
industry. Precarity as an analytic connects the socio-economic and environmental 
conditions of late capitalism with the affective experience of insecurity that derives from 
these conditions. This is a critical insight, but it is only one outcome of the dissolution of 
modernist imaginaries.  
The Anthropocene reflects another critical awareness of the contradictions of 
modernist fantasy through the lens of society/nature entanglements. It may be seen as an 
aspect of the existential precariousness that Butler describes as a universal experience 
deriving from the awareness of unavoidable interdependencies of the human condition 
(2009). However, Anthropocenic precarity also has socio-economic dimensions that 
result in vulnerability being unequally distributed. This is evident in industries such as 
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coal mining. Here, the livelihoods of miners are not only affected by changing forms of 
precarious labour which threaten the security of their livelihoods, but the very product of 
their labour also threatens the possibility of life itself on a planetary scale (Weston 2012). 
This paradox is further complicated through the double bind in which defending the 
mining industry against moralized attack, including that derived from climate change 
activism, disables miners’ ability to effectively fight against their increased labour 
precarity. Political actions to address the planetary crisis would only further threaten their 
livelihoods. These paradoxes highlight that it is crucial to approach to the Anthropocene 
in a way that takes seriously the everyday contradictions and tensions of life within it.  
 
Towards an Experienced Anthropology of the Anthropocene 
The Anthropocene term was proposed by climate scientists Paul Crutzen and Eugene 
Stoermer (2000) as a designation for a new epoch that is based on the observation that 
human activity has impacted the earth at such a scale as to be geologically significant.  
Anthropogenic climate change through burning fossil fuels is a major contributor, but it is 
only part of this impact which includes nuclear contamination, loss of biodiversity, 
increased erosion from deforestation, other pollutants and landscape destruction (Crutzen 
and Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002). However, the Anthropocene as a concept has been 
taken up beyond the earth sciences where it was first formulated and has expanded into 
the humanities and social sciences where it has led to a reenergizing of thinking beyond 
the society/nature division. Latour has termed the prominence of the Anthropocene in 
popular discourse a gift for anthropology through its shared Greek root and reflection of 
longstanding anthropological concerns about the mutuality of human and environmental 
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relations (2017). The Anthropocene concept is intended to reveal both humanity’s 
immense power to impact the earth as well as our dependence and vulnerability to the 
earth’s vagaries.   
It lays bare our inseparable entanglement with what we have falsely defined as a 
distinct realm of nature (Latour 2013). Through its refiguring of modernity’s foundational 
Descartian separation of nature and society, the Anthropocene speaks to the feebleness of 
longstanding theories of modernization (Barry and Maslin 2016; Bauer and Ellis 2018). It 
disrupts modernity’s stories of endless growth and history of progress, civilization, 
development, and capitalism, for the environment can no longer be seen as a mere 
boundless resource or neutral ground on which human action unfolds (Latour 1993). This 
affects both our understandings of nature’s agency (Latour 2014), and our understanding 
of human history (Chakrabarty 2009).   
As a result of the perceived contemporary crisis of modernity, a number of post-
humanist or new materialist perspectives have arisen which attempt to offer alternatives 
to the nature-society dualism that is said to fundamentally characterise the modernist 
ontology. Donna Haraway proposes the term Chthulucene as a way forward in a 
speculative project of what she terms tentacular thinking through multi-species 
assemblage (Haraway 2016). Povinelli discusses the problematics of what she terms 
geoontologies (Povinelli 2016) which revolve around the binaries of life and non-life. 
She proposes that alternative ways of thinking through the crisis must refuse such 
distinctions. Partially drawing on indigenous ontologies as their inspiration, these 
perspectives on the Anthropocene have linked Anthropocene anthropology to the 
ontological turn in the discipline particularly those which emphasize society/nature 
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relationalities (Blaser 2009, 2010; de la Cadena 2010; Descola 1996; Escobar 2018; 
Kohn 2013, 2015).  I recognize that bringing attention to different ontologies is a crucial 
political project, particularly in relation to the forms of society/nature entanglements and 
mutualities that exist within indigenous communities despite modernity’s violent 
erasures, because they may present inspiration for much needed alternatives to the 
Anthropocene’s foundational false binaries. Therefore, I disagree with Hornborg that 
such scholars are “dithering while the planet burns” (2017b; see also Bessire and Bond 
2014). However, I understand his frustration with the way such perspectives overshadow 
the political contingencies and alternatives that exist within ontologically ‘modern’ 
populations—those that maintain a Descartian separation between mind/body and 
society/nature.  
The modernist ontology does offer affordances for the Anthropocene, setting the 
ontological divisions of society/nature or life/nonlife (Povinelli 2016) on which 
commodification and extraction rests.  However the conditions of the Anthropocene also 
relied on specific configurations of power and fundamentally asymmetrical agencies 
within entangled relations. Thus I agree with those who emphasise that, despite the 
political motivation of the posthumanist approach, it remains problematic for not 
disentangling differentiated responsibilities within an empirically entangled, historically 
crafted, and asymmetrical assemblage of society and nature relations (Bauer and Ellis 
2018; Fortun 2014; Hornborg 2017a, 2017b; Malm and Hornborg 2014). An ontological 
perspective cannot sufficiently attend to the contingent political formations which 
reproduce the forms of Anthropocenic precariousness in which people live in the present, 
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and thus take seriously issues like labour into its framework (Bessire and Bond 2014; 
Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016). 
 Drawing on my fieldwork experience, I worry that the claim that hope lies 
exclusively in elevating alternative ontologies implies a direct causation between 
modernist ontologies and environmental destruction, which is not so empirically or 
philosophically simple. Such perspectives seem to imply a monolithic and totalizing 
vision of the Anthropocene which ignores the numerous inconsistencies, gaps and 
tensions that exist and thus may offer opportunities for alternatives even within modernist 
ontologies. As Hinkson argues, “in effectively evacuating structure, history, power, and 
subjectivity, network and ontology immerse us in the instabilities of the status quo rather 
than helping us understand how we—collectively and distinctively—have come, and are 
coming, to be, here” (Hinkson 2017: 59).  
Thus, my project differs quite markedly from such ontological perspectives. The 
motivation behind such projects is to offer ways of thinking out of the Anthropocene, 
which requires new concepts and ontological inspiration. By contrast, my objective in 
this thesis is to interrogate the lived experience of the Anthropocene for those already 
deeply entangled in its conditions, and to pay attention to already existing political 
contests within it. 
 I take particular inspiration in this regard from the work of feminist analyses of 
capitalism (Bear et al. 2015; Empson 2018; Gibson-Graham 2006 [1996]).  They 
emphasize that, despite capitalism’s intrusion into life, non-capitalist forms of value and 
relations have continued to exist and in fact are crucial to capitalist value creation. I am 
particularly indebted to Gibson-Graham’s (2006 [1996]) thinking on capitalocentrism, 
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which they argue is the discursive and political process which continually defines all 
forms of economic and social life in relation to capitalism. Much like their goal of 
“theorizing capitalism without representing dominance as a natural and inevitable feature 
of its being,” (ibid) I hope to represent the Anthropocene not as a definitionally all-
encompassing and inevitable outcome of modernist ontology with its binary 
understandings of nature/society. Rather my approach to the Anthropocene is to show 
that despite the affordances of modern ontology, more attention should be put on the 
actually existing relations and negotiations that continue to shape the encounter between 
nature and society.  
This is also similar to numerous anthropological studies which show, despite the 
universalizing goal of development, modernity, or globalization these projects are always 
incomplete, inconsistent and affected by the contextual contingencies of social life 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1993; Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990, 1999; Nash 1993 [1979]; 
Tsing 2000, 2005). In an approach to the Anthropocene, we should avoid assuming a 
universal coherence and totalizing power of such an ontological perspective and take 
inspiration from our critical untangling of these other meta-narratives.  
My perspective here is partially reflected in approaches to the Anthropocene that argue 
that not all humans or forms of social organization are equally responsible for the 
contemporary crisis. In this view, the root ‘anthropos’ to describe the contemporary crisis 
is deemed inadequate. Nomenclatures such as the Plantationocene, emphasizing the 
alienation of nature and labour through plantation logics (Haraway 2015) or the 
Capitalocene which places responsibility within the long durée of imperial capitalism 
(Moore 2017a, 2017b) have been proposed as alternatives to the Anthropocene. I agree 
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with these perspectives of differentiated responsibility and share the interest in political 
economic conditions through which the contemporary crisis is produced. However, these 
framings operate through differentiating responsibility at the world-system level and still 
give insufficient attention to the instability and contingency of the local relations which 
compose abstractions like capitalism and the always incomplete processes of 
commodification and alienation. 
Therefore, I am less concerned with the terminology used. Instead, I argue that the 
most politically expedient and empirically accurate perspective for an anthropology of 
the Anthropocene is to recognize the contingency of the Anthropocene even within the 
affordances of modernist ontology and extractive capitalism. The contemporary crisis of 
the environment and the human relationships entangled within it are a result of political 
choices which have been enabled through specific acts and imaginations. They are not the 
inevitable outcomes of foundational ontological dualisms, but the outcome of discursive 
and material operations of power which draw from and reproduce them.  
This does not mean anthropology should not feel a renewed sense of urgency or scholarly 
commitment to the reinvigorating of the society/nature entanglement that the 
Anthropocene concept has triggered. Quite the contrary; despite my discomfort with the 
post-humanist turn that much of the prominent anthropology of the Anthropocene has 
taken, I am inspired by the potential for the Anthropocene concept to work as a framing 
which connects seemingly disparate, although empirically intertwined, phenomena, 
particularly for placing the environmental crisis as central in the making and un-making 
of the world today. Therefore, despite my criticisms, I do not want to abandon the 
concept. Through its potential to reveal the mutuality of the crisis of the environment 
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with the crisis of modernity, the Anthropocene speaks to the experienced dissolution of 
progressive and modernist futures and the resultant layers of precarity as locally 
differentiated but global conditions. 
The connection of labour precarity to a broader Anthropocenic precarity is still 
relatively underdeveloped, although some scholars are beginning to point out the 
analytical overlap (Hinkson 2017; Tsing 2015; Weston 2012). As Judith Butler writes, 
“we have to rethink the human in light of precarity, showing that there is no human 
without those networks of life within which human life is but one sort of life” (Butler in 
Puar 2012: 173). Weston (2012) has proposed the phrase ‘political ecologies of the 
precarious’ as a step towards this awareness. Anna Tsing has most directly thought 
through precarity as a foundational analytic for the dual crisis of the contemporary 
moment which she describes as “the fate of the earth” and the “contradictions of postwar 
development” (Tsing 2015: 3). Australia’s recent political turmoil and the resultant 
insecurities clearly derive from such a dual crisis. The loss of modernist imaginaries of 
progressive development are upset in a condition of dependence on commodity exports in 
a world which may no longer want them, while simultaneously these very exports 
threaten the Australian, and indeed the planet’s, environment to such a degree as to call 
any such future into question.  
  Tsing’s elaboration is most pertinent to the perspective through which I approach 
precarity as an analytic that highlights the connections between the fragility of capitalist 
modernity’s failures alongside the environmental impacts it has crafted threatening life 
itself. However, rather than taking this as a call to look at this indeterminacy as 
productive of life in ruins as Tsing does, this thesis focuses on the grounded experiences 
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of change and the differentiated responsibilities and vulnerabilities. It does so not only at 
the level of political economy or post-humanist entanglements but also at the level of 
complex configurations of extractive capitalism and commodification, including the 
frictions, inconsistencies, and affects that are intrinsic to its maintenance (Tsing 2005; 
Weszkalnys 2016). Thus while recognizing the shared and global conditions of both post-
Fordist precarity and the Anthropocene, I follow an ethnographic perspective that notices 
the “textures of vulnerability” (Han 2018: 341) that anthropocenic precarity presents for 
my research participants.  
I am not alone in my desire to focus an anthropology of the Anthropocene on 
grounded experiences. There is growing recognition of the need to study the 
Anthropocene as a multi-scalar phenomenon, which requires grounded analysis alongside 
global awareness (Braun et al. 2015; Gibson-Graham 2011; Hecht 2018: 114; Ogden et 
al. 2013). As Braun at al. argue, “the great irony in much of the Anthropocene research is 
that it does not attend to the lived everydays which constitute it, nor to social differences 
like sex, gender, race, class, and nationality, even as it puts humans at the center of the 
analysis” (Braun et al. 2015: np).  This is the benefit of precarity as an analytic for 
studying the Anthropocene ethnographically. It allows for a focus on the presentist 
experience of multi-scalar crisis and the attendant social, political, and affective 
dimensions of global dynamics without assuming either utopia or apocalypse.  
Such a perspective also offers opportunities for balancing the emphasis on the 
‘suffering subject’ with an anthropology of the good. As Robbins (2013) has identified, 
anthropology seems to have moved from its heritage in the savage slot (Trouillot 2003) to 
the suffering slot or, as Ortner (2016) puts it, the spread of neoliberalism has led to a 
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focus on ‘dark anthropology’ which captures oppression and inequality.  Although 
Robbins proposes an anthropology of the good, which focuses on morality and ethics to 
replace the suffering subject (2013), I prefer Ortner’s argument that one meta-focus 
should not be replaced by another, but a balance between the two presents the best way 
forward in anthropology. Bringing attention to the shared conditions of neoliberal 
suffering has a potential power in that it highlights connection and similarities across 
difference through shared human vulnerability (Robbins 2013), but this suffering is 
always accompanied by resistance and gaps and is unevenly distributed.   
This thesis follows various elements of this dark anthropology through 
highlighting the violences of late industrialism (Fortun 2012) and post-Fordism (Allison 
2012) in order to draw out how the connections of precarity which, although unevenly 
distributed, are shared in Anthropocenic conditions. This serves as a particular framing 
which highlights the interconnections between precarious labour and insecure livelihoods 
with the precarious environment (Tsing 2015; Weston 2012). This attempts to draw out 
connections and reach across political divides of a rhetoric that pits ‘jobs versus the 
environment’. However, I also show how this shared suffering is unevenly distributed. 
Attention to morality and ethics, and the divergent visons of the past and future they draw 
upon, work to configure the distributions of such suffering (Das 2012; Fassin 2014; 
Keane 2014; Laidlaw 2013; Lambek 2010; Stafford 2013; Zigon 2009). 
As my thesis fits snugly into these broad diagnoses of recent anthropology that 
Robbins (2013) and Ortner (2016) describe, it shows that an anthropology of the 
experienced Anthropocene is far from a project that anthropology must start anew. I draw 
from the expertise of many who studied these dynamics before me even though they 
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often do not directly refer to the Anthropocene (cf. Ferguson 1999; Nash 1993[1979]; 
Scott 2010; Smith-Rolston 2014). Thus although this thesis aims to be an anthropology of 
the experienced Anthropocene it draws primarily from, and is more reminiscent of, these 
ethnographic approaches than of the experimental forms of ethnographic writing that 
have come to characterize much of Anthropocenic anthropology (Haraway 2016; Howe 
and Pandion 2016; Tsing 2015; Tsing et al. 2017). 
Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on Moranbah and the 
second on the Upper Hunter Valley.  The first two chapters of the thesis focus on the 
increasing precarity of labour in Moranbah, Queensland, and the social effects that such 
labour arrangements generate. Chapter one describes the dislocation of labour (Harvey 
and Krohn-Hansen 2018), in which relationships between labour, place, and capital are 
refigured in Anthropocenic conditions, drawing from a number of anthropological studies 
on extractive projects and natural resources, as “the point at which labor and nature are 
brought together” (Ferry and Limbert 2008: 8). This chapter describes how the particular 
configurations of the commodification of labour, land, and money have played out in 
Moranbah.  The chapter traces how the material affordances provided by the relative 
geographic isolation of Moranbah have been utilized in the original dispossession of 
indigenous Australians. They also underwrote the founding of the community through 
pioneer imaginations and associated environmental relations and, in the contemporary 
Anthropocenic conditions, have encouraged disembedded labour through the use of fly-
in-fly-out (FIFO) workforces and new formulations of alienation through modular 
infrastructures of contemporary extractive capitalism (Appel 2012; Ferguson 2005).  
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Chapter two focuses on the temporal elements of labour precarity in Moranbah and, 
particularly, on the gendered effects of shift work in the mining community. This chapter 
describes how the new temporal work regimes have gendered effects, which shift social 
relations, particularly for the heteronormative household.  However, rather than this being 
a unidirectional process through which the organization of labour determines household 
organization, my ethnography reveals how the affects, desires, and life projects of 
families and particularly those of women, feed back into the form that capitalism takes 
thus complicating arguments about the feminisation of labour in Anthropocenic precarity. 
Chapters three and four look at issues of moralities and contested ethics, particularly the 
way in which moral and ethical accusations and counter-accusations fail to undermine the 
Anthropocenic structures from which they derive. Chapter three describes the speculative 
nature of extractive industry and how it has shifted understandings of legitimate 
accumulation. The coal miner’s reputation has shifted from that of the working-class 
labourer into that of a so-called cashed-up-bogan (CUB), a class-based distinction that 
emphasizes greed, excessive consumption, and environmental destruction. This is 
compared with the example of a failed real estate speculator in Moranbah, Queensland, in 
order to analyse how local accusations of greed and associated schadenfreude work to 
obscure the structural inequalities and larger processes of Anthropocenic precarity 
through pathologizing structural failure.   
Chapter four continues the focus on morality but starts the second section of the 
thesis, which draws on the fieldwork conducted in the Upper Hunter Valley. It outlines 
my fieldsite within the CCC and describes how the coal industry is increasingly engaged 
in the moralized framing of coal mining. The chapter describes the ordinary ethics 
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through which pro-coal lobbyists relate to this moralized landscape. It argues that their 
complicity with the industry is produced not through insufficient integration of moral 
concerns about climate change, but through particular everyday interpersonal relations. It 
thus offers an analysis of the everyday and ordinary production of complicity with the 
precarious Anthropocene 
Chapter five describes how, in contrast to Moranbah, the material affordances of 
the Upper Hunter Valley landscape create conflict between competing land-uses. This 
chapter focuses on the planning processes which attempt to manage competing visions of 
the region’s past and future. The chapter describes how complex affective and regional 
values are made legible through infrastructures of planning and public consultation. 
Through the example of a planning hearing for the Drayton South Coal Mine, the chapter 
shows how planning and public consultations both silence and translate affect into 
economic rationalities that are legible to the planning system through particular 
configurations of scale. Through defining the boundaries of the planning process as the 
regional economy, the concept of the region allowed the integration of historical place-
based attachments to an imagined rurality, encouraging appeals to locality over globality. 
Although this allowed affective attachments to place to filter into the economic 
privileging of the planning process, it discounted the appeals by environmentalists to 
scale up the impacts of an individual mine to its contributions to global climate change. 
Chapter six follows the debate over land use in the Upper Hunter Valley but focuses on 
the affective dimensions of already mined landscapes. Engaging in the Anthropocenic 
attention to blasted landscapes (Kirksey et al. 2013), the chapter describes the complex 
ambiguity of the mine final voids as empty landscapes and ruins. The chapter introduces 
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the concept of solastalgia (Albrecht 2005; Albrecht et al. 2007) that was first coined to 
describe the melancholy of landscapes lost to open-cut mining in the Upper Hunter 
Valley. Although some see the potential for life in capitalist ruins (Tsing 2015), the 
potentiality that these ruins present has become a site for continued human hubris and 
capitalist imaginations that serve the interest of the pro-coal lobby.  The thesis concludes 
with a brief summary of the preceding argument and points to further directions for study 
that emerge from this research. 
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Figure 1.1 Labour Day Parade in Moranbah, Queensland. Young girl upon her father’s 
shoulders wearing a t-shirt of the main mining union, the CFMEU, that reads, “Future 
Unionist” (Photograph by author) 
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INTRODUCTION TO MORANBAH: 
 
Driving was a constant theme of my fieldwork in Moranbah. The town itself is relatively 
compact with tightly packed houses along cul-de-sacs branching out from a central 
thoroughfare which hosted the local government offices, the town square shopping 
centre, two pubs, large supermarket, two primary schools and a secondary school. This, 
for the most part, satisfied the immediate needs of its 8,333 residents (Australian Bureau 
of Statistics 2016). But living in Moranbah also meant driving to and from surrounding 
towns at regular intervals.  
For myself and many local residents, the coastal town of Mackay—a two-and-a-
half hour drive east along the Peak Downs Highway—is a relatively common destination 
for a weekend trip to the shopping mall, cinema, or an away sport game. The town of 
Clermont, an hour-and-a half southwest, welcomes visitors for rural pursuits including its 
rodeo and local show. The landscape is vast, dry, and dusty. There are few landmarks to 
pass the distance along these drives, and weak radio and cell reception means most of the 
trip is accompanied by familiar and overplayed CDs or conversations which eventually 
lull to blend with the hum of wheels on hot asphalt. While drives away often meant 
blinding morning sun, drives returning to Moranbah were often only lit by the moon and 
stars.  
The darkness was calming and beautiful, and I would occasionally pull off to the 
side of the road on these trips to stretch my legs and awaken my dreary eyes by looking 
up at the beauty of the stars. Back in the car for the final leg of the journey, light again 
marked a relief from the road. The first sign that you were almost done the drive was a 
glow that slowly appeared on the horizon. It represented the end of the journey and a 
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waiting bed. For as you approached the light, it took shape and revealed itself to be the 
lights of a coal mine, particularly the washplant and conveyor belts that transferred and 
processed the coal on the 24-hour open cut mine just a few kilometres east of Moranbah. 
I was not alone in experiencing this emotional warmth that accompanied coming 
home to Moranbah that the mining lights triggered. Returning from the Clermont Rodeo, 
a German mine engineer, Russell, who had lived in Moranbah for several years saw the 
lights up ahead—this time the mine a few kilometres north of Moranbah, and said: “It’s 
strange, but I just love those lights.”   
While the lights still felt significant, it wasn’t such a simple symbol for everyone. 
Another time, driving home from a football game in Mackay with a friend Clara—an 
electrical apprentice at the Moranbah North underground mine—I looked at the lights and 
broke the silence in our car, “We’re almost there, I see the lights.” She responded, “Oh 
those lights. Sometimes I hate them; sometimes I love them”. I asked her, “Don’t they 
make you feel relieved that you’re almost home?” She responded, “Well sort of. I mean, I 
was born in Moranbah. But my parents live in Mackay now. My sister lives in Moranbah 
though.” She paused, “so it’s a little bit like home. But it also kind of feels like going to 
work.”  
To those who have left Moranbah for a daytrip to a football match or to attend a 
local rodeo, coming back to Moranbah is a peaceful return to a community, a home, an 
oasis in the vast dry landscape. To others it is the beginning of an intense work week 
away from the towns and community that they call home. For people like Clara, the 
spatial organization of labour in the coal regions means that it is both and neither 
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completely. These short conversations encapsulated some of the tensions of what 
Moranbah represents to the different people who live and work there.  
Coal mining is integral to life here. The region produces more than half of 
Queensland’s saleable coal, approximately 90 million tonnes annually (Queensland 
Government Data 2018) coming from 26 active coal mines. The coal is transported by 
rail, loaded directly from conveyor belts leaving the wash plants on the mine sites and 
into trains which carry the coal to the port of Hay Point, just south of Mackay. About a 
dozen of these mines are within a reasonable commuting distance (under an hour’s drive) 
from Moranbah. To name a few: just kilometres north of town is Anglo-American’s 
Moranbah North underground mine, and few kilometres further BHP in partnership with 
Mitsubishi (under the name BMA) owns the Goonyella and Riverside mines. To the 
South is the sprawling Caval Ridge Mine, then Peak Downs, followed by Saraji, all large 
open cuts run by BMA.  The closest of these mines can be seen from the small hills in 
town, but mining’s presence extends far beyond the visibility of the mines themselves.  
Coal is practically and symbolically woven into the social fabric. The original pub 
is called the Black Nugget Hotel, the rugby team is the Moranbah Miners and the 
entrance to town is marked by a large dragline bucket (the largest piece of mining 
machinery) painted red that reads “Welcome to Moranbah” (See figure 1.2). During the 
day most of the population is wearing hi-vis, neon collared shirts that are the standardized 
uniforms of the mines. The yellow reflective stripe and lettering on the white utility 
vehicles parked in the town’s driveways reveal which mine or contractor employs 
members of that household.  When signing up for the local 24-hour gym, I was told the 
busiest hours were between 3 AM and 6 AM, before the coming day shifts. Perhaps most 
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ominously, the mines produce beautiful sunsets of vibrant pinks and reds. It is said that 
the light is refracted just right through the coal dust and diesel exhaust which floats 
through the air. This dust also constantly lands on white sheets drying in the waning 
summer sun, turning them a dull grey.  
 
 
With little alternative industry around, there are very few people who are here 
without at least one family member being employed in the mines or in a closely related 
service industry. Moranbah, the town itself, would not exist if not for the mines 
constructed in the 1970s. But now it is also much more than a dormitory for these mines, 
it is home and community for many. I will soon describe in more detail the pioneering 
drive that motivated the original residents to invest their time and energy in constructing 
Figure 1.2: Red Dragline bucket that marks the entrance to Moranbah 
(Photograph by author). 
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a strong emplaced community and the relationship to nature it engendered. But for now, 
these early residents constructed a rather idealized small community with sport, clubs, 
and strong social traditions like the debutante ball and annual garden party. These went to 
building strong bonds to the town itself and the community that lived there, beyond the 
wages that drew people here in the first place. However, the conditions of the town’s 
deep entanglement and dependence on the mines around it mean that it also experiences, 
rather directly, the flow-on effects of global commodity prices and thus the fluctuating 
demand for locals’ labour.  
The booms and busts of the commodity cycle are built into the town’s design 
itself, as the architecture of houses reveals the date of the boom that built them. The 
original houses built by the American Utah Development Company in the early 1970s 
reflect the imported American class-based distinctions, as regular workers received low-
set houses, and supervisors lived in the raised high-set houses next door. Moving 
outwards from the original town centre, the most recent booms appear on the edges with 
pre-fabricated rectangular structures stacked on top of each other to form townhouses that 
remind one more of Lego constructions than the aesthetics of idealized country 
Australian life (see figure 1.3). Mining booms, particularly the most recent 2008-2012, 
saw massive influxes of temporary workers and although the busts saw many leave again, 
the cost cuts that accompany busts eat into the permanent residents’ entitlements as well. 
Contract and casual jobs are increasingly becoming the new normal.  
These dynamics between a local community with strong affective connections to 
the town and a more mobile fluctuating workforce, lead to a tension in Moranbah that I 
felt early on. However, it took me many months to begin to think through it analytically. I 
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came to think of Moranbah as two ideal types, with many residents existing somewhere 
within a spectrum even as they rhetorically and morally clung to one side of it. There are 
some who relate to Moranbah as home, a community, and as full of meaning, attachment, 
and belonging. For others it is a place of work, a fully alienated extractive enclave with 
an airport that one can literally fly into and fly out of returning to homes 1,000 kilometres 
away in urban centres of Brisbane or Cairns. While there are certainly exemplars who fit 
these two ideal types, the majority of the population exists somewhere in between, as 
Clara’s reflection on the mine lights signals.  Yet the moral ideal is still the 
conceptualization of Moranbah as home and community. In reality, however, this ideal is 




Figure 1.3: Homes constructed in the recent boom, approximately 2011, on the 
eastern edge of Moranbah (Photograph by author). 
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This is primarily due to the changing employment conditions that coal miners in 
the region face. As I will soon describe in substantially more detail, the community is 
facing increased workforce casualization and more jobs are going to workers who 
commute long-distance (fly-in-fly-out or drive-in-drive-out) rather than living locally.10 
Thus, the ideal community form is no longer supported by the employment conditions or 
company policy that once nurtured this community.  
A long-time resident and beloved local primary school teacher once told me, “The 
mines use to be really supportive of the schools in the earlier years… But after about 
1998, the mines became tighter with their money and during the most recent boom, 
money didn’t come into the community from the mines in the same way it did in the past 
at all.”  She summarized the change: “That era I think is gone. Now it’s just not 
community driven. With all the fly in and out, it’s a job now, it’s not a community.” 
Yet the community that was constructed does remain, even as people lament that 
it is suffering. Although now struggling to find volunteers and seeing decreased 
participation numbers in community sports and clubs, most activities are still going. A 
Christmas light competition sees the town’s electrical engineering skills on full display as 
synchronized lights and music shows appear on competitive homes. Every year on 
Christmas Eve morning, Santa drives around the neighbourhood in the 40-degree Celsius 
heat delivering presents to children. There is hardly a sport that is not available. In 
addition to the classics of rugby, Australian rules football, soccer, and netball, there is 
also a large gymnastics complex, Olympic size swimming pool, handball courts and 
 
10 The Peak Down’s Highway is full of this traffic. Tired miners driving home after long working weeks 
make this a remarkably dangerous road. Clara was actually hit and seriously injured when a car driven by a 
DIDO miner who had fallen asleep at the wheel swerved into her car a year after I had left the field.  
 72 
martial arts centre.  Social clubs include the local radio station, theatre group, arts 
council, and the wine appreciation society. Kids ride their bicycles freely to and from 
school. Some hang at the skate park in the afternoons, others head to tennis or guitar 
lessons. I often thought, what a great place this would be to raise a family.  
Then again sometimes Moranbah felt like this sunny picture was all a façade. A 
woman who worked as a youth social worker asked me if I had heard about the 
“Moranbah Starter Pack”? She explained, “a bottle of Bundy rum and antidepressants.”11  
I began to hear more about the ‘two-year plan’ a common strategy of couples who 
decided to bring their families to Moranbah for two years, working and saving their wage 
before returning with house deposits to then settle in coastal towns. However, even these 
short two years weren’t always attainable. I attended a small evangelical church every 
Sunday, and I once counted four weeks in a row where the service ended with someone 
being called to the front of the church to receive a goodbye from the congregation (which 
rarely numbered more than 30 attendees). Lay-offs and whispers of who would be next 
fuelled the gossiping chatter in the grocery store aisles. A friend explained: “Jobs felt so 
safe before, now it’s like no one is safe. There are always rumours of coming 
redundancies going around. We’re always holding our breath because we don’t know 
where we’re going to end up.”   
The work camps and the temporary accommodation on the edges of town began 
to appear as ominous warnings of what was to become of Moranbah.  The newer of these 
camps or ‘accommodation villages’ were like a small motel. They were a few stories high 
with balconies where men in their hi-vis looked out over town while smoking a cigarette, 
 
11 “Bundy” or Bundaberg Rum is a brand of rum produced in Queensland and a popular spirit in Moranbah.  
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sometimes on the phone to family on the coast. They ate their meals in the canteen within 
the same building, only rarely venturing out of the complex beyond going to work. Large 
buses were parked outside which transported them to the nearby mines and further back 
to homes in Mackay for those who chose not to drive their own vehicles or who had 
fatigue requirements that prohibited them from doing so. Older versions of these camps 
were filled with rows of ‘dongas,’ or trailers consisting of a single studio room and small 
attached bathroom where workers slept during their working weeks. Some of these camps 
were right on the edge of town, others further hidden from view behind gates closer to the 
mines themselves. Some were privately run filled with employees working for various 
contractors, other were directly for BMA employees. These camps and the largely 
casually employed single men that filled them represented the Moranbah that existed for 
work and little else.  
However, this was complicated when thinking about the boom and the bust. These 
men were associated with both dynamics. The boom saw massive influxes of them, 
threatening the small town feel that many loved about Moranbah. Fear spread about what 
moral pathologies these single men might bring with them. And yet, in the bust, they are 
a threat again. They are accused of taking the jobs that long-term residents committed to 
life in the community are deemed most deserving.  
At a reunion of retired coal miners who worked at the original Peak Downs Mine, 
which opened in 1972, I had the pleasure of meeting George Batchelor who has since 
passed away.  In 1969, he helped to cut the fence of the original cattle property that 
became Moranbah.  When the town was established, he owned the first store, a small 
general store, which he lived above with his four children: two boys and two girls. 
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Although they had the first house in town, there were no stairs. They just had a ladder 
that they used to get up to the house. His daughter Vicky told me, “It was great to see a 
town grow from dust to what it is now.” Her kids, George’s grandchildren, are still living 
in Moranbah with their own families.  She explained further: 
We feel like we own the place, but it’s different now. Back then everybody knew 
everybody and we worked to make things happen. The tennis court needed to be 
built, so we did. We formed a committee and we built it… We were so proud of 
what we had...[but] a job in the mines isn’t so stable anymore. I don’t think my 
grandkids will get them. It’s funny I still call that home. I would have retired out 
there, but with the fly-in-fly-out, I said no. You just don’t know who these people 
are. 
Vicky’s comments reveal how these mobile workers were feared as unknown others, and 
yet also reveal how the locals saw themselves become more and more like them. Vicky 
left town, and she suspects her grandchildren will not know the stable employment of 
previous generations. The Batchelors are a foundational family in Moranbah’s history, 
the street on which they once lived is still called Batchelor Parade. Yet even they are 
slipping further into this relationship with Moranbah as an extractive enclave, an 
alienated workplace that is divorced from the social and communal attachments they once 
privileged, which is symbolized in activities like local sport and knowing your 
neighbours’ names.  
The changing workforce conditions is threatening these activities for even 
seemingly permanent residents.  The pressures of managing difficult rotating 12-hour 
shift schedules makes participation in social events, particularly sport harder. Further, 
permanent jobs are cleverly converted into casual ones through contracting mine 
operations to labour hire companies, or through financial incentives during the mining 
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boom that tempted people to give up permanent positions. A permanent employee of one 
of the BMA mines is covered by an enterprise agreement negotiated between the 
CFMEU union and BMA, to cover a period of three years. Although slightly different at 
each mine, a typical operator makes around AU$ 140,000-150,000 annually under this 
agreement. During the boom, the massive demand for labour meant that contractors 
received higher salaries than their permanent counterparts. Some left their permanent jobs 
to take these positions. Yet with the bust, many contractors lost their jobs entirely and 
were not hired back on a permanent basis. Now, contractors and casuals make 
significantly less money and don’t qualify for many of the entitlements of permanent 
employees such as sick and long service leave. So even long-term residents are forced to 
look elsewhere for work or rethink their strategic family decisions. This sees less people 
moving to town permanently or choosing long distance commutes.  
Through these processes, Moranbah began to feel more and more like the camps 
on its edges. The Anglican pastor’s wife told me: 
I knew one kid who was in year seven, and he had moved nine schools in his 
schooling career. These short-term contracts that everyone is on now are having a 
big impact. In church, on average, we are lucky to have nine to twelve month 
stays for newcomers. There is no sense of stability. Contracts create a sense of 
uncertainty, a climate of fear that is really disturbing. 
Some strong advocates for a community minded Moranbah lament these changes and 
fight back. They use the limited resources that the mines still donate to these activities 
and work with it with amazing resourcefulness. A major figure in this regard was the 
community representative who fought every year to get her contract renewed by BMA, 
even though she was an incredibly qualified and energetic community relations 
professional. She consistently blew me away with her zeal and commitment to this 
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idealized community. Another major figure was the local radio station, and its fearless 
leader, Cynthia, who managed to secure a grant from BMA by crafting a clever proposal 
that configured the radio station as an advertising venue, thus fitting the entrepreneurial 
local business focus of the company’ grant preferences. 
These community advocates also felt the need to not overplay the suffering of the 
community. They emphasized that Moranbah was a great community and a great place to 
raise a family. They hated portrayals in the media that represented Moranbah as the 
archetypical boom and bust town. After the town appeared in a negative light on the 
national news program 60 Minutes, which I will describe further in chapter three, Cynthia 
from the radio station posted on Facebook:  
For family and friends around the country who are concerned- that Sixty Minutes 
story was as usual an absolute beat up and misrepresentation of Moranbah. As 
you all know [Greg] and I have made this place our home for nearly 14 years and 
would kill for a ghost town experience for even just one weekend!!! Involved in 
over 7 community clubs between us (our choice) I also work for a local not-for-
profit organisation that has managed to scrape by through the good and bad for 
nearly 20 years. This town is a fantastic place to live and we have a mortgage here 
too-just 1- and live in it as our family home. Who knows what the future will 
bring and maybe we’ll never sell it in the future for a decent price but I wouldn’t 
swap the experiences I’ve had here for anything. 
Although I often heard Cynthia lament the loss of community participation, and the extra 
burden this put on her, she also wanted to defend against the negative portrayals of the 
town as suffering.  This was partly because these representations only fuelled the 
problem. Firstly, in the context of increased long-distance commuting, which I will 
outline more thoroughly in chapter one, a negative reputation that portrayed the town as 
suffering only discouraged people from moving their families to Moranbah when they 
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were offered a job. The company rhetoric that presented fly-in-fly-out and drive-in-drive-
out as a lifestyle choice fed this tension. If it was known that Moranbah was suffering, 
and people now had the option of not moving there while still being able to take 
advantage of the high paying mining jobs, they would simply keep their families in 
coastal homes. A miner once told me, when “I worked at the Middlemount Mine, I told 
the general manager of the mine, ‘You know they’re losing teachers at the school’ and 
the manager replied, ‘Yeah, I know, I took my kids out of school here’. That was the 
ridiculousness! As the manager he could have done something about that, but instead he 
just moves his kids to boarding school.” 
In addition to the immediate threat of a negative reputation to people’s choice to 
move or not, the community also faced a political context—which as I described in the 
introduction—framed coal and coal mining as morally unjust in the context of 
anthropogenic climate change. Coal’s contribution to climate change, although somewhat 
divorced from the specific context of Moranbah because Moranbah mostly mines coking 
metallurgical coal, meant that protecting coal jobs and coal communities conflicted with 
moral arguments about climate change. Thus, Moranbah residents faced another paradox.  
They rose to defend the industry which they depended on for their livelihoods and 
to protect the strong social attachments to coal mining which were fundamental to what 
they valued about their community. However, the actual coal jobs that they rose to defend 
were no longer what they used to be. They had to support coal mining and the companies, 
at the same time that these companies were undercutting their entitlements and neglecting 
their community. As the mayor of Moranbah released in a press statement in response to 
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a convoy of anti-coal protestors led by the former Green’s leader Bob Brown, who passed 
through the region: 
Bob Brown’s Stop Adani Convoy is an absolute affront to the proud resource 
communities of Queensland. The convoy represents an attack on our history. An 
attack on our lifestyle. An attack on our very future. It is, in a word, 
offensive….Residents in our cities reap the benefits that our sweat has earned—
public transport, roads, schools and hospitals are all funded with those revenues 
[derived from coal royalties]…Our miners toll every day to deliver for Australia. 
But in the echo chambers of the inner city, where a myopic green mantra drowns 
genuine debate, the livelihoods of thousands of regional Queenslanders appears to 
mean nothing. …Let them come [the convoy], let them look us in the eye and let 
us challenge their misguided belief that their actions are about some faceless 
corporation and not without impact on hard-working families (Baker 2019).  
As Mayor Baker highlights, in Moranbah, mining companies cannot be disentangled 
from the community which depends on them.  Therefore, climate change protestors intent 
on stopping an expansion of coal mining are an affront not just to a corporation but to a 
community’s “history”, “lifestyle” and “future”. Yet Mayor Baker was no fool about the 
role of corporate policy in undercutting the community, telling me in an interview, “The 
companies are like teenagers. You tell them they can’t have 100 per cent of the workforce 
fly-in-fly-out, and they’ll make it 99.9 per cent!”  
The tensions of labour alienation in the context of increased global and moral 
rhetoric around climate change and the environmental crisis is the unifying framework 
for this first section of the thesis.  The next chapter will outline the specific details of 
casualization and long-distance commuting. I will describe the threats and tensions to this 
particular emplaced community and the pioneering relationship to the environment that 
this undermines. I will then complicate this representation through the stories of familial 
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life projects and young women working in the mines who add nuance to this more 
conservative story. Finally, I will engage in the moral entanglements and debates through 
which some of these ideal types of Moranbah’s residents are contested and worked out 
through the back and forth of moral accusations, including what this might tell us about 




CHAPTER ONE: ‘Nothing But Scrub’: The Spatiality of Labour Precarity in 
Moranbah, Queensland 
 
For the alleged commodity ‘labor power’ cannot be shoved about, used 
indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual 
who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity. In disposing of a man’s 
labor power the system would, incidentally, dispose of the physical, 
psychological, and moral entity ‘man’ attached to that tag. Robbed of the 
protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the 
effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation 
through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its 
elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety 
jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. Finally, the 
market administration of purchasing power would periodically liquidate business 
enterprise, for shortages and surfeits of money would prove as disastrous to 
business as floods and droughts in primitive society (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: 77). 
 
Moranbah regularly experiences extremes of weather. Wet and dry seasons are 
remarkable contrasts. Often the land is parched and dry but then the rains come far too 
quickly for the ground to absorb, and the usually dry riverbeds overflow with intense 
energy, flooding over the roads and cutting the town off from the outside. While living in 
Moranbah I experienced a ‘mini-cyclone,’ in 2016. The rain wasn’t falling but blowing 
sideways like a horizontal waterfall, and the strength of the wind tore down powerlines, 
knocked down sheds, ripped off roofs, and sent trampolines flying through the air and 
into neighbours’ trees. There is nothing particularly unusual about this. Extreme weather 
is a regular occurrence, but there are certainly whispers that the storms are getting worse. 
Cyclone Debbie in the following year caused so much damage that BHP-Billiton, the 
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main coal mining company in the area, had to declare force majeure, unable to fulfil its 
coal export contracts (Westbrook and Regan 2017).  
The 2016 storm was understandably the topic of public discussion as people 
began to clear debris and return to their normal lives. Climate change was occasionally 
evoked as a nervous joke, but instead a different element of vulnerability was emphasized 
in public debate: the impact of recent employment practices on the community’s ability 
to weather the storm.  
When I brought up the cyclone in conversations in the days after, several different 
people told me a story about a mother who was home alone with her three young children 
during the mini-cyclone. She was worried about the damage that was occurring to the 
house as she witnessed the shed in the backyard fall to pieces. In her anxiety she called 
her husband pleading with him to come home. This shouldn’t have been a problem. The 
open-cut mines weren’t operating in this weather, and the mine where her husband works 
is only a few kilometres from town. However, her husband works as a fly-in-fly-out 
(FIFO) miner, a job he was eligible for by lying on his job application saying he lived 
1,000 kilometres away in the city of Brisbane. If he had set off to assist his family living 
less than fifteen kilometres away, he would have risked being found out. 
At the time, 2016, FIFO was mandatory at two nearby mines, Caval Ridge and 
Daunia both operated by BHP in partnership with Mitsubishi (under the initials BMA). 
This meant that having a home postcode in the vicinity of Brisbane (roughly 1,000 km 
south) or Cairns (roughly 1,000 km north) was a condition of employment at the mines. 
These FIFO workers fly into the Moranbah airport and transfer to a bus which takes them 
to the gated mine camps, where they sleep and are fed, for a period of weeks working at 
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least 12-hour shifts. When these days are over, they re-board a bus that returns them to 
the airport, and board a plane that then flies them home to larger coastal cities. This 
bypasses the local community. No resident of the nearby region was allowed to get a job 
at these two mines. Some used distant family postcodes to secure a job, but during their 
working days they were not allowed to come home to Moranbah.  
The farcical nature of this situation is clear to many in Moranbah. “It makes no 
sense but it’s just part of the contract” the wife of a miner who occasionally worked on 
short contracts at Caval Ridge told me.  A mine that is actually visible from town will not 
hire local residents. There was political pushback before the mines were approved with 
these conditions, particularly from members of the local council government (Wright and 
Bice 2017).  However, these mines were approved during the mining boom and hence 
intense housing pressure was a bigger concern than local unemployment. In the context 
of the bust, these pressures have reversed. Once the mines were approved with these 
conditions, it was difficult to change, as the mining companies (in this case BHP) have 
considerable political power in state and national politics. There has been some 
legislative success in changing the situation lately.  
 In August 2017, the Queensland state Parliament passed a law making 100 per 
cent mandatory FIFO workforces illegal by prohibiting postcode discrimination. 
However, this does not apply to already existing contracts, and many in Moranbah are 
critical of the impact the legislation will have in reality because, as I will show in this and 
the following chapter, this legislation does little to change the structures that encourage 
FIFO even when it is not mandatory. Beyond mandatory enforcement, long-distance 
commuting like FIFO is enabled through particular temporal and spatial arrangements 
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and the casualisation of employment, which have knock-on effects for labourers and their 
families. The temporality of labour arrangements and their impacts on gender and 
household organization will be the focus of chapter two. First, however, I will examine 
the particular spatial dynamics of labour commodification and associated alienation and 
precarity. This includes a precarity of the particular form of environmentalism in 
Moranbah. As the vignette above shows, the experience of extreme weather is compatible 
with a pioneering conception of a harsh and oppositional nature. However, through 
communal organization this harshness was previously overcome. Through the increased 
precarity of labour, the ability to oppose this harsh nature is undermined. This dynamic 
presents a double environmental and labour precariousness, reflecting the interlinked 
commodification of labour, land and money in the conditions of the Anthropocene.  
The Spatiality of Partial Labour Commodification  
The quote that starts this chapter from Polanyi’s Great Transformation described the 
social and environmental degradation that would derive from the fictitious 
commodification of labour, land, and money (2001 [1944]). He assumed that a double 
movement would accompany such commodification, as it did momentarily through the 
growth of labour protections and associated social structures of stable employment and 
forms of Fordist corporate paternalism (Allison 2012). However, this was followed by 
subsequent waves of commodification linked to the conditions of neoliberal late 
capitalism (Burawoy 2010; Parry 2018; Standing 2016: 37).  
Burawoy has updated Polanyi’s analysis to describe the contemporary moment as 
a third wave of marketization which is more than the escalation of commodification but 
derives from “the forms of and synergies among the commodification of different 
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fictitious commodities” (2010: 310). These forms of synergetic commodification 
illustrate the complexity of contemporary capitalism and the layered forms of precarity 
that I hope to highlight throughout this thesis as characteristic of the experienced 
Anthropocene. For as Burawoy has further argued, commodification is “the key 
experience in our world today, and … exploitation, while essential to any analysis of 
capitalism, is not experienced as such” (Burawoy 2010: 307 emphasis in original). 
Even though the commodification of labour, land and money are inseparably 
implicated in Anthropocenic precarity, this chapter uses labour as the entry point to 
analyse these relations because labour commodification is central to the experience of the 
increased precarity of life in contemporary Moranbah. I will use commodification to refer 
to the broad conditions through which labour is partially transformed into a disembedded 
and exchangeable commodity, which requires alienation from social structures and 
physical dislocation. I use the term alienation to refer to the social and affective impacts 
of the commodification process, particularly the alienation of labourers from relations 
with each other and thus communities, which are themselves in place (Carrier 1992). 
Increased precarity is a resultant outcome of the commodification of labour (specifically 
workforce casualisation) and the broader social effects of alienation that are intrinsic to it. 
However, as the vignette above shows, labour cannot be separated out from the 
commodification of place, both through the commodification of nature in its 
transformation into a resource and the linked environmental danger of extreme weather 
events deriving from the burning of this resource, or through the forms of alienation that 
ignore the emplacement of labourers. Further, the commodification of money through 
increased speculative commodity markets and resultant cyclical prices reinforces 
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precarity and the commodification of labour by encouraging flexible—casualised and 
spatially mobile—workforces.  It should be reemphasized that this commodification is 
never a complete nor homogenous process, and that the structures of commodification are 
crafted in relation to people’s pursuit of various life projects (Bear et al. 2015; Gibson-
Graham 2006 [1996]; Nash 1993[1979]).  
 David Harvey introduced the concept of the spatial fix to describe the process 
through which capitalism must reorganize space in order to address the problem of 
overaccumulation (Harvey 2001, 2003). While Harvey’s analysis privileges capital’s 
physical emplacement, this chapter focuses on labour’s particular implication in the 
spatial fix. This chapter’s focus on labour reflects analysis which reveals the critical role 
of labour control interacting with the materiality of energy in the historic adoption of 
fossil fuels and the political consequences (Malm 2013; Mitchell 2011).  Yet while 
reacting to the demands of capital and material conditions, labourers simultaneously 
pursue their own life projects which feed back into the particular forms that the spatial fix 
takes.  Labour is partially mobile when combined with particular infrastructures, but 
labour is socially emplaced. Thus when labour is moved around to respond to 
capitalism’s spatial fix, emplaced social formations reorganize in response and not 
always in the idealised form intended by capital.  
The complications that result in labour responding to capitalism’s spatial fix 
resonates with Harvey and Krohn-Hansen’s edited collection on dislocated labour. To the 
authors, “[d]islocation implies spatial movement, but it also refers to other senses of 
disruption or disorientation, such as the sentiment of feeling out of place, or of losing 
your bearings or sense of self as things move and change around you” (2018: 12). The 
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resultant social precarity that derives from labour dislocation illustrates the connection 
between political economic conditions and lived “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977: 
128) that are intrinsic to their making and maintenance (Allison 2012, 2016; Han 2018; 
Hinkson 2017; Muehlebach 2011; Parry 2018; Stewart 2012, 2016).  Within Moranbah, 
the particular spatial organization of labour through the increase in long-distance 
commuting like FIFO and linked casualisation is increasing the precarity of the emplaced 
community as the long-term future of the town is in question.  However, rather than the 
affects merely responding to capitalism’s spatial organization, these precarious affects 
also reinforce the same dislocation as they feedback into life strategies which discourage 
family migration to mining communities.   
This chapter focuses on the spatiality of labour in Moranbah and its implications 
for the increasing precarity of the emplaced community. I will contrast the previous 
stable employment at the town’s founding to the current conditions of community as 
casualisation and long-distance commuting become more common. The town’s founding 
required aboriginal dispossession to craft the possibility for the ‘discovery’ of the 
resource frontier. The town was then built to house the employees of the nearby mines. 
The mining company’s needs for a stable labour force combined with the life projects of 
the workers and their families. This resulted in the growth of a pioneering community 
and associated conceptualizations of the environment which were linked to stable Fordist 
employment. However, in response to improved transportation infrastructures and 
decreased organized labour political power, the workforce has been gradually casualised. 
This casualisation, again in complex combination with people’s life projects and 
strategies to manage this new insecurity, has led to the rise of long-distance commuting 
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practices like FIFO. The lack of secure employment, even when not enforced through 
mandatory FIFO described above, discourages miners with insecure employment from 
moving their families to Moranbah, unsure of the tenure of their jobs. The long-distance 
commuting then has served to increase the commodification and related alienation of 
labour through spatial organizations of enclave extractivism (Ferguson 2005) and 
modularity (Appel 2012) which further add to the precarity of the emplaced community. I 
will show how FIFO offers an additional insight into recent scholarly attention to the 
particular spatial and temporal possibilities that fossil fuel materialities offer capital—
particularly the consequences of these spatio-temporal formations to labour and politics 
(Malm 2013; Mitchell 2011). Here, materiality is crucial to labour and political 
organization, including the geographic location and geologic structure of coal as well as 
the infrastructures of connection and disconnection that enable the mobility of fuel and 
labour. However, rather than these material conditions being determinate, the shifting 
uses of connection and disconnection shows how spatial and temporal organization is 
flexibly utilized to match the demands of Anthropocenic commodification (cf. Smith-
Rolston 2013b). 
Indigenous Dispossession and the Making of the Frontier 
Whether driving the two and a half hours from the coastal town of Mackay or flying in 
with a bird’s eye view of the landscape, Moranbah appears as if it were just dropped 
down in the middle of nowhere fully formed. Despite the large expanse of open land 
encircling it, the town itself is compact. Homes and buildings are built close to each 
other, lined up around patterned blocks and cul-de-sacs. Tightly organized 
neighbourhoods stretch out from a town centre, which hosts two pubs, a small shopping 
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centre and local government buildings. The only open spaces within the town limits are 
the large sporting grounds. I would come to learn that the reason for this compactness, 
and Moranbah’s island-like character, is that the town is surrounded on all sides by 
mining leases.  
 
Figure 1.4 Aerial map of Moranbah, Queensland (Google maps) 
The town is here precisely because of the coal that lies underground. Construction 
on the town began in 1969, specifically to house the employees and their families of the 
nearby new open-cut mines. The area has grown since its official founding in 1971, but 
the relative isolation of the town means that there are still very few people who are here 
for reasons other than mining or related service industries. Originally built to service only 
two mines, the town is now home to workers who commute to about a dozen mines in the 
surrounding area.  
A map of Australia is marked with ghost towns. These are places that once saw 
miners flooding into them; boom towns that are now busted and largely deserted. They 
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include the former copper town of Kuridala in Queensland; the tin mines of Poimena in 
Tasmania; the silver town of Silverton, New South Wales; the goldrush towns of, Clunes, 
Castlemaine, and Walhalla (Meredith 2016). All with their grand public buildings, the 
courthouses, and town halls that reveal a period of optimism now decay and serve as 
reminders of the dangers of single commodity economies (Knox 2013: 79). It is difficult 
to look at this long pattern of history and not read these towns as dismal omens predicting 
a similar outcome for a settlement like Moranbah. They have much in common with it; 
these were ‘remote’ mining towns, which relied on a single commodity, whose relative 
geographic isolation inhibited economic diversification and risk spreading, and whose 
population was primarily drawn to the area in pursuit of extractive profits. When 
politicians and climate activists argue for the end of coal, they seem to be echoing the 
drying up of the gold and silver lodes of the early 20th century. They would, it seems, be 
calling for the turning of towns like Moranbah into the ghost towns visited on school 
trips, where petticoated tour guides explain what life was like during the frenzied gold 
rushes.  
This is the fear of many people living in Moranbah, today, who are reliant on coal 
for their livelihoods, and who feel an attachment to this place in which they have built 
their lives. However, the end of coal is more complicated, for not all coal is created equal. 
There will be various trajectories of the transition from fossil fuels, relating to the 
materiality of types of coal and the affordances of particular material properties and 
deposit geologies.  Moranbah produces coking coal, which in contrast to thermal coal 
mined in the Upper Hunter Valley discussed later in this thesis, currently has no 
economically viable replacement in the production of steel. The coking process requires 
 90 
more than just energy, the chemical reaction involved also necessitates the high carbon 
content that, for now, only coking coal can feasibly provide at scale (Norgate and 
Langberg 2009). As many people in Moranbah told me, the last coal to come out of the 
ground in Australia will come out of this region.  
This distinction between coking coal and thermal coal was the most often cited 
response to my questioning miners about the morality of coal mining and its contribution 
to climate change. Although some denied the reality of climate change, most accepted it 
and used this typological distinction to separate their own labour from responsibility for 
it. And yet, this distinction often fell apart when faced with further questioning. Many 
had worked in thermal coal mines before or admitted that they would if that was the only 
job available. The skills and mining process are exactly the same, and thus in the 
fluctuating industry with increasingly insecure employment, movement between the types 
was common or at least imaginable.  
This typological distinction also fell apart in relation to the Adani Carmichael 
mine (to be discussed further in chapter 4). This mine was being proposed during my 
fieldwork and would be a large thermal coal mine relatively near to Moranbah. Thus, it 
represented potential employment and future growth opportunities for the coal mining 
industry. It was strongly supported by Moranbah locals despite the debate which framed 
it as incredibly detrimental to global climate action. However, the hopes around this mine 
did not fully displace the anxieties that many felt about their future in the industry and the 
way in which this mine was utilized politically.  
Those involved in the main mining union, the Construction, Forestry, Mining, and 
Energy Union (CFMEU) were quite articulate in expressing how climate change and 
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environmentalism worked to distract critique away from the coal mining companies and 
the casualization of the industry. In an interview with the head of the CFMEU branch at a 
local mine, I asked him what he thought about the Adani Carmichael mine and whether 
he thought it would go ahead. He replied:  
Carmichael is the biggest real estate scam ever. There is lots of hope around it, 
but it’s false hope…I hope I’m wrong about that. All this talk about it being the 
next boom is false hope, but I would love to be wrong. The government is just 
stirring everyone up about it so that we blame the greenies for why we don’t have 
jobs.  
A CFMEU representative at the state level repeated a similar critique in an interview with 
me where he explained his evolving thoughts on climate change: 
 There is acceptance globally that climate change is real. It took me a while to get 
there, I admit. But at the higher levels you get to understand it…None of our 
mines have shut because of climate change; they’ve been shut because of the 
oversupply of coal causing the price to collapse, and then even if they don’t shut, 
the company uses the lower price as an excuse to go and cut ‘costs.’ That means 
our entitlements. We see economics as a bigger pressure than climate change.  
 
Importantly, as these union representatives recognize, it is not the end of coal that most 
immediately threatens the town of Moranbah but the changes to labour through 
increasing casualisation of the workforce and labour dislocation through long-distance 
commuting practices. The material affordances of coking coal and the geographic 
location of the deposit craft the political possibilities around which coal mining and the 
associated community take shape, but they are not determinate as the history of the 
region illustrates (cf. Smith-Rolston 2013b).  Thus, the ghost towns that were once 
thriving mining towns are not the inevitable future of Moranbah, instead Moranbah’s 
‘remoteness’ and thus vulnerability is more than mere physical distance or disconnection 
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but configured in political practice. Remoteness draws on the appearance of naturalized 
conditions of physical distance but, as Ardener has shown, remoteness is a relative 
concept (Ardener 2012: 532) and a representation used for various political or economic 
ends (Andersson 2016; Andersson and Saxer 2016; Gardini 2016; Rippa 2016). I will 
now show how Moranbah’s physical isolation and disconnection are inconsistently 
deployed to match the demands of extractive capitalism and, in particular, the 
commodification of labour and land in Moranbah. 
While the official history of Moranbah begins in the late 1960s, the possibility of 
this town required an erasure of the region’s much longer history. The emptiness of the 
landscape had to be conceptually, legally, and physically made. Legally, the land was 
deemed empty through the juridical falsehood of Terra Nullius, designating Australia as 
previously uninhabited, thus legally justifying British colonial settlement. This legal lie 
required the aboriginal population of Australia to be conceptually non-human, unworthy 
of recognition as original inhabitants. They belonged, instead, to nature, which, like the 
landscape, would have to be tamed and civilized by British colonists (Povinelli 2002; 
Wolfe 1999). The Australian landscape then was made empty, legitimizing the expansive 
frontier of settler colonialism and, through this expansion, the erasure became physical 
through violent dispossession and genocide.  
The German explorer Ludwig Leichhardt explored the region in the mid-1840s 
noting the existence of coal in his expedition journal (Leichhardt 2002 [1847]: 68) and 
clearing the way for the coming of pastoralists to the area, which set off the Frontier 
Wars in Central Queensland. This period was marked by immense brutality. The violence 
committed against the aboriginal population was not well documented whereas any 
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deaths of white settlers received outsized retribution from the Native Mounted Police 
Force. This frontier violence continued beyond original dispossession through to the 
stolen generations (Bottoms 2013).   
The Barada Barna people—who have recently received their native title 
determination as the traditional land owners of the land on which Moranbah now sits—
trace their latest dispossession back to 1908, when their apical ancestor, Maggie Barker, 
had her children stolen. The children were stolen when playing on the banks of the Nebo 
River and sent 700 kilometres away to the mission at Barambah (today called 
Cherbourgh).  In 2015, the original inhabitants received acknowledgment through the 
native title legal system. Nonetheless, the erasure of this earlier indigenous history is 
thoroughly achieved in the local narrative, as a history of the town written by a local 
historian describes: “Thirty years ago [referring to 1966] there was nothing but scrub and 
the sound of crows where Moranbah now stands. It was, in every sense, a new frontier in 
a place as old as time” (Murray 1996: ix).   
Wolfe (2006) describes the “logic of elimination” that was intrinsic to the 
genocide of the indigenous populations through the concept of territoriality as “settler 
colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (2006: 388). He argues that the logic of 
settler-colonial territoriality “destroys to replace” (388), for the frontier had to be made 
empty and open for expansion, civilization, and development. As Anna Tsing has argued, 
“[f]rontiers are not just discovered at the edge; they are projects in making geographical 
and temporal experiences. Their ‘wildness is’ made of visions and vines and violence; it 
is both material and imaginative” (Tsing 2003: 5100). This is clearly the case in the 
erasure that crafted the possibilities on which Moranbah would be built. The emptiness of 
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this land was part of the original project which made it colonisable and set the conditions 
on which the future mining industry would ‘discover’ a resource frontier and construct a 
pioneering inspired community.  
While Australia had a significant history of coal mining prior to the expansion 
into this area of Central Queensland in the late 1960s, much of this previous mining was 
underground coal mining. The shifting technology now opened up new areas for mining 
through capital intensive open-cut mining. An American company, called the Utah 
Development Company,12 had secured the right to mine in the Bowen Basin of Central 
Queensland.  It first built the open-cut Goonyella mine, opening in 1971, which would 
soon be followed by the open-cut Peak Downs Mine opening in 1972.  Open-cut mining, 
also referred to as open-cast or open-pit, is a form of surface mining. Rather than digging 
tunnels into the layers of rock above a coal seam and then mining under the surface, 
open-cut mining strips away the surface layers of rock, thus exposing the coal seam to be 
mined. Unlike underground mining, where a smaller area of the surface is disturbed, 
open-cut mining disturbs large areas of land, leaving substantial voids and pits within the 
landscape (to be discussed further in chapter six). This form of mining does not require as 
large a workforce as earlier methods, but it does require some labour. The relative 
isolation of the area, made through violent elimination, required that the labour force for 
these mines be brought in, and necessitated the construction of towns for labourers to live 
in. 
 
12 The first boom time ended around 1982, which allowed BHP to buy Utah 
Development Corporation from General Electric, of which it was a fully owned 
subsidiary. Several of the mines in the Bowen Basin are still run by the now merged 
BHP-Billiton in partnership with Mitsubishi, although other multinational companies 
have entered the area, including Anglo American, Glencore, and Peabody.   
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Building Moranbah: Environmentalism in a Pioneer Town on the Resource Frontier 
Building a town to house the workforce for the mine in the area around what is now 
Moranbah was deemed necessary. This is partly due to earlier struggles over the 
provision of housing for mining workforces, primarily in Moura as well as Blackwater, 
Queensland (see chapter three). However, this was also a time in which the state’s  
 
Figure 1.5 An operating dragline (photo by author) 
 
development plans followed a modernization logic, in which economic development and 
the opening of regions included the building of towns.  This era of stable employment 
meant that constructing company towns with associated infrastructure and social services 
to support workers’ families was considered necessary to recruit a reliable workforce of 
married family men (Murray 1996; Peetz and Murray 2010; cf. Nash 1993[1979]). 
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Although having its own specificities, the town followed similar patterns of paternalist 
Fordist management practices premised on stable employment and families headed by a 
male wage-earner (Allison 2012; Parry 2005, 2018).  
The site of the current town was chosen both because of its proximity to the mine 
sites and because it could be included within the bounds of a single local government 
area, the Belyando Shire. The town would not strictly be a company town, but it would 
be governed under existing local governments in this cattle-grazing country. The Ullman 
and Nolan Engineering firm was hired to draw up the plans for the town, which they 
developed in two stages, with 550 homes to be built in the initial stage, and room for 
another 410. They recognized that there would be a need for an eventual expansion. 
Although the ultimate purpose of the town was to serve as a ‘dormitory,’ the 1969 
feasibility study also stated that: 
the isolation of the town from nearby large centres of population, such as Clermont or 
Mackay, implies that the town will have to be self-contained. The town plan therefore 
must make provision for accommodating essential service industries, government, 
communal, business, shopping, and recreational facilities (quoted in Murray 1996: 
21). 
The narratives that surrounded the building of this town, particularly in the regional 
media, emphasized a frontier-style developmentalism. This linked modern development 
to a history of pioneering and settler colonialism. A regional newspaper, The 
Rockhampton Morning Bulletin, wrote that those building this new town were: 
infinitely different to the old concept of pioneering—axe-swinging individualists 
raising large families in bark and slab results. … Although conditions are different 
today, the spirit of the new pioneers, the challenge, the excitement and the satisfaction 
of creating a new community are as apparent today as in the old days (quoted in 
Murray 1996: 22).  
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This sense of pioneering and frontier fantasy also came to define how the early residents 
conceived of themselves with the founding of this new town. Moranbah’s largely Anglo-
Celtic settlers, the first contemporary residents, are mostly still living and able to 
recollect the early years of the town. Oral histories I collected revealed a very consistent 
narrative that emphasizes the place-making strategies of these residents. Finding what 
they perceived as an empty landscape, an open frontier, they went on to craft a 
community. From research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, however, it becomes clear 
that the community (Gibson 1991, 1992; Williams 1981) was not homogenous in any 
sense but was structured by highly unequal class and gender relations. Nonetheless, a 
rather homogenous narrative comes out in nostalgic reflections about the making of 
Moranbah. I will quote at length one woman’s recollections because they typify the 
narrative of the place-making of early Moranbah: 
 I came here in January 1970. There were twenty homes, no A/C, no ceiling fans, no 
roads, no shopping centre. The doctors flew in from Blackwater every Thursday and 
stayed from 9am to 2. The ambulance officer was the doctor to us. The butcher came 
from Clermont on Tuesday to take orders and would bring it on Thursday. They 
would bring everything, shopping things. The first building was the Black Nugget 
[pub]. There was the primary school but my kids never saw preschool or kindy 
[kindergarten]. It was so hot and dry. I would flatten cardboard boxes to walk on top 
of to get to the clothesline because the ground was so hot. I wasn’t scared. It was a 
new adventure. We looked after one another…We pioneered and, you know what, I 
would do it all over again. 
In recounting the early years, residents often emphasize the harshness of the environment 
and the lack of comforts, but also stress that this brought them together socially in order 
to care for each other, and through this they relate to a longer history of pioneering and 
settler colonialism. This resonates strongly with Veronica Strang’s (1997) description of 
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the importance of the pioneer in Australian national identity. In contrast to aboriginal 
engagement with the land, she argues that, for Anglo-Celtic settler Australians, scientism 
and belief in linear development emphasize the technological transformation of the land. 
The landscape was conceived of as an adversary, and thus settlers’ first concern was to 
bring the land under technological control. She further discusses how this frontier 
representation continues to reproduce a strong nostalgic image, important for Australian 
identity, creating “enthusiasm for the preservation of archetypes that symbolize courage, 
freedom, and an intimate interaction with the physical world” (1997: 178). This is clearly 
reflected in the pride with which early Moranbah residents reflect on their relationship to 
this place, even in a much more contemporary history, for as Anna Tsing has argued, 
“[f]rontiers energize old fantasies, even as they embody their impossibilities” (2005: 28).    
Early residents describe the heat, the dry river, the dust, and their own adaptation 
to a harsh landscape, and emphasise that this was often a collective endeavour 
approached with sustained energy and occasionally a sense of humour. Tales circulated 
of an old tradition, called the Henley on the Isaac (a play on the Henley-on-Thames 
Royal Regatta).  Instead of racing boats, teams constructed boats that could be carried. 
This was an ironic comment on the Isaac River, which ‘flows’ past the town, but is 
usually a dry river bed, except during the flash floods. It is this sort of social adaptation 
and overcoming a harsh landscape, with a social framing, that play into frontier narratives 
about building an active community (see figure 1.6).  
Environmental historian Tom Griffiths has argued that this settler colonial 
relationship to nature alongside the introduction of non-native flora and fauna compose 
an ecological imperialism, where “for Australian settlers, ‘ecology’ and ‘empire’ 
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represented the competing realities of geography and history, land and culture, and stood 
for a fundamental, persistent tension between origins and environment” (Griffith 
1997:11). Thus, the particular relation to nature cannot be divorced from the imperial, 
colonial, and pioneering values that are encapsulated in these celebrated frontier 
narratives. Ecology and the environment are primarily privileged in relation to a social 
history through which they are intertwined and made valuable.  
 
Figure 1.6: Henley on the Isaac in 1970s exact date unknown. (photo courtesy of Barry 
Ford).  
 
It was primarily young nuclear families that moved to Moranbah in the early 
years, many with young children. The jobs in Moranbah offered high salaries for the 
relatively uneducated workforce that was recruited.  The high wages were considered the 
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main motivation for working in Moranbah, and the distance from any regional centres 
and the poor quality of the roads in those days, which were subject to flooding during the 
wet season, meant that long-distance commuting was not a realistic option, so families 
moved together. Most young families did not come with the intention of staying forever. 
However, many became connected to the community and accustomed to the high salaries. 
Many stayed their entire working lives and beyond. Early residents point to Moranbah’s 
cemetery as evidence of such lifelong attachment. While Moranbah families were 
responding to capital’s spatial fix as they moved to the region, their pursuit of their own 
particular life projects led them to build the social infrastructures of an active community. 
Community sport and social clubs became important elements of life, and early 
residents put much energy into starting and running these activities. Claire Williams who 
conducted social surveys in 1975 found that 45 per cent of women were involved in at 
least one sports group (Williams 1981).  There also were a number of social and arts 
groups that formed. Early residents point to the success of these endeavours as well as the 
modern conveniences Moranbah now has—the large grocery store and the air 
conditioning in every home—as sure signs of their success as pioneers and frontiersmen.  
However, things are beginning to change for newer residents. Moranbah has in 
some ways always been seen as a place that requires trade-offs and sacrifices to live in, 
but the short-term commitment and the transience of the population has increased in the 
last decade. There is a common trope in Moranbah called the ‘two-year plan’ where 
families move to Moranbah with the plan of staying for two years, suffering but saving 
money, after which they will be able to return to the comfort of the larger urban centres 
that they come from. Many of the teachers in Moranbah’s schools are young teachers 
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doing their ‘rural service,’ a scheme which entices teachers to less desirable locations by 
offering them better placements when they eventually return to teach in urban schools. In 
what seemed to echo my own experience as an anthropological fieldworker, a friend who 
was born in Moranbah lamented this attitude among many newer residents, telling me: 
“It’s almost like a rite of passage for people to suffer through Moranbah, you just suffer 
through your years here.” The pastor of a local church even explained the church’s name 
to me, the Oasis Life Church, saying: “an oasis is a place where people come, collect 
what they need from it, and move on. We recognize that our community is like that for 
many.”  
This sense of value extraction from Moranbah is not entirely new and, of course, 
reflects the conditions of extractive coal mining itself. However, the lack of stable 
employment is shifting the frontier building of earlier pioneer imaginations into a more 
purely extractive enterprise, in which labour insecurity discourages social investment. 
The increased precarity of labour through the casualisation of the workforce is increasing 
the precarity of life in the community, not only through employment insecurity and the 
loss of stable futures but also because of the particular spatial organization of labour that 
increased casualisation encourages, particularly FIFO employment. 
These communal changes are articulated in relation to the natural environment, 
particularly how the loss of community and social support relates to a loss of control over 
a harsh nature. The story of the cyclone with which I started this chapter reflects this 
clearly. Although the power of the cyclone was devastating and frightening, it was the 
fact that the father was not able to be home to protect his family that was the real point of 
concern. The vagaries of nature may be frightening but through social protections linked 
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to this pioneering conceptualization of the community, it can be overcome. Nature thus 
cannot be distinguished from the human project of settlement.   
Australian theorist Ghassan Hage has similarly linked settler-colonialism to 
environmental relations in his book Is Racism an Environmental Threat. I will discuss the 
implications of his theorization more thoroughly in chapter three, but what is most useful 
here is his theory of generalized domestication. This, he explains, “is a mode of 
inhabiting the world through dominating it for the purpose of making it yield value: 
material or symbolic forms of sustenance, comfort, aesthetic pleasure, and so on” (Hage 
2017, 87). It is directly linked to settler-colonialism, both through the exploitation of 
people, such as the dispossession of the indigenous population, as well as the exploitation 
of nature. However, his emphasis on domestication is crucial for understanding the social 
value of nature in Moranbah. Hage relates this domestication first to the domestication of 
animals, which beyond exploitation is also the incorporation of animals into human 
socio-economic systems as objects of exchange. It involves taming them in what is meant 
to be a mutually beneficial process to both the animals and their owners. It is a process of 
“bringing into the home” (91). Although this is a “homeliness attained through 
domination” (92). This is quite relevant to the framing of nature in Moranbah. The 
exploitation and domination of nature is done in order to construct home and community. 
Thus, the loss of this home and community also represents a loss in this ability to tame 
nature.  
Resident’s relations to their front lawns and gardens reveal this tension. 
Moranbah’s front lawns of manicured green grass and flowerbeds signal a preservation of 
social settlement, and thus the privileged form of moral community. At the reunion of 
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early residents and miners described earlier, a woman who has now retired to Mackay 
told me, “I went back to Moranbah the other day, and driving around it just made me sad. 
We were so proud of the community we built, but that pride just isn’t there for the new 
generation. No one looks after their garden anymore.” I followed up, “Their garden?” She 
continued, “Yeah, in the old days we all had these beautiful gardens. You’d see everyone 
out there on weekends working on their gardens and the men mowing the grass. The 
other day I didn’t see anyone outside, just lots of weeds.”  
A few weeks later, discussing the foreclosures with a local businesswoman who was born 
and raised in Moranbah, she said:  
I hate seeing all those overgrown lawns. The banks are supposed to mow the 
lawn, but they don’t.  So the town just looks so messy now. It’s like this constant 
reminder of how much the town is struggling see all that tall grass. It’s dangerous 
too! I don’t want my kids walking by that grass; there might be snakes. 
Again, nature should be tamed. Weeds should be pulled, and grass should be cut. When 
this is not done, danger might be lurking. Communal life involves the curating of nature 
to keep it safe and under control. This is a domestic and gendered task. The loss of the 
morally privileged nuclear household and the community ideal they contribute to is thus 
symbolically linked to the loss of this tamed landscape. As Smith argues:  
The reconciliation of history and environment endures as a contested discursive 
field, because its tension is neither wholly naturalised nor wholly accommodated. 
Australian natural history is, then, a national history, saturated in existential and 
normative aspects of human experience (Smith 1999: 302).  
The taming of nature as part and parcel of pioneering success means that the threats to 
this communal organization—the loss of social community which foreclosures and FIFO 
represent—is interpreted symbolically in relation to these ecological forces.  
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This social taming of nature however reaches its most extreme on the mine sites 
themselves. In my early days of fieldwork, I heard the oft-repeated description of mine 
sites as lunarscapes. I had assumed that this was primarily a reference to the craters that 
are associated with the moon. But the first time I managed to spend a day on a mine site, 
I understood this reference differently. Now standing on this scape myself, what struck 
me about the lunarscape description was not the specific shape of the land but the sense 
that you are no longer on Earth. All the familiar and taken-for-granted markers of an 
Earthly grounding are gone. There is so little green, so little dark organic soil, not a single 
weed, no miniscule sounds of insects underfoot. It is dead sterile rock as far as the eye 
can see. Stretching into the horizon, there is nothing but rock and yellow alien life forms 
with large round rubber legs and scooping claws slowly making their way through this 
extra-terrestrial space. Yet, with a look at my human companion next to me, the young 
woman on my football team, I was reminded that I was on Earth.  Then I looked at those 
yellow aliens and realized they were actually trucks being driven by another human, one 
of the young men or women that fill the pubs in the evening and the church on Sunday 
morning. All of a sudden, it seemed incredible, the human ability to construct something 
so massive, so vast, that it can only be understood as extra-terrestrial. On the mine site, 
the sense of human domination is predominant. The belief in technology matched with 
human labour makes the natural environment seem so arbitrary, so malleable.  
When I reflected on these thoughts later to my close interlocuter, a German mine 
engineer, Russell, he agreed and added: 
Yeah, it’s amazing how it all just becomes a new kind of natural landscape. Like,  
I just found out recently that this lake in Germany that I used to go camping at on 
family vacations all the time is actually an old rehabbed mine site. But to think of 
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that area without the lake, it just wouldn’t be natural. That lake was as significant 
a part of the landscape as any other part. 
I will discuss more the political ramifications of this attachment to mined landscapes in 
chapter six, but for now this shows a complex interaction between what is deemed natural 
and the human co-constitution of it.   
Russell was incredibly interested in nature, perhaps more than anyone else I met 
in Moranbah. He loved spending time outdoors and taught me the names of native flora 
and fauna. He even regularly texted me photos of interesting insects he found wandering 
his house or the mine site. He loved to go kayaking and would travel great distances to 
find creeks with enough water in them for a short journey paddling along. He grew up on 
a farm in Germany that his family had owned for several generations, and his general 
love of nature seemed to derive from a childhood spent outdoors.  
As one of my closest friends in Moranbah, I challenged him about his 
environmentalism regularly. I often asked him how he reconciled his love of nature with 
his work as a coal miner. I asked if he ever worried about climate change and his 
contribution to it, or if he felt bad about the destruction he was having on the landscape. 
In answer to the landscape question, he replied there was plenty of land out there and that 
the mines were only a tiny bit of it. In terms of climate change, he would immediately 
deflect using the common refrain that because he was mining coking coal, that largely 
absolved him of responsibility. I pushed him further on this: “Yeah, but your first job was 
in a thermal coal mine”. He replied, “Sure. Fine. But look, at the end of the day, I like my 
job. I get to spend time outside playing with dirt.” The nature he loved and appreciated 
deeply—the joy he felt paddling his kayak along or his excitement over the golden orb 
spider that took up residence in his kitchen—did not raise moral dilemmas with his work 
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in the mines. He enjoyed his work, spending time in his nature, a mine site, which was 
just as natural as the lake he spent his childhood summers swimming in.  
Another example of these differential relations to the environment can be seen 
through the relationship between a young couple Lena and Dane. I took guitar lessons 
while in Moranbah from a young woman, Lena, who had lived in Moranbah for nine 
years, brought there by her husband, Dane, who was an underground miner. Lena was 
very artistic, musical, and into new age spirituality. New age spirituality was relatively 
popular amongst a significant group of women in Moranbah, enough to support a small 
crystal shop in the town shopping mall, and a pop-up yoga studio opened by an intense 
yoga teacher who stood out in town with her shaved head and tan robes. She booked out 
instantly and caused the town to sell out of yoga mats. There was little formality or 
specific doctrine to this spirituality, drawing on a hodgepodge of non-western religious 
practice.  It was more a chance for an exclusively female intimate gathering, particularly 
for those who did not want to look to the Christian churches for this.13  
This sociality increased when Lena began running mantra singing workshops 
monthly. Mostly held in attendees’ back gardens or garages, I attended several where a 
group of ten to twelve women sat in a circle. Lena demonstrated and led us in chants 
from native American folksongs to sikh meditations. She occasionally played guitar or 
rang a Tibetan singing bell. We chanted to channel the energy of the sun, moon, and 
earth: “Ra Ma Da Sa.”  We sang to Mother Earth to guide us through our life cycle: 
 
13 They were enough of a presence in town that when the topic of discussion at the weekly women’s prayer 
group at the evangelical church I attended was “Who in your community is lost and in need of saving?,” the 
group decided that the most lost in the community were “all the people into crystals and meditation.” As 
the women agreed, “they are tempted and corrupted by the devil.” I managed to keep my involvement with 
them to myself until I ran into another member of the church group also attending a meditation circle.  
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“Mother carry me, your child I will always be. Mother carry me back to the sea.”  These 
were fun and intimate events. Throughout the evening we got over our initial shyness and 
opened up to the spirit of the event, singing loudly, laughing and holding hands.  
Over a coffee one afternoon I asked Lena why she thought so many women were 
into spirituality in Moranbah. She offered a theory in her characteristic timidity, “I don’t 
know, but maybe it’s because miners are so down to earth and so they’re attracted to 
women who aren’t, who kind of have their heads in the clouds.”  
I followed up, “but when we’re all singing about Mother Earth together and then go home 
to husbands who are all mining the same Mother Earth, doesn’t that also create a bit of 
hypocrisy?” She responded: 
Yeah sometimes it becomes an issue with me and Dane. When I first met him, I 
thought it was awful that he worked in mining, and I particularly thought coal was 
terrible because of climate change and all. But Dane always explains things well; 
he’s very practical about it. I suppose that’s part of how opposites attract. He says 
the world needs coal and until people are willing to do without most electricity 
and without steal and all the other products that require coal, it’s going to 
continue. So unless we are willing to live like that, we shouldn’t talk about getting 
rid of coal. That’s actually more hypocritical. 
 I witnessed this explanatory clarity often as Dane and I shared several mutual friends. 
One night at the bar—when Lena wasn’t present—I asked him if he was into the same 
new age spirituality as Lena. He said, “Nah, Lena and I are very different.” I ask if he 
means more than just the spirituality. He responded: “Well, you know, she’s an artist, she 
likes different things. I’m a miner, I just need to be in the dirt.”  
What’s interesting in his and Lena’s theory of their difference is not Dane’s lack 
of intimacy with nature, but a different expression of what material form of it he 
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privileged: dirt.  He and Lena both track this material earthiness onto symbolic 
understandings of their personality and their labour, an artist and a miner. I didn’t think to 
ask him explicitly about her theory on ‘groundedness’ and ‘clouds’ but there seems to be 
something to Lena’s theory that he was grounded while she was atmospheric. He was 
practical and expository, and she was mystical and anagogic.  
This intimate interaction with nature through the particular act of labouring in 
earth was often repeated as a celebrated aspect of working in mining. Being covered in 
dirt represented a hard day’s work, but one that was valued as productive. To view 
mining as destructive was not fitting with either the pioneering sociality through which 
mining built Moranbah, nor to the practical need for mined materials for steel or 
electricity. Mining might change the landscape, but this can be transformative rather than 
simply destructive, even making childhood lakes. Climate change is even harder to 
imagine, it is a step away from the intimate way in which miners relate to nature as dirt 
and earth, and into the atmosphere, a space more accommodating to artists with their 
“heads in the clouds.” 
Modularity and Distance-Enabling Technologies 
I will soon discuss the increasing precarity of labour and its flow on effects in 
communal social life in more detail. However, first I want to place the increase in long-
distance commuting in conversation with a larger theoretical discussion on the spatial 
affordances of fossil fuelled capitalism.   
Australia’s two major airlines both fly from Brisbane into the Moranbah airport, 
with several flights in and out per day. One would think this would have the effect of 
decreasing Moranbah’s isolation. However, as FIFO shows, this connectivity has led to 
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the bypassing of the community. James Scott uses the phrase distance-demolishing 
technologies to refer to the roads, bridges, and telecommunications technology which 
reduced the difficulty of travelling through the landscape for the British colonial advance 
into the remote regions of Upland Southeast Asia (2009: 166). However, in the case of 
Moranbah, it is perhaps more accurate to think of the modern roads, comfortable cars, 
and the modern airport as distance-enabling technologies, for although they more readily 
connect Moranbah to major cities, such connection enables the dislocation of labour 
(Harvey and Krohn-Hansen 2018) through the bypassing of the local town and residential 
labourers. 
The grid-like homogenization of modernist state development that Scott describes 
has also been seen in other terms when discussing contemporary forms of neoliberal 
capitalism which are particularly relevant to resource extraction.  Ferguson maintains that 
“[w]hen capital is invested in spatially segregated mineral-extraction enclaves, the ‘flow’ 
of capital does not cover the globe, it connects discrete points on it” (Ferguson 2005: 
379). The creation of distinct points of capital and profit-making are enabled through 
technologies which work to sever extraction from the conditions of its surroundings.  
Malm (2013) describes a similar process in the adoption of fossil-fueled steam 
power in Britain’s cotton mills. Malm argues that rather than the common assumption 
that the adoption of steam power was a result of resource depletion—either forests or 
water resources—coal powered engines were actually adopted due to the spatio-temporal 
opportunities that they presented for the control of labour. Particularly, steam power 
enabled the disembedding of industrial production from the temporal vagaries of natural 
water flows and the demands of the rural labour force, including the obligation to provide 
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local housing and services. The mobility of fossil fuels—opposed to the embeddedness of 
rivers and their rural labourers—enabled mills to concentrate in urban spaces with a 
plentiful reserve army of labour trained in industrial discipline. Thus, it was not the 
necessity of resource depletion, nor even the price of coal power,—as water mills were 
still cheaper—but the desire for labour control that led to the adoption of the coal 
powered steam engine in Britain’s mid-19th century cotton mills. The alienation of 
nature—which mobile coal represented in opposition to emplaced rivers—and the 
alienation of labour were mutually reinforcing in the commodification process of early 
industrial capitalism.  
However, the spatio-temporal organization that Malm (2013) describes for 
Britain’s Industrial Revolution, has differential effects at the source of this fossil fuel 
energy than it does at the point of its use. In other words, although coal-fuelled steam 
power diminished labour power in the cotton mills, the dependence on coal eventually 
saw labour power increase at the coal face.  
Timothy Mitchell (2011) and Andrew Barry (2013) have taken a similar approach 
to energy materiality as Malm (2013), but they have studied the political ramifications of 
energy production and the materialities of their distribution. Mitchell directly compares 
the politics of 19th century coal with those of 20th century oil. He argues that, in contrast 
to the flows of oil, the materiality of coal and the railway distribution chains created a 
number of bottle necks in the distribution of energy.  Further, the underground method of 
mining also distanced miners from supervision and enabled mobilization. General 
political consciousness was not unique to the coal mining industry, but the materiality of 
coal’s transportation enabled strikes and sabotage to be effective, leading to the rise of 
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19th century democratic politics. Mitchell argues, “[s]trikes became effective, not 
because of mining’s isolation, but on the contrary because of the flows of carbon that 
connected chambers beneath the ground to every factory, office, home or means of 
transportation that depended on steam or electric power” (Mitchell 2011: 21). Oil 
extraction, by contrast, required less labour, and workers were more heavily supervised 
as they were not underground and out of sight. Further the liquid form of oil allowed for 
easier transportation along pipelines. Pipelines do not require human operators as trains 
did, were harder to sabotage, and easier to repair. Therefore, the material conditions of oil 
allow its transportation through space to match the jumping of capital between discrete 
points that Ferguson identifies (2005).   
 Mitchell’s argument relies on the historic materiality of coal, but technology has 
shifted the conditions which a coal workforce faces (2011). Modern open-cut mines are 
heavily supervised. Some mines have even implemented SmartCap technology where 
mine machinery operators wear specially fitted hats which monitor their brain waves 
through conducting regular electroencephalograms (EEGs), and which alert their 
supervisors if they show signs of excessive fatigue (Ker 2015). The technology of cheap 
air travel also enables importation of workforces and thus diminishes the labour-
organizing potential of the previously intimate underground miners. These changes to the 
coal industry do not diminish Mitchell’s argument but support it. As Mitchell has argued, 
the oil age has so diminished the democratic politics of the coal age that all we are left 
with is a politics concerned with economic growth, that strives to distance itself from the 
political, as exemplified in the modularity and enclaves of offshore oil extraction (Appel 
2012) but is being reproduced in coal mining’s use of FIFO workforces.  
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Andrew Barry has argued that “[o]il companies have therefore long been 
concerned with the technical and managerial problems, as well as the financial costs, of 
containing and monitoring the unruly properties of both materials and persons” (2013: 
15). Such unruly properties, in the case of Moranbah, are precisely the human employees 
with their attachments to place, family commitments, and social lives which exist outside 
of the workplace. FIFO thus partially reflects what Hannah Appel characterizes as 
‘modularity’ to describe off-shore oil extraction’s infrastructure and techniques through 
which the industry attempts to isolate itself from local conditions. She argues, drawing on 
Anna Tsing, that “[m]odularity draws our attention to the productive though ever-
incomplete work done in the name of frictionlessness and disentanglement” (Appel 2012: 
697).  
  Jessica Smith, further highlights that these resource materialities which matter 
for labour, not only relate to the broad historical narratives that Malm (2013) and 
Mitchell (2011) describe but have quite localized consequences that are simultaneously 
worthy of attention (Smith-Rolston 2013b: 585).  In Moranbah, FIFO mines and, to a 
lesser extent, DIDO practices emphasize the particular labour consequences of coal’s 
materiality here. The long-distance commute turns the coal mines into modular systems, 
which ignore the inevitable embeddedness of their operations in a nearby social world. 
The particular spatial organization of labour that FIFO represents is primarily about 
workforce control and labour commodification. I will now describe the particular ways in 
which FIFO and labour casualisation work to reinforce labour precarity in Moranbah, and 
how they serve the interest of Anthropocenic commodification.  
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From Frontier to Oasis: The Increasing Precarity of Labour and Life 
The first town that the Utah Development Company built in the Bowen Basin was called 
Blackwater, built in 1967 to service the mine of the same name (Peetz and Murray 2010). 
It is about 200 kilometres south of Moranbah. In 2015, the mine, now run by BMA, hired 
a contracting company, Downer EDI, to take over the mine’s operations. The decision to 
operate the Blackwater mine through a contracting company was justified as a necessary 
cost-saving measure in a depressed coal market. Following the pattern through which 
decreased coal prices are used to justify lost labour entitlements (Bowden and Barry 
2015), the move saw the contracting company replace the 306-member permanent 
workforce with casual positions. Some were paid their severance and given the chance to 
reapply for the same job, but as casuals. Others were redistributed to surrounding mines. 
One of the 306, nicknamed Hound Dog for his reputation as a relentless union activist, 
was transferred to Moranbah and would become a key research participant. I first met 
him at a rally in Blackwater that was organized to oppose the casualisation. At the rally, 
he addressed the crowd in a clear expression of the link between precarious labour and 
precarious social life through labour dislocation. He passionately said: 
In moving me and my colleagues and redistributing these positions to a casual style 
workforce, Blackwater has lost many hours of volunteer work, children in our 
schools, locals to support local businesses, and people who love to call Blackwater 
home. My fear for this community and many of our coalfield neighbours in the 
Bowen Basin is that there will become a belief that our towns are just somewhere you 
work instead of somewhere where you live. This will have terrible implications on the 




Figure 1.7 Protest signs displayed along the highway running past Blackwater, 
Queensland.  BMA refers to the BHP-Billiton and Mitsubishi’s partnership, which owns 
several mines in the region, including the Blackwater Mine (Photographs by author) 
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Hound Dog’s comments describe the three main drivers which feed into each other to 
produce increasingly precarious futures: the cyclical nature of the commodity cycle, the 
increased casualisation of the workforce, and the use of long-distance commuting.  
-The Cyclical Commodity Cycle 
It may take two and a half hours to drive to the city of Mackay with 24-hour pharmacies 
and a coastline, but Moranbah is far from disconnected. In fact, it is deeply connected to  
global markets, and perhaps more than most towns in Australia, this link is obvious. 
Moranbah’s surrounding mines primarily export coking coal to Asia and there is little 
alternative industry around to absorb some of the shifts in global demand. The reliance on 
a single commodity means that the town’s economy fluctuates in line with the global 
demand for coking coal and the mining company policies that organize in response. The 
commodification of money, the shift of money from a medium of exchange to an 
increasingly financialized instrument, generates increased instability in global markets 
and has everyday effects, particularly in communities with little alternative industry to 
absorb the shocks of such wider financial speculation (Burawoy 2010).  
As a good friend described this unusual condition of life in Moranbah: “I can’t 
think of any place where you have to think about the long-term price of iron ore. We’re 
such a one-tier economy, you have to think about consumption patterns in China when 
you want to buy a house.” This comment on the vulnerability of life in Moranbah to 
cyclical commodity prices was not an exaggeration—coal market sentiments do have a 
direct effect on housing prices.  Even the local market for luxury items is directly affected 
by coal price projections. For example, while I was conducting fieldwork, a Chinese 
regulation was passed that limited the number of days per year Chinese coal mines were 
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allowed to operate. This instantly raised the price of coal (McHugh 2016). This change 
was much discussed and the news was widely shared. The owner of a local electronics 
store said it was the best day of business he had in years. In short, the shared sentiments 
around the coal price and its instability have a rather direct impact on people’s perception 
of their own precarity, making it harder to imagine and plan for stable futures.   
Of particular relevance to this chapter is that downturns are felt not only at the 
level of everyday expectations and thus consumption choices but also in the relationship 
of the mining companies to their employees. Historically, mining downturns have been 
accompanied by reversals in hard-won worker entitlements. While they recover slightly 
during the boom times, the entitlements gained never match those lost in the previous 
downturn (Bowden and Barry 2015), leading to a general downward trajectory since 
neoliberal labour reforms were first put into place. As Hound Dog’s story shows, cost 
reductions are the main excuse for large-scale workforce casualisation. However, it is 
crucial to understand that market downturns very rarely mean decreased mine production.  
-Casualisation 
The drop in the coal price has made life more difficult in towns that rely on these 
industries. However, this is not because the mines are slowing down production. It is true 
that a few mines in the region have shut down in response to lower prices, leading to lay-
offs; but those that continued operating were actually increasing production.  Increasing 
production allows the mines to lower the unit cost of the coal, thus squeezing out profits 
at the reduced price. These cost-reduction strategies become legitimized as the only 
alternative to shutting down the mines. Despite the downturn in the industry, annual coal 
production in Queensland was 36 million tonnes more in 2015-16 than it was at the end 
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of the boom in 2012 (Queensland Government Data 2018). In other words, the downturn 
means increased rather than decreased coal production but, in order to keep costs down 
and production up, the companies look for ways to reduce employee compensation.  
The main cost savings come from the increasing casualisation of the workforce. 
This is primarily done through contracting mine operations to secondary companies, 
which then function as labour-hire companies. This is what happened at the Blackwater 
Mine and to many of Hound Dog’s colleagues. Miners now work for the contracting 
company as so-called casuals rather than the mining company. They receive lower 
salaries,14 no annual leave, long-service leave, or other entitlements and protections. This 
has been a rather recent and drastic trend. Contractors were only six per cent of the 
Queensland coal workforce in 1996, but by 2005 the figure was 47 per cent (Peetz and 
Murray 2010: 18). It is noteworthy that more recent statistics on this matter do not exist.  
The Australian Bureau of Statistics does not collect this information and the Minerals 
Council of Australia, the main industry body, stopped publishing these statistics in 2007 
(Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union 2018: 21). However, the numbers of 
contractors are likely higher today, as the CFMEU, the main union representing the coal 
miners, has estimated that 1,000 permanent jobs in the mines of the Bowen Basin have 
been replaced by casuals in the last few years (Smith 2016).  
Working for these contracting companies is not like the stable employment of 
previous mining jobs. Many of the contracts on which workers are employed allow their 
contract to be terminated with 24 hours’ notice. As Standing (2016) has shown, while 
increased flexibility is thought to be primarily motivated by the greater ease in firing and 
 
14 In the case of the Blackwater Mine, casuals made 25.7 per cent less than those employed by 
BHP directly (Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union 2018: 21).  
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hiring to match the demands of cyclical markets, this is only one outcome of flexibility. 
Another is that replacing permanent employees with insecure workers makes it harder for 
workers to organize (Standing 2016: 37). As Parry argues, “[k]eeping workers guessing 
about the company’s intentions and in suspense about the security of their jobs 
predisposes them to acquiesce to the deterioration of their employment conditions” 
(2018: 12). This is evident in the broader coal industry strategy towards de-unionization. 
This insecurity in combination with the “displace[ment of] the unionized workforce with 
contractors” saw that “union density in coal mining declined from 75.5% to 39.8% 
between 2001 and 2013” (Bowden and Barry 2015: 51).  
The form of workforce casualisation in the Bowen Basin has often lowered 
operating costs through contracting-out operations but, beyond immediate cost reductions 
casualisation also enables increased workforce control (Parry 2018: 8). This is a longer-
term strategy towards workforce commodification in pursuit of frictionless profits (Tsing 
2005). The increased discipline and control discourage unionism. Less organized 
workforces—either through decreased wages and entitlements or through fewer 
workplace stoppages—are less expensive over time.  Greater control also explains the 
benefit of FIFO employment to the mines. It may seem entirely wasteful to be regularly 
flying workers in and out of a regional area rather than hiring locals. However, savings 
that derive from such workforce control compensate for the expense of the commute. 
These conditions closely reflect the spatio-temporal implications of fossil fuel capitalism 
identified by Malm (2013) and Mitchell (2011) in which workforce control is the main 
motivation for the particular organization that Anthropocenic capitalism takes. 
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-Long-Distance Commuting 
This increase in casualisation is implicated in the increase of long-distance commuting 
practices like FIFO and drive-in-drive-out (DIDO). DIDO is similar to FIFO but, here, 
workers commute by car between their family homes on the coast and their workplaces. 
They stay at camp or in town during their working days and nights and return to families 
on the coast on their days off. Those I knew who DIDO’ed often told me that it was 
because of the better facilities located on the coast in Mackay that they chose this 
commuting pattern. The lack of a movie theatre in town, inadequate healthcare, childcare 
or alternative employment for the non-mining spouse were often described as the primary 
objects that Moranbah lacked, but that the coastal town of Mackay offered.   
DIDO is often presented as a lifestyle choice, and scholars who have studied it 
closely show that DIDO “was an informal rather than a company-directed process, albeit 
one driven by changed job circumstance” (Bowden and Barry 2015: 54; see also Murray 
and Peetz 2010, 2011). These job circumstances include the difficult shift schedules, to 
be discussed in the next chapter, and also the increasing casualisation of the workforce. 
When jobs are insecure, this discourages miners from uprooting their families and 
moving them to Moranbah. As a local council woman explained, “if you’ve got 
companies systematically casualising the workforce, that effects the community. People 
don’t move when they are on six-month contracts.” It is a reasonable risk reduction 
strategy in the context of precarious employment for families to maintain residence in 
coastal towns, where there are larger family support networks and potential employment 
for the non-mining spouse. The conditions are legitimized as a choice which—as 
Burawoy has shown through the metaphor of the game—is central to how capitalism 
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generates the consent of labour. As Burawoy argues, “[i]t is by constituting our lives as a 
series of games, a set of limited choices, that capitalist relations not only become objects 
of consent but are taken as given and immutable” (Burawoy 1979: 93). The choice that 
surrounds DIDO commuting represents such strategic moves and the pursuit of life 
projects within changing spatial and temporal circumstances.  
The growth in fly-in-fly-out (FIFO), however, has been more deliberate, and Bowden 
and Barry argue: 
Many of those who commuted from the coast were workers with established ties to 
the historic coal communities. The recent decision of producers such as BHP Billiton 
to not only utilize FIFO employment but to also avoid recruiting from Central 
Queensland, therefore, represents not an alteration of industrial relations practice but 
a fundamental recasting (2015: 54).  
This increase in FIFO is more notably linked with control than is DIDO. Although 
Parry argues that control is often more important than cost savings in workforce 
casualisation (Parry 2018: 8), control and cost savings go hand in hand. BMA’s own 
submission into the parliamentary inquiry into FIFO lays out the business case for FIFO 
most clearly. BMA’s two 100 per cent FIFO mines are 26 per cent more productive than 
the mines with residential workforces. Absence rates are only 1.5 per cent at FIFO mines 
compared to 4 per cent at residential mines, and most strikingly, “[e]mployee disputes 
measured per person is about 47 times less at our FIFO mines” (BHP-Billiton 2015: 9). 
These statistics emphasize the productivity benefit of the alienation of labour to the 
mining companies. Absenteesim is reduced as social and familial demands are distanced 
from the workplace, and increased control and monitoring leads to mine productivity 
increases. This last statistic about employee disputes is especially illustrative of another 
crucial element of control for alienation; that of labourers from each other. FIFO 
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discourages the formation of relations between mine employees. They do not play on the 
same local sports teams or have children at the same schools; their families are unlikely 
to know each other as they are geographically distant. A lack of employee disputes also 
means a lack of employee relationships. 
 By recruiting from Brisbane and Cairns, mining companies are more easily able to 
target employees without family connections to mining, and thus the unions. There was 
an obvious distinction between long-term residents and more recent arrivals in terms of 
how they viewed the labour unions. My housemate, Slimbo, who I will describe further 
in chapter three, was a second-generation Moranbah local. He was a proud member of the 
CFMEU. He marched in labour parades, attended all branch meetings, wore the union’s 
stickers on his hard hat. Yet many of my other friends, who were employed as casuals 
and not members of the union, would speak negatively of the union. I heard a comment 
repeated several times that the unionized labourers were overly entitled and would strike 
if the mine ran out of sugar for their tea. These radically different attitudes to the unions 
reflect their different historical and familial experiences, particularly the strong labour 
solidarity that had been crafted and nourished by the emplaced community in Moranbah. 
Recruiting from outside enabled the mining companies to avoid this attachment to labour 
unionism. A state-level leader of the CFMEU summarized this to me when he stated in an 
interview, “I reckon they [mining companies] have 20-year plays…They’re willing to 
lose money in the short term. It’s obvious because the list just goes on and on of all the 
ways they are working to strip worker protections, destroy the union, and destroy 
community.” 
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All these elements of alienation discourage labour organizing and decrease resistance 
to precarious employment. It creates a feedback loop through which increased 
casualisation encourages FIFO as families choose not to relocate to the mine fields as 
they are unsure of the stability of jobs there, and the practice of FIFO further increases 
the casualisation of the workforce by weakening labour organizing capacity. Thus, the 
increased casualisation of the workforce draws on and reproduces particular spatial 
formations enabled by technologies of connection and disconnection alongside crafting 
the conditions in which people must pursue their life projects.  
The increased options to commute facilitated by better roads, a local airport, and the 
willingness of the mining company to hire non-residential workforces mean that a 
growing number of mine employees now do reside outside Moranbah permanently. Many 
take up this offer to FIFO within the changed employment circumstances, preferring the 
better amenities in larger towns and cities on the coast. Thus, the feedback loop through 
which labour casualisation and FIFO reinforce each other is matched by a feedback loop 
of community precarity. This was continually reflected upon by long-term Moranbah 
residents who often complained about the difficulty of recruiting members to social clubs 
and sport that were once so central to the emplaced community.  
As more people choose to commute long-distance, less is invested back into the 
emplaced community. This is so, both in terms of mine employees’ wages when they  no 
longer shop at local stores or imbibe in local pubs, and in terms of the various social 
activities that were prized as the condition of Moranbah’s recent pioneer heritage. The 
presence of young families, and in particular women’s volunteer labour (to be discussed 
further in the next chapter) were crucial to the pioneer community building project and 
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the generalized domestication (Hage 2017) through which they relate to an oppositional 
nature. Thus the precarity of labour for those in insecure jobs translates into a kind of 
precarity of life for those who manage to hold onto their permanent positions and prefer 
to live locally, as the social relations and institutions of their community weaken (Kasmir 
and Carbonella 2008; Sanchez 2016: 13). In the words of Hound Dog, the dislocation of 
labour in this community makes Moranbah “somewhere you work instead of somewhere 
where you live.”  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the spatial dynamics of the commodification of extractive 
labour. It highlighted that the contemporary form of labour dislocation (Harvey and 
Krohn-Hansen 2018) in Moranbah is not an inevitable outcome of its geographic 
isolation, but flexibly utilized to fit the demands of Anthropocenic commodification 
(Malm 2013; Mitchell 2011). The particular spatial organization and modularity (Appel 
2012) that are characteristic of the commodification of labour in Moranbah through long-
distance commuting implicate the commodification of land. Land becomes a source of 
minerals to be extracted rather than a socially meaningful location of emplaced 
community, shifting extraction further from the community building of previous pioneer 
imaginations. Further, the commodification of money, through the speculative boom and 
bust of commodity cycles, reinforces the commodification of labour.  
As is illustrated by the description of the cyclone which started this chapter, just 
as the commodification of labour, land, and money reinforce each other, so too do the 
forms of precarity that result from the experience of this commodification. Contemporary 
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forms of precarity in Moranbah are crafted by unstable commodity cycles, labour 
alienation, and extractive but simultaneously domesticating relationships to the 
environment. Through these, the precarity of labour through casualisation is intertwined 
with the precarity of emplaced social life. However, these conditions of commodification 
arise in relation to people’s life projects as they shape the conditions to which the 
increased commodification of labour must respond.  
The preference of mining companies to fly an entire workforce into and out of an 
established town that has plenty of skilled workers to take these jobs has attracted 
significant political pushback, such that this mandatory FIFO was recently made illegal 
under the aegis of postcode discrimination. However, as I have argued, even when it is 
not mandated, the structures of precarity which encourage such practices, and thus allow 
them to be legitimized as a choice, have already been laid down (Burawoy 1979). 
Further, despite legislative changes to mandatory FIFO, these long commutes are only an 
example of a broader trend of labour commodification which reaches its extreme in 
Western Australia, where Rio Tinto is running its Mine of the Future programme.  
Rio Tinto’s Mine of the Future is an automation programme implemented in a 
number of its iron ore mines in the Pilbara of Western Australia. These mines are 
managed from an Operations Centre in Perth, over 1,000 kilometres away. An Automated 
Drilling System has been trialled and is expanding, and an Automated Haulage System 
sees 69 fully automated trucks moving iron ore through the mine before being loaded 
onto what will be the “the world’s first fully autonomous, long-distance, heavy-haul rail 
network, operating the world’s largest and longest robots” (RioTinto 2018). Although as 
Bear et al. (2015) have argued, commodification is never complete, such robots represent 
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the closest approximation to it. While iron ore is more amenable to automation through a 
less complex deposit geology, the technological momentum reveals that the dream of 
‘The Mine of the Future’ is not just a mine without a community but a mine without a 
human workforce.  
Although this form of mining may at first appear to fit with a settler-colonial 
sense of nature as primarily a resource, in actuality, the sociality and domestication of 
such extractivism is fundamental to its moral valuation. Thus as mining companies work 
to distance extraction from the communities built around it, they undermine the particular 
relationality and co-constitutionality of nature and community that characterizes 
Moranbah residents’ conceptualisations of their labour productivity. 
 The pioneering construction of nature as adversary is also fundamentally about 
the construction of social community which overcomes the hardships it presents. There is 
still human hubris and hierarchy here, but within this perspective is a sense of social and 
communal benefit through generalized domestication (Hage 2017). The alienation of 
contemporary mining labour undermines the communal ability to respond to 
environmental threat and thus the coordination of these two challenges represents a 
connection between the threat of the environment to that of labour. 
This highlights the critical importance of disentangling the specifics of 
ontological foundations of the Anthropocene. It significantly shows the context specific 
environmentalism in Moranbah that connects the labour precarity residents face to their 
particular understanding of natural and social entanglements, which although deriving 
from modernist foundations are not so simply or entirely defined by them. It also, as I 
will show in chapter three, helps build an understanding of the tangled anxieties and 
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moral accusations that link labour and environmental concerns in the rise of populist 
politics. I once asked a long-term Moranbah resident and unionized permanent employee 
of the Goonyella open cut mine, “What do you think is the future of Moranbah? What do 
you hope for and what do you think the reality is?” He responded:  
I hope it continues on. There is no reason why we can’t remain a family friendly 
vibrant community. Simply because there is no other way to make steal, we’re 
100 per cent coking coal, and the reserves are here. It’s just whether people want 
to be part of the community…I’m not sure what I expect to happen. If we keep 
electing conservative governments, they’ll legislate us out of existence. If we 
continue to see multinationals rule with an iron fist, they’ll break us down. If 
automation takes hold, it’s still 4 or 5 years off, but it will get rid of the need for 
us. 
Although these dynamics are clearly reinforcing the precarity of life—labour and 
environmental—in Moranbah for many, there are some who manage to benefit from 
these new spatial organizations. In other words, there are some whose particular life 
projects are more amenable to these transformations. Precarity as an analytic has a 
tendency to privilege conservative positions, “in the broad sense of seeking to preserve 
the status quo” (Millar 2017: 2). This might be considered a positive when it comes to a 
more conservationist form of environmentalism, as I will discuss in chapter 6. However, 
in its application to labour, the emphasis on increased precarity for some tends to ignore 
the many who never had the security of stable Fordist employment in the first place. 
Precariousness has always been unevenly distributed by geography, race, class, and 
gender. The increased precarity of the community in Moranbah illustrates such a 
conservative tendency, as those who are now seeming to lose the stability of their 
previously emplaced social life are precisely those that have most benefitted in recent 
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history: largely male, working class, white-settler Australians with heteronormative 
nuclear families. It is to the gendered dynamics of precarity that this thesis will now turn.  
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CHAPTER TWO: A Part-Time Marriage: Shift-work, the household, and the 
feminisation of labour in Moranbah 
 
I met Caitlin, who later became my closest friend in Moranbah, after soliciting research 
participants through the local newspaper. When I arrived at her home for the first time, I 
recognized her from the local church and learned that she too was an American. We 
quickly bonded over our ‘outsider’ observations of Australian life. Caitlin had come to 
Moranbah eight years ago in her early twenties after meeting her now husband online. 
When we first met, her husband, Tyler, had been recently laid off from a permanent job, 
which meant he took an AU$60,000 pay cut when he moved to a casual position. They 
used his severance to pay off their debt which they had accrued during the boom times, in 
a familiar pattern where higher incomes were often accompanied by higher levels of 
indebtedness.  
Tyler was born in the Moranbah hospital in the mid-1980s to parents who had 
come in the early years of the town. Today, expectant mothers are generally sent to stay 
in the coastal town of Mackay for the month leading up to their due date. When I first 
interviewed Tyler and Caitlin, I asked them about why they chose to stay in Moranbah. 
Tyler told me: “It would be hard to leave. Here I have my home. I have my spot to fill; I 
have my place.” Listening to Tyler, Caitlin offered her own experience expressing her 
frustration at the lack of opportunities that life in Moranbah offered her as a young 
mother but resigning herself to her fate with the statement, “but faith always helps us 
know that we are always where we are meant to be.” She then paused, smiled, and 
uttered, “I wouldn’t mind if God wanted us to be in Mackay though,” and they both 
laughed.  
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 Several months later, Tyler was offered a permanent position. However, because 
it was on a crew in which everyone else FIFO-ed, the shift schedule for the job was 
fourteen 12-hour days in a row, followed by thirteen days off. Caitlin and Tyler had a 
three-year old son, Andy, who Caitlin was looking after full time. She was anxious about 
these 14 days looking after their toddler on her own, but they needed the security of a 
permanent position. Caitlin struggled adjusting to this new schedule. Her son often only 
saw his father for half an hour each night. By the second week of 12-hour shifts, Tyler 
was exhausted and struggled to contribute much to the intimacy of the household.  
Caitlin had her own aspirations which did not always fit into the conditions of 
Moranbah. Unlike for her husband, Moranbah was not her hometown and she was only 
linked to life in Moranbah through her commitment to her husband and son. Tyler’s new 
work schedule tested the conditions that had previously equated her commitment to her 
nuclear family with the need to live in Moranbah. When Tyler was working, she and her 
son didn’t get to spend much time with him anyway, so why not move somewhere where 
she could pursue her own interests? The possibility of Tyler’s FIFO schedule made it 
possible for her to consider moving the family to the town of Mackay on the coast (a two 
and a half hour drive away) and have Tyler commute back and forth. 
She confided in me that she was worried particularly about what she would do to 
keep herself busy when her son started school. She had never finished university, having 
followed Tyler to Australia at a young age. She was smart and motivated, and wanted to 
finish her degree, but Moranbah offered little opportunity for her to grow and to pursue 
her own goals. “I’m really ready to get to work, even if it’s just McDonald’s, but there is 
no childcare. There are only twenty spots for his [Andy’s] age group,” she lamented. 
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Although Moranbah offered little in the way of part-time employment or tertiary 
education opportunities, she was willing to do anything, as the reference to McDonald’s 
was intended to imply. But it was the lack of alternative childcare that she identified as 
the primary structural constraint to her fulfilment.  
As time went on and our relationship strengthened, I began to learn that part of 
the appeal of moving to Mackay was also a desire to build more stable friendships. She 
felt she was continually being left behind as her friends moved on. Our own friendship 
flourished when her previous best friend moved to Mackay and I became a replacement, 
but my time in town was also limited. One night we went out to the Black Nugget pub 
and getting along so well, chatting and playing pool, another group of women 
commented on how we looked like such good friends. Mel instantly responded, “Well, 
until she leaves me.” She continued, “In this town, you have to have friends like you use 
to have men, a few dates or a one-night stand”.  Ultimately Caitlin decided against 
moving, telling me “my marriage is worth more than convenience”. They have since 
purchased a home in Moranbah, had a second child and are expecting their third.   
Caitlin’s dilemma illustrates the impact of the temporality of work regimes on 
household and social organization (Thompson 1967: 79, 93-97) and, in particular, the 
ways in which shift work encourages long-distance commuting. However, her story also 
shows how the organization of labour intersects with life projects and familial priorities 
such that, beyond merely responding to the demands of capital, people’s desires, morals, 
and affects also feed back into such structures (Bear et al. 2015; Gibson-Graham 2006 
[1996]). Her husband’s FIFO schedule—and the potential for him to commute—offered 
Caitlin opportunities to pursue a different future for herself and her family, even though it 
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simultaneously put new strains on the household dynamics and discouraged her 
attachment to the local community. Although Caitlin ultimately decided to stay living 
locally, for the many who do choose to commute, the pursuit of personal desires and 
alternative social forms enables a dislocated labour regime which may suit the ends of 
extractive capitalism.  
The changes to the spatial organization of labour recounted in the previous 
chapter have increased precarity for the emplaced community. At the same time, they 
have shifted the forms of social organization, presenting new opportunities for some. This 
chapter explores the intersection of the temporality of labour organization with the 
pursuit of individual and familial life projects. It follows feminist analyses. These 
highlight the complex interaction between capitalism and social life and argue that, rather 
than seeing capitalism as a monolithic force on social organization, non-capitalist 
relations co-exist and even impact the form that capitalism takes (Bear et al. 2015; 
Empson 2018; Gibson 1992; Gibson-Graham 2006 [1996], 2011). Such insights have 
particular consequences for the analysis of precarity, particularly the gendered 
implications of post-Fordist labour transformation and its social effects.  
The chapter will first describe the changes in household organization in Moranbah 
and show how these reflect the nature of new temporal work arrangements. It will 
highlight how the changes present new challenges for nuclear households but 
simultaneously offer new opportunities for alternative household structures and 
socialities. I will then show what a focus on the household offers for understanding 
labour-related precarity and the temporality of labour relations. This has particular 
insights for arguments about the feminization of labour and its relation to precarity 
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(Standing 2016). I will show that flexibility—as a condition of precarious labour—is 
linked to familial demands and the dislocation of reproductive labour from the 
workplace, but this is also made possible as people pursue alternative life projects.  
The Male-Headed Household: gendered impact of rotating shift work  
As I have described, Moranbah was built to house the families of the men who worked in 
the newly built open-cut mines. In the 1970s women did not work in the mines 
themselves. Thus, the structures of employment and the provision of housing meant that 
wives followed their husbands’ work to Moranbah. Women had little opportunity for 
employment outside the mines, only in the few service industries that developed in the 
town. It was primarily young families who moved to Moranbah; recently married couples 
and nuclear families with small children. This earned Moranbah the nickname ‘the town 
without grandmothers’ as few extended family members made the move. Early residents 
told me stories of how their children, when on vacation, were fascinated by all the old 
people. Such people were rarely seen in Moranbah. This youthfulness is also credited 
with the growth and enthusiasm with which Moranbah developed a culture of community 
sports and social clubs. But it also meant limited childcare was available from extended 
family. This, alongside the lack of employment options, left many mothers working 
fulltime in the home.  
Claire Williams conducted a sociological study of the area in 1975 and 1976, 
looking precisely at the issues of family life and marriage in Moranbah, which she gave 
the pseudonym Open Cut. She emphasizes the burden that mining shift work places on 
female labour. According to Williams, “[i]n Open Cut [Moranbah] capitalism and the 
patriarchal hierarchy have intertwined themselves into a mutually dependent structure 
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exemplified by the shift work system. This structure deepens the oppression of working 
class women” (Williams 1981: 190). Williams argues that the lack of employment 
opportunities for women and the nature of shift work limited women’s possibilities for 
fulfilling lives outside the home, reinforcing their oppression.  Reading Williams’ work 
today, what is striking is that the shift work she describes as causing significant 
disruptions to social and family life looks positively benign in contrast to contemporary 
conditions. Today, many people reflect that the shift work schedule of the time was the 
most amenable to working men’s participation in family life.  
At the time of her study, only those working on the dragline crews worked 
continuous rosters. The majority of the workforce was divided into four crews which 
each worked only eight-hour shifts, rotating through five weekdays of work in morning 
shifts, then five days of afternoon and five days of evening shifts. This temporal work 
regime was compatible with the structure of the nuclear family that was the norm in 
Moranbah. This included the active community social life of regular Saturday and 
Sunday weekends as well as the privileging of heteronormative cohabitating nuclear 
families, with young school-aged children and mothers who stayed home.  
By the time Katherine Gibson came to study the area in the late 1980s (Gibson 
1991, 1992, 1993), a drop in the price of coal caused a restructuring of the industrial 
award—the agreement which set working conditions and entitlements in the mines. The 
new award went into effect in 1988 and was designed to maximize profits. It led to the 
adoption of the continuous production schedule on the mines and the adoption of the 
seven-day roster. Now the workforce, still divided into four crews, worked seven 
consecutive days of either morning, afternoon or night shifts of eight-hours each. The 
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crews then rotated through this series, with a day off in between and four days off at the 
end of the cycle (Gibson 1992, 1993). This led to the loss of a traditional week and 
weekend for mine employees. In fact, it was designed to enable a majority of working 
days on weekends, as weekend hours were paid double. This meant a substantial pay rise 
for miners, garnering support for the changes from the workforce. However, this shift 
schedule put miners out of synch with the schedules of their households.  
The loss of the weekend was felt profoundly, as much of family and community 
life revolved around shared weekend activities, primarily sport.  Taking men’s weekends 
away further burdened the wives of miners since it further reduced their husbands’ 
contribution to family and social life. Gibson identifies how this put a strain on the 
relationships in the family, occasionally leading to their breakdown (Gibson 1992: 46). 
The expectations of marriage included companionship, the distribution of specific 
household tasks to men, and the presence of fathers in particular community spaces, such 
as at football or cricket matches, but these expectations became harder to meet. Further, 
one of these important expectations was enabling women free time to contribute to 
community work and volunteering which went to building the strong sense of a 
pioneering community described in the previous chapter.  
However, when comparing this to the continuous rosters of today, in which 
workers now work 12-hour continuous rotating shifts, the dynamics that Gibson and 
Williams identify have worsened further.  The bust in the mid-1990s led to the adoption 
of the 12-hour shifts that are common in the industry today. The ‘six and six’ is a 
common variant, which is three 12-hour day shifts, and then three 12-hour night shifts, 
with a so-called pyjama day in the middle. A pyjama day is the 24 hours between the end 
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of the previous day shifts and the beginning of the next round of night shifts where the 
worker has to adjust his sleeping schedule. After these six days of working, he had six 
days off. Another common shift is called the lifestyle roster, also known as the ‘divorce 
roster’ because of the strain it puts on families. It is a 5/4/4/5 roster, that is, five day or 
night 12-hour shifts on, four days off, four day or night 12-hour shifts on, and five days 
off. The main legitimation of these rosters is that they maximize productivity, as 12-hour 
shifts require one fewer work crew changeovers and thus there is less downtime for the 
machinery. However, the rotating nature of the shift schedule through days and nights is 
less clear from a productivity perspective. It was often described to me that this was an 
egalitarian measure, as it meant everyone had to do their share of the dreaded night shifts 
(cf. Smith-Rolston 2014). 
To most, although the booms and busts mark important points on the 
community’s historical timeline, the adoption of the 12-hour shifts is the major historic 
turning point.  When the early residents told me stories about the “good old days” they 
often prefaced these with something like, “this was before the 12-hour shifts”. Although 
men were able to contribute less when the mines moved to the seven-day continuous 
roster through lost weekends in 1988 (Gibson 1992, 1993), they still had the ability to 
take part in social activities during the days they worked. With the eight-hour shifts, 16 
hours of their days were still theirs to distribute between sleep, family, and social 
activities. With the 12-hour shifts there was now no time for doing much more than sleep 
and commute during non-working hours. Similarly, the long blocks of working days 
mean that exhaustion builds, and despite being home after work, miners have little energy 
to take part in household activities. This makes co-habitation during working days feel 
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unimportant, and thus makes long-distance commuting a smaller sacrifice. A woman 
whose husband worked a ‘7 and 7’ another common shiftwork variant with rotating 
weeks of day and night 12-hour shifts, described how she often struggled with whether 
living in Moranbah was worth it. She didn’t particularly enjoy life in the town, and was 
doing an undergraduate degree in psychology online. She would have preferred attending 
classes, but she also wanted to live with her husband. However, she also recognized that 
this was more a personal preference than an obvious choice. She told me:  
The last two days of his seven, he’s not worth talking to… I’m not going to say 
it’s the same as having him gone, because at least I know he is down the hall if I 
need him. But in terms of the day to day emotional support, he’s not there. Then 
after his seven days working, his first and second days of rest are pretty much a 
wash as he’s just recovering. But the next five days are good. 
Such shift schedules, as Jessica Smith has described, alter kinship relations, as 
work crews on similar shifts become the basis of social life as they spend much of their 
time together and have schedules that align more closely than those of one’s nuclear 
family (Smith-Rolston 2014). This time spent away from family, and particularly the lack 
of shared meals and simple routines of everyday life, puts similar strains on the nuclear 
family in Moranbah. She, however, focuses more on the work crews themselves, 
analysing how the shared shift schedules undermine gender difference in the mixed-
gender crews because of the shared hardship and development of kin-like relations 
(2014). In Moranbah, in contrast, significantly fewer women work in the mines and 
particularly in the operating and technical jobs which face these challenging shift 
schedules. In 2016, only 11.6 per cent of the coal mining workforce in Australia was 
female. Only 8 per cent of machinery operators and drivers were female, and only 3.4 per 
cent of labourers and 2.5 per cent of technicians or ‘tradies’ in Australian parlance. 
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Women are primarily employed in clerical and administrative roles, where they represent 
76.3 per cent of these positions, and constitute 100 per cent of the workforce in 
‘community and personal services’ in the coal mining industry (Workplace Gender 
Equality Agency 2018). The majority of women who work in the mines, then, are still not 
working on shift schedules, as most administrative roles work more conventional hours 
(and a number of operators and drivers may be working the ‘mummy shift’, which I will 
describe shortly). Therefore, the impact of continuous rotating 12-hour shift schedules is 
significantly gendered and often reinforces already existing gendered divisions of labour 
within households.  
These shift schedules particularly strain families with children, which Jessica 
Smith also finds in Wyoming (Smith-Rolston 2014). First, they make it difficult for the 
partner of the miner – primarily the male miners’ wife—to take on any employment. 
Although there is little work available outside mining, for those who might find work in 
the local service industries, it becomes difficult to manage the family schedule. And for 
the few families where both partners work, either one or both doing shift work in the 
mines, outside childcare is necessary. As I mentioned there is a lack of extended family 
networks in Moranbah and thus a lack of kin who might otherwise have been able to look 
after children. There are also few childcare centres in Moranbah and few places for pre-
school aged children. Further, the rotating night and day-shift work makes the regular 
nine to five hours of even the childcare centre incompatible with two shift-working 
parents. The only real option for those with two mining parents is to hire live-in au pairs. 
This makes Moranbah the host of a constantly rotating population of young men and 
women from Europe, the US, and Hong Kong, working in Moranbah for six months at a 
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time. This is however prohibitively expensive for most and the lack of permanence this 
means for children is also viewed negatively by many.  
This lack of childcare and the familial dilemmas that shiftwork presents, reflect 
the complexity of decision making faced by Caitlin as described in the introduction to 
this chapter. However, the new conditions of labour, particularly the concentrated blocks 
of working hours, also present the opportunity to commute long-distance for the mining 
spouse. This has presented a new set of possible strategies for household organization.  
Gibson returned to her earlier work in the region in her writings with Julie 
Graham, republishing her 1992 article on Moranbah with updated commentary in The 
End of Capitalism (as We Knew It) (2006 [1996]: 206-237). Crucially, the work on 
miners’ wives is intended to highlight the coexistence of non-capitalist processes with 
those of capitalism, and in particular the efficaciousness of the household on industry 
organization. She uses the concept of the feudal domestic, although recognizing the 
problematic historic associations of the term ‘feudal,’ to emphasize this particular non-
capitalist formation within mining households. The terminology is less critical than the 
particular point which the analysis is making regarding the role of the household. 
Gibson-Graham (2006 [1996]) see divorce and men’s increased absenteeism as a 
potential form of class struggle as women react to the increased burden that the seven-day 
roster places on them. Their main evidence for this argument is that the seven-day roster 
was accompanied by increased absenteeism. They deem this a sign of women’s 
successful imposition of demands on their husband’s time over his waged employment. 
They also argue that the seven-day roster is increasing the incidence of family breakdown 
and divorce.  
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Gibson-Graham (2006 [1996]) argue that this shows the impact of household 
organization and non-capitalist class processes on the form industrial labour takes. 
Particularly, they point out that mining companies in the region were beginning to 
question whether the seven-day roster was sustainable with these high absentee rates. 
This was a prescient observation, as the more recent forms of labour spatial and temporal 
organization have now similarly reoriented to these tensions. However, rather than 
returning to shorter work hours more amenable to the co-habiting nuclear family, the 
mining companies have opted instead for concentrating working hours and days to 
encourage long-distance commuting.  
The links between the adoption of the seven-day roster and the more recent 
adoption of FIFO is rather direct. Firstly, the major benefit of FIFO to the mining 
companies is increased production from reduced absenteeism. Secondly, although not 
always taking the form of divorce or pathologized as family ‘breakdown’, the co-habiting 
nuclear family is no longer the only form of social organization for mining employees as 
long-distance commuting becomes more common and many women refuse the perceived 
limitations that life as a housewife in Moranbah entails.  The choice to move—a choice 
structured by the temporal pressures and mobility possibilities of contemporary 
Moranbah—is often taken as a result of a wife’s demand to live elsewhere. This insight 
raises a discomforting question. Is the adoption of FIFO and other long-distance 
commuting not only the newest form of labour alienation, but also simultaneously the end 
result of miners’ wives’ successful class struggle against the oppressive temporal and 
spatial conditions of a Moranbah marriage? 
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Precarity, Gender, and the Household: a feminist contribution  
The question of whether FIFO might be the result of women’s ‘class struggle’ 
gets at the heart of a problematic tendency in precarity studies. Precarity successfully 
connects the loss of stable Fordist employment to a more generalized insecurity deriving 
from the affective loss of stable futures in the Anthropocenic present. However, the 
concept also has a tendency to privilege the status-quo. As analyses of precarity lament 
the loss of stable Fordist employment, they can reproduce the power dynamics that were 
part and parcel of the social structures around this social and political formation, 
particularly racial, class, and gendered inequalities (Millar 2017). This is particularly 
evident in the relationship of the gendered household in Moranbah, in which the stable 
employment of the early years of the town were dependent on the existence of male 
wage-earner headed nuclear households. Now, the opportunities of long-distance 
commuting and the temporality of concentrated blocks of work and leisure schedules are 
beginning to reorganize forms of sociality and family. However, this is not a uni-
directional process, for they are entangled with the pursuit of life projects, particularly of 
women who face new opportunities and constraints.  
The analysis of E.P Thompson (1967), which showed how the organization of 
time under waged industrial labour crafted particular worker subjectivities, is reflected in 
how “the transition to precarious labor in contemporary capitalism is also a process 
involving the transformation of desires, values, and arts of living” (Millar 2014: 45). Just 
as the power dynamics of industrial temporalities were not gender-neutral (Parry 2005), 
nor are the gendered experiences of precarity in post-Fordism (Federici 2008). The 
particular arts of living as people respond to industrial labour feed back into the form 
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which such industrialism takes. Social and household organization thus have a particular 
impact on the way in which capitalism is organized. This relates to broader feminist 
critiques which have challenged assumptions about the unidirectionality of economic 
change. Feminist-informed analyses of capitalism have shown how work regimes not 
only create subjects, but subjects, including women, also create and influence the 
particular forms that capitalism takes (Bear et al. 2015; Gibson-Graham 2006 [1996]). 
The household is a crucial site for recognizing the mutually constitutive relations 
between social life and capitalism or, as Melhuus puts it, a double focus, “on one hand, 
on those relations and practices that contribute towards reproducing a particular economy 
(through relations of labour); and, on the other, on those relations and practices that 
contribute towards creating a livelihood” (Melhuus 2018: 84).  The household has 
historically been important in anthropological analyses to describe the basic social unit of 
production/reproduction and consumption (Moore 1994; Yanagisako 2001) and is central 
to Willams’(1981) and Gibson’s (1991, 1992, 1993) work in Moranbah where it can help 
to reveal the gendered divisions of productive activity and, in particular, the way in which 
political economic conditions are interlinked with the everyday and affective (Ahearn 
2018; Melhuus 2018). The particular form of the nuclear household linked to Fordist 
employment in Moranbah is now being reworked. Changing structures of employment – 
particularly long-distance commuting and shift-schedules incompatible with family life – 
interact with women’s life projects. This does not occur without pushback, however, as 
the normative form of a co-habiting nuclear family is much debated within the 
community. 
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The new options that FIFO and DIDO present to wives and single women have 
brought many of the underlying moral assumptions and normative expectations of 
women’s sacrificial role in the nuclear family into question and negotiation. A 
perspective which privileges ‘the marriage’ over the particular demands of the wife is 
echoed in sentiments that I heard over and over again from wives in the community who 
had tried FIFO and moved to Moranbah to reunite with their husbands. A volunteer at the 
radio station told me, “I didn’t get married to have a part-time marriage.”  A teacher 
married to a miner explained to me, “in my experience from watching many friends, 18 
months is the pressure point. Either the marriage breaks up or people stop doing it.” A 
South African woman who had moved to Australia with her husband 20 years ago, 
described how when they stopped doing FIFO and moved to Moranbah together, it took 
them several months to get used to each other again, saying “It’s impossible to have a 
good marriage that is two weeks on, two weeks off”.  
These perspectives reflect a moral privileging of the nuclear family and 
particularly the cohabitation of the married couple above the individual concerns of the 
wife and mother. As Williams suggested, “[m]oral values about love and duty, and a 
socioeconomic system which barely provides alternative means of support for any 
women with dependent children effectively lessens women’s capacity to revolt” 
(Williams 1981: 191). The possibility of FIFO and DIDO means that the socioeconomic 
system in which decisions to live in Moranbah take place has changed drastically. It has 
enabled women to demand their own lives elsewhere, and thus the decision to live in 
Moranbah comes not only from the socioeconomic conditions but also women’s practical 
and moral preference for the cohabiting nuclear family.  
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Instead of purely being dictated by socioeconomic and material conditions, 
choosing to stay in Moranbah is saturated by moralized understandings about the proper 
form of the heteronormative nuclear family and women’s role in it. The possibility of 
FIFO and DIDO bring established norms into view and have generated local debate about 
the normative marriage (cf. Ahearn 2018). Rather than merely creating precarity, as 
happens in the case of the emplaced community, these forms of mobile labour reveal the 
unequal distribution of precarity within the community, particularly for women. This was 
summarized by a middle-aged male miner who told me while at a group dinner, “We’ve 
seen lots of break-ups in our friend group from FIFO. The wife gets her own life in 
Mackay.” Here, it is a wife’s “own life” that creates the problem.  
Butler (2009), has most directly approached the relationship between precarity 
and gender, through her aligning of precarity with the differentially legible body. To 
Butler, precariousness is an existential and shared condition of insecurity, but one which 
is unequally distributed, particularly amongst variably intelligible subjects, those who are 
or are not deemed worthy of recognition as subjects, including via their gender 
performativity (2009). Here, the role of women in Moranbah, as particular subjects - that 
is, as housewives and mothers - is in a period of transformation. The normative nuclear 
household is being undone and refigured, as norms are made and remade through “a 
process of repetition that is structured by a complicated interplay of obligation and desire, 
and a desire that is and is not one’s own” (Butler 2009: xi). As wives and mothers 
negotiate the new conditions through which they can structure their households, the 
performativity of the gendered expectations of motherhood sometimes come into conflict, 
and other times reinforce, their desires for their “own lives”.  
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 As mentioned previously, because my research was based in Moranbah, I did not 
know families with children who enjoyed FIFO or DIDO lifestyles. It is likely that such 
livelihood strategies did work for some.  However, I did know many single women who 
benefitted from FIFO and DIDO, for the structure of the male wage earner and female 
caregiver is no longer universal in Moranbah. Young women are able to take advantage 
of the labour shifts mentioned in the previous chapters, as permanently employed 
unionized (historically male) employees are being replaced by contractors and a more 
casualised labour force. This presents opportunities for women to break into the industry 
and benefit from the high salaries and extended periods of leisure time, even if these new 
jobs are more precarious than their Fordist counterparts. As Standing has described in the 
context of the growing precariat, “[i]n each group, there are ‘grinners,’ who welcome 
precariat jobs, and ‘groaners,’ obliged to take them in the absence of alternatives” (2016: 
69).  
The Feminisation of Labour and New Forms of Flexibility 
Although women currently make up only a small percentage of the mining workforce, 
this number is slowly increasing. BHP, a main employer in the region, has set itself the 
goal to have gender equity in its workforce by 2025, a goal it is still far from reaching. 
However, as a result of such policies, many, particularly young women, are entering the 
industry. I came to know some of them through joining a women’s Australian Rules 
Football team, the Moranbah Bulldogs. Some of the young women on the team worked as 
teachers or nurses in the town, but several others also worked in the mines. Most of these 
were apprentices learning a technical trade in the mines, such as training to become 
electricians or diesel mechanics. Quite different to the married women with families, 
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these young women largely embraced their shiftwork schedules. Of course they 
sometimes found it hard to manage the physiological rhythms of rotating day and night 
shifts, but the long blocks of time allowed them to travel and to pursue their other 
interests. They were able to maintain lives and commitments elsewhere, while earning 
substantially higher salaries than those that would be available to them in other industries 
and other locales.  
 One of my teammates, Clara, mentioned in the introduction to Moranbah, turned 
21 while I was in the field. Clara was an apprentice electrician who worked at one of the 
few underground mines.15 Clara was petite with long blonde hair, blue eyes, and a 
delicate face, with physical attributes she intentionally contrasted to her occasionally 
brash demeanour and love of getting her hands dirty. She called herself the tomboy of the 
family and she enjoyed playing up the contradictions of her appearance and her 
employment, often posting selfies on social media of reflections of herself in the mine 
bathroom mirror. Wearing her high-visibility uniform and covered in black dust 
everywhere except where her hard hat, safety goggles and face mask blocked the coal 
dust and diesel exhaust that covered her, she reproduced the seductive pose and pursed 
lips of a more conventional selfie. Playing with such gendered expectations was common 
amongst female miners, although there were a variety of strategies that women deployed, 
emphasizing and downplaying certain traits usually associated with male and female 
identities (cf. Smith-Rolston 2014).16   
 
15 Although open-cut mines predominate the industry, different geologies mean that some 
deposits, particularly deeper coal seams, are more efficient to mine through underground 
methods, in this case, longwall mining. Modern underground mines are also highly capital 
intensive, like their open-cut counterparts. 
16 Another young female friend who worked in management reflected her strategy for dealing 
with her job’s requirement that she “boss around” the older male miners, saying, “I get them to 
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Clara’s apprenticeship in the mines enabled her a level of financial stability 
unusual to women of her age and secondary school level education. She already owned 
her own home in Mackay, making more than AU$80,000 a year as an apprentice 
electrician. She travelled back and forth between her home in Mackay and the mine camp 
where she lived in Moranbah. She enjoyed the spread of her life across these two sites. 
Her parents lived in Mackay, and her sister Beth lived in Moranbah, driving the almost 
two-kilometre-long trains, transporting 8,500 tonnes of coal each from the mines to the 
coastal ports. I once asked Clara why she was training to becoming an electrician. She 
told me that it was a skill that she would be able to take anywhere. She thought someday 
she might like to move to America. Unlike many Australians who envision American 
futures in California, Clara dreamed of moving to the American South. She was an avid 
country music fan and would often ask me to explain lyrics in her favourite songs. As she 
explained mining terminology to me, I explained the texture and taste of American soul 
food.  
Although Clara, her sister, and their parents all worked in the mining industry, she 
did not imagine her long-term future in the mines. She saw the skills, training, and high 
salary of her electrical apprenticeship as an opportunity to pursue many different possible 
futures.  Her sister, Beth, who drove coal trains, similarly often talked of someday 
moving elsewhere. Her skills would easily translate into more urban settings, as she could 
also drive commuter trains. She was particularly interested in moving to Melbourne. She 
 
like me by baking for them. They’re never going to respect me, so I have to get them to like me.” 
She would regularly bring in her home-baked goods. I shadowed her through a workday and saw 
the success of her strategy clearly. As she instructed a group of male miners that the road they 
were making was too close to the edge of a cliff, they were clearly annoyed. But the tension was 
broken by one of the male miner’s joking, “Alright we’ll move it, but only if you promise to bring 
in those chocolate bickies [biscuits] again.” 
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liked art and fashion and envisioned her future in a place where she could enjoy more of 
these passions. However, because of the high price of real estate in Melbourne, she 
thought it best to earn more money working in the mines to save up for a house that she 
would someday buy in the city.  
Another member of the football team, Mary, worked in one of the open-cut mines. 
Although she was in a long-term partnership, she had no children. She moved to 
Moranbah from Tasmania during the boom times around 2011. Her male partner was a 
local Moranbah native and did not like to travel, but she was an avid voyager and would 
often go without him. The shift work schedule enabled her to concentrate her days off 
and travel internationally. On a ‘six and six’ schedule for example, taking only six days 
of annual leave meant that she could have 18 days off in a row, perfect for the 
international trips she enjoyed. While I was conducting fieldwork she spent three weeks 
hiking in Peru. She went scuba diving in Malaysia, and she was planning a safari in South 
Africa. She had been drawn to working in the mines because of the high salary and 
decided to stay because of the schedule. Her mining schedule enabled her to pursue her 
passion for travel. She recognized that her career in mining might not last, but she wanted 
to take advantage of the time-off that her schedule currently offered her to see as much of 
the world as she could. She often talked about checking countries off of her bucket list. 
This was, of course, in reference to places she wanted to see before she died. However, 
she emphasized that it also applied to her life before children, telling me that she 
wouldn’t always find it so easy to travel the world.  
A third friend, Emily, worked as a nurse but FIFO’ed from Brisbane to work at 
the same underground mine as Clara. Emily was drawn to working in the mining industry 
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because the pay was significantly better than it was working in the hospitals in Brisbane. 
However, she kept her nursing job at the hospital in Brisbane, cutting back her hours 
there but maintaining enough to keep that job. It was a permanent position and she 
wanted to have it to fall back on because her job in the mines was casual. Despite her 
mobility, she played football on two teams, one in Moranbah and another in Brisbane, 
depending on where she was for practices and games. She was an exceptional player and 
hoped that she might catch the eye of a recruiter for the new professional women’s 
league. Emily was an open lesbian, often referencing her sexuality and dating other 
women who worked in the mines as well as in Brisbane. Homosexuality, particularly 
lesbianism, was not exceptional in Moranbah, particularly amongst the young women 
who worked in the mining industry, and as far as many confided in me, did not elicit the 
strong condemnation or discrimination that might otherwise be expected in conservative 
rural areas.   
These women’s working careers were possible because of the specific mobility 
and temporal flexibility that their lifestyles enabled. In contrast to the young families with 
children in Moranbah, these women strategically used the opportunities the mining 
industry offered them without being tied to long-term futures in the town or industry. 
Most of them, furthermore, worked in parts of the mining industry that would give skills 
transferable to other industries. They chose to learn trades or drive trains that they could 
use elsewhere. They did not, for the most part, imagine a long-term future in Moranbah, 
but used the opportunities of working in the mines to prepare for futures in other settings. 
Although the loss of the primacy of the co-habiting nuclear family may present a threat to 
the emplaced community, it also offers new potential socialities.  As the workplace 
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kinship Jessica Smith identifies, the loss of sociality within the nuclear family does not 
mean pure alienation as people adapt creatively to these conditions (Smith-Rolston 2014).  
Allison’s analysis of social precarity in post-Fordist Japan particularly resonates 
with the changes in Moranbah, in which the heteronormative nuclear family of 
corporatist Japan has been challenged through the loss of stable employment and thus 
resultant forms of valued sociality linked to this household organization (Allison 2012). 
She draws on Lee Edelman’s concept of “reproductive futurism” (Edelman 2004) to refer 
to the way in which Fordism “attaches—and delimits—sociality to the heteronormative 
family and home” (Allison 2012: 351). Sociality, however, can be much more broadly 
defined than through the male-headed nuclear household, and as Allison argues, “[a] 
reconstitution or shoring up of the family then—of the ‘old’ kind at least—is not 
necessarily the solution to precarity of life” (Allison 2012: 361). These young women’s 
flexibility and lack of cohabiting nuclear household and children does not mean that they 
were socially alienated. Rather they established sociality through a patchwork of relations 
spread out through geographic sites, through travel or through friendship and workplace 
relationships.  This reveals how the alienation of labour is never complete, as capitalism 
and the specific forms it takes are always interacting with the particular pursuit of desires 
within constraints.  
This flexibility and mobility which presents opportunities for alternative 
socialities for these young women, also makes them more compatible with the flexible 
labour demands of the mining industry. They become complicit in the particular alienated 
form of labour that Anthropocenic capitalism privileges. Kathleen Millar’s analysis of the 
work of a female catador in Rio de Janeiro, describes what she considers to be two quite 
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different forms of ‘flexibility’. One is the flexibility of a “radically individualized” 
worker who is able to respond to the flexible demands of neoliberal capitalism, and 
whose flexibility “arises from the worker’s alienation from her social world” (2014: 46). 
She contrasts this with the flexibility of the catadores which she describes as “relational 
autonomy,” for the way in which their desire for flexibility derives from their “sociality, 
intimacy, and relations of care” (Millar 2014: 47).  
I do not believe it is so easy to distinguish between these two forms of flexibility. 
The alienated form of autonomy that Millar identifies may be preferred by capitalist 
employers, but the process of alienation is never complete, and even this alienated 
autonomy when actually lived through human labourers is always implicated and tied up 
in other desires and socialities. Even thinking of the young women working in Moranbah 
who are mobile and have few emplaced familial obligations, they are drawn to mining 
because it allows them to travel or to maintain relations in dispersed locales. Their 
sociality is thus less emplaced, but it is far from alienated. Similarly, they often work in 
these jobs as preparation for social futures, buying homes for the families they do not yet 
have, preparing for careers which they will use to support family and community.   
However, Millar’s dual concept of flexibility (2014), points to what is a complex 
complicity between post-Fordist precarity and its gendered implications. The gendered 
expectations on women to be caregivers makes the intermittent time demands of 
precarious employment appealing.  One instance of such relational autonomy in the 
mining industry is the rise of the so-called ‘mummy shifts.’  
The phenomena of the ‘mummy shift’ illustrates the ambiguous nature of the 
benefits women derive from working in the mines, but also their role undercutting 
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previous labour entitlements, and thus the benefits of their labour to mine industry 
profitability. The ‘mummy shift’ is an option for mothers of school-aged children to find 
employment in the mines and represents the kind of ‘flexible’ employment of Millar’s 
“relational autonomy” (2014), in which flexible work arrangements accommodate other 
caregiving demands on women’s time.  
According to gender workforce statistics, despite being underrepresented in other 
mining jobs, 65.5 per cent of part-time operators and drivers in the mining industry in 
2016 were women.  This group it can be assumed is largely made of these ‘mummy shift’ 
employees. The ‘mummy shift’, is more neutrally called the ‘crib relief shift’. ‘Crib’ is 
the term for a meal and the associated break from working. Regular mining operators 
take staggered crib breaks, in which their machines would otherwise sit idle. Instead, 
these workers on crib relief operate the machinery while the regular driver is on break, 
and then rotate through to the next worker going on his break, and so on.  These shifts 
during the day are usually six hours long, often from 9:00 AM to 3:00 PM, enabling 
mothers who take this work to be home with children after school, hence the name of 
‘mummy’. Most of these jobs are not permanent (Peetz and Murray 2010). While this 
seems to be a perfect solution to the lack of part-time employment options for mothers in 
Moranbah, it also means that instead of hiring permanent employees for this work, the 
coal-mining companies are able to utilize underemployed women to fill these spaces. 
Peetz and Murray (2010) in their study of women in the Bowen Basin mining industry 
quote a union representative that they interviewed about these shifts. He said:   
The company, they had this big idea that they would utilize this big pool of women in 
town to get them out there to do the crib breaks…so the coal oilers would keep on 
running all day. We wouldn’t support it because we had concerns that there were 
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people in town that were more deserving of getting trained, whether they be kids that 
had missed out on apprenticeships, kids that couldn’t get traineeships, men that were 
working on the council or people who should really be given first chop at it, these 
jobs. (quoted in Peetz and Murray 2010: 253).  
In the union representative’s thinking, those deserving of getting trained are men, or 
gender-neutral ‘kids’, although it would not be too much of a stretch to imply he meant 
young men. His reference to “men that were working on the council” makes this 
particularly obvious, since the council—referring to the local government—is generally 
considered to be a female space. What becomes clear in his remarks, is that married 
women are least deserving (Peetz and Murray 2010: 253).  
‘Mummy shifts’ are a practice that optimizes profits for the mining company and 
allows the continuous operation of machinery without growing its permanent workforce. 
The flexibility of working arrangements that encourage female participation work to the 
industry’s advantage, allowing companies to grow and shrink their workforce with the 
needs of the constantly fluctuating extractive economy.  
Simultaneously, the ‘mummy shift’ represents opportunities for women to disrupt 
the gendered distribution of labour that this union representative seeks to protect, in 
which wives and mothers belong in the home. It presents opportunities that many desire 
for work outside the home, but it also increases the burden placed on women, as they are 
often still expected to maintain their roles as primary care-givers and household labourers 
even as they contribute wages to the household. The need to contribute wages to the 
family comes not only from changed social expectations in which women’s participation 
in the labour force is celebrated, but also from the increasing precariousness of their 
husband’s waged labour, which their own employment may ironically enhance. As one 
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woman I talked to put it: “Even though my husband makes a good salary in the mines, we 
spend as if we only made my salary, because we never know if he will have work 
tomorrow.”   
The ‘mummy shift’ seems to resonate with the “feminization of labour” defined 
by Standing as having “a double sense of more women being in jobs and more jobs being 
of the flexible type typically taken by women” (Standing 2016: 70). Standing identifies 
three main contributions to the feminization of labour which seem to match quite closely 
with the conditions in Moranbah.  First, he describes “the demise of the ‘family wage,’ a 
feature of the industrial age and the compact between capital and the working class” 
(Standing 2016: 70). While wages are still high in Moranbah’s mines, the structure of 
work is no longer crafted in such a way as to support the structure of a cohabiting nuclear 
family. This disrupts the pattern of the industrial-age family while the lack of security of 
employment induces families to distribute the responsibility for wage provision.  
A second aspect of the feminization of labour is the changing nature of work, 
where today “more labour [is] in services, where manual strength [is] not required” 
(Standing 2016: 70). Here, the mechanization of contemporary mining undermines 
previous arguments that women’s lack of physical strength limits their participation in 
mining. Of course, they never made particular sense as women and children have a 
history of gruelling work in mining (Freese 2004; Peetz and Murray 2010; Scott 2010: 
65; Smith-Rolston 2014). However, post-Fordist precarity has been associated with the 
rise of immaterial labour, in which labour does not make objects, but ideas, information 
and affect. Precarity is thus rooted in this transformation because this new productive 
form requires different structures of labour, including different temporal regimes, in 
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which “its rhythms of work are much more intermittent, fluid, and discontinuous” 
(Federici 2008: np). This flexibility of precarious employment is often associated with 
women, particularly through the kind of relational autonomy discussed by Millar (2014). 
Here, other demands on women’s time, particularly childcare and elderly care, mean that 
jobs with more intermittent temporal regimes are more appealing to women.  
However, this form of flexibility, like that of the ‘mummy shift’, is quite different 
to the flexibility that I have described for the young women that work in the mines full 
time.  Aside from the ‘mummy shift’, most jobs in mining are not more flexible, rather 
the temporal demands of rotating shift work are extremely rigid. Instead of jobs being 
flexible, workers must be flexible. Thus, the flexibility of precarious labour in Moranbah 
serves mainly to privilege childless young people who are mobile and have fewer 
demands on their leisure time. 
This is not necessarily gendered, as single men and women can fit into these same 
mobile subjectivities, except that men tend to be able to maintain more of this flexibility 
once they have children, whereas women’s mobility is more directly affected by 
childcare responsibilities. Many men continue to work in the mines on rotating shift 
schedules after they have children, but many women leave the industry and even the 
young women I met, mostly choose to learn trades and professions that they can transfer 
into other industries, which will be more amenable to their future families.  
The continued incompatibility of reproductive labour with post-Fordist labour 
conditions highlights that the appeal of rotating shift work may be more linked to a 
particular moment in young women’s lives than to their more permanent lifestyle 
choices.  Not all will—or plan to—have emplaced nuclear families, but some do and 
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hence recognize the temporary nature of their mobility. For example, the mobility and 
flexibility of the young women I described who manage to pursue alternative socialities 
is just a snapshot which exists in the ethnographic present. In the two years since I first 
met them, Mary has had her first child, though she still refuses to marry her partner and 
continues to travel with her young daughter, although to nearer destinations. Clara got 
married and subsequently divorced and has moved to Brisbane. Emily has stopped long-
distance commuting after losing the mine job that she realized was never secure. I find 
this temporally-circumscribed appeal of rotating shift work to a particular moment in 
young women’s lives particularly complex in thinking about the end of “reproductive 
futurism” (Edelman 2004) and the alternative socialities to the heteronormative nuclear 
family that the flexible lives of the young women I describe represent. The loss of 
reproductive futurism and the rise of sociality outside the heteronormative household in 
which the physical process of reproducing the labour force through childbirth and 
childrearing is increasingly dislocated from the sites of capitalist production, may not 
represent precarity for those who choose not to reproduce. However, within social life, 
such loss may simultaneously represent the precarity of human life itself. It is worth 
noting the coherence between the rise of immaterial labour and the post-human labour 
force envisioned by the fully automated ‘mine of the future’ discussed in chapter one 
(Federici 2008).  
By way of conclusion, the story of a fourth young woman will illuminate the way 
in which different life stages play into the organization of long-distance commuting and 
the particular relationship between reproductive labour, rotating shift work, and personal 
and familial desires. Stephanie was already visibly pregnant with her first child when we 
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met. Her husband worked on the mines, but until recently had DIDO’ed back and forth to 
Hervey Bay, an unusually long eight and a half hour drive from Moranbah. When 
Stephanie became pregnant she wanted to be with her husband. The couple decided that 
she would move with him to Moranbah hoping he would be able to share more in the 
experience of her pregnancy, and they could live together as a family. They rented a 
studio apartment in Moranbah. However, Stephanie wasn’t accustomed to living with her 
husband while he worked and thus was naïvely unaware of the difficulty of living with a 
rotating shift worker. Sharing a studio apartment with him when he was on night shifts 
and thus had to sleep during the day, meant she had to be silent all day or get out of the 
house. Moranbah is often too hot to spend much time outside. Stephanie eventually gave 
up and moved back to Hervey Bay before she gave birth. She realized it would be better 
to be closer to her parents who could help with childcare, and her husband returned to 
long-distance commuting. Although her pregnancy led her to attempt to establish the 
normative co-habiting nuclear family she had envisioned, her ideal family form soon 
gave way to the practical constraints of rotating shift work and the spatial opportunities 
offered by long-distance commuting.  
Again, these young women’s desires, their particular life projects, are part of what 
enables the growth of FIFO, the dislocation of labour, the increasing precarity of the 
community and the instability and contingency of employment in the mines. Industrial 
organization does not simply impose subjectivities on labourers, but the conditions of 
employment are always entangled in the desires and life projects of men and women, 
feeding back into the form that industry employment can take. Women’s recruitment into 
the mining industry and their role in negotiating the organization of labour indicates the 
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ambiguous relationship between women’s agency and its appropriation by capital. 
Although many young women find opportunities working in the mining industry, or 
prefer the long-distance commuting of their husbands, they also serve to undercut some 
of the protections of previous stable Fordist employment that their older male colleagues 
or fathers enjoyed. Their own desires thus are interlinked and co-constitutive of the forms 
that extractive capitalism takes in Anthropocenic conditions.  
 
Conclusion 
The emphasis on precarity to describe the changing conditions of labour has a 
conservative tendency, in that it partially draws on a nostalgic image of Fordist 
employment which ignores the racial, classed, and gendered inequalities on which it 
rested. The lamentation about the loss of the gendered relations of Moranbah’s early days 
reflect this particular conservative tendency. In the first decades of the town, women 
were primarily wives with little opportunity to pursue their own desires outside the 
accepted community spaces attached to the frontier building of sport groups and social 
clubs. As Gibson-Graham (2006 [1996]) argue, women fought against the particular 
constraints of married life in Moranbah, in which they had few opportunities as a result of 
the shift work schedule and the spatial isolation of Moranbah. Through a form of 
resistance that caused increased absenteeism and the rise of family breakdown, wives in 
turn affected the form that capitalism took as the earlier shift schedule was not amenable 
to either maximizing mine profits nor family life.  Thus, women desires for lives outside 
of Moranbah helped enable the adoption of the FIFO and DIDO commute, presenting a 
workforce of both married men and single women willing to work under these conditions. 
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This was of course not devoid of forms of structured coercion that I presented in the 
previous chapter. However, the pressure of the 12-hour rotating shift and the 
concentration of work and leisure time that enable long-distance commuting have 
presented new options for women as they can organize their households around DIDO or 
FIFO.  
Now that many more families are taking up long-distance commuting strategies, 
how do we make sense of this phenomenon? Is it that, as Gibson-Graham (2006 [1996]) 
suggest, divorce and family dislocation constitute a type of successful class struggle 
against the oppressive conditions affecting women in Moranbah? Or are families the 
victims of increased labour alienation, forced to structure themselves to fit the demands 
of extractive capital? In this chapter, I have argued that both are true to a degree. The 
particular conditions of labour organization in Moranbah are a co-constitutive result of 
personal desire and familial life projects within structured policies and preferences of 
extractive capital.  
Single, and particularly childless, young women and men are able to utilize their 
personal flexibility and mobility to take advantage of the opportunities the rotating shift 
work schedule and long-distance commute presents them. This allows them to form 
alternative socialities to that of the co-habiting nuclear family. However, if their desires 
for families or the physical conditions of pregnancy and childcare reinforce continued 
gendered divisions of labour, women face greater hindrances on their mobility. Although 
increased precarity has been linked to the feminization of labour (Standing 2016) through 
the rise of immaterial labour and new irregular temporalities, this flexibility is quite 
different to the type of flexible labour demanded by the rotating shift schedule of 
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Moranbah’s mines. Instead of flexible labour that allows for the maintenance of social 
relations and particularly childcare—their ‘relational autonomy’ (Millar 2014)—the new 
form of precarious labour in Moranbah does not allow for flexible work arrangements. 
Rather, rigid work arrangements demand flexible people, thus upsetting established 
household organization and gendered divisions of labour.   
The loss of male stable employment has not necessarily directly translated into 
more opportunities for women, but new opportunities for flexible people. Although this 
presents childless women with opportunities, it places a greater demand on women when 
they become mothers.  It is a complex distribution of precariousness (Butler 2009) that 
interacts with the specific life projects of people in specific contexts. Some of them 
benefit from these dynamics and others do not, yet a certain element of precarity seems to 
remain. Futures are still not envisioned in an emplaced community of Moranbah or even 
the coal industry for most women.  Those who benefit from these conditions are not 
achieving a new form of stability. Rather, they have life projects that enable them to 
manage this precarity, for the time being.   
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CHAPTER THREE: Blaming in the Boom and Bust: The figures of the Cashed-up-
Bogan and the Real Estate Speculator 
 
This chapter looks at the moral accusations that have accompanied the political economic 
conditions of the mining boom and bust in Australia. I introduce the figure of the 
‘cashed-up-bogan’ (CUB), a new stereotype attached to contemporary miners which 
emphasises their greed and consumption over their physical and communal labour. This 
figure reflects anxieties about Australia’s reliance on commodity production in the 
context of the mining boom and bust as well as global climate change. It also serves to 
morally excuse the increased precarity of coal miners in the current mining bust. This 
representation, however, is countered by locals who maintain a strong connection to the 
labour of mining and their emplaced community despite their increased precarity. 
Moranbah residents are also involved in their own moral debates over who to blame for 
their precarity. These invariably take place in the context of such national discourses, but 
they more specifically reflect local conditions.  
Emplaced locals in Moranbah are not immune to the temptation to blame that 
precarity seems to induce. However, the main figure that has arisen in their search for 
blame is the real estate speculator.  Although not directly opposed, these two figures 
reflect the layers of precarity that are experienced through the changing nature of labour 
and its moral associations, as financial speculation, automation, and social alienation 
seem to surpass the attachments to physically demanding work and communal 
solidarities. By disentangling the bundles of anxiety that these accusations draw upon, 
this chapter reveals the valued conditions and moral contests over them that accompany 
the contemporary mining industry as well as pointing to how understanding these 
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anxieties might make sense of growing far-right populism locally. This shows how the 
moral accusations which arise around such figures reinforce the Anthropocenic 
conditions of precarity through distracting blame away from structural and institutional 
failures. Instead, these critiques become pathologized and precarity is blamed on an 
individual’s moral failure which leads to political divisiveness and othering.  
I was about two months into fieldwork in Moranbah when I finally started to feel 
settled in. I had found a base at the local radio station, had joined several social clubs and 
was making friends. But just a month later, in December, I became worried as a wave of 
lay-offs was sweeping through town, and many of my close informants were moving 
away. I was told the lay-offs were an attempt by the mining companies and mine 
servicing businesses to “balance the books” before the end of the year. There was a 
palpable sense of anxiety that seemed to permeate the town that month.  The aisles of the 
grocery store and the line of mothers waiting to pick up their kids at school were full of 
whispered rumours about who would be next. 
  One of my informants I most enjoyed spending time with, a local artist, left town 
as her husband was laid off. My first friend in Moranbah, Russell, the engineer from 
Germany, was afraid his job would soon be terminated. The mine he worked for came up 
for sale, and he suspected his work visa would not be renewed by the new owners, telling 
me “as soon as they find a buyer, I’ll be sacked and deported.” This did not eventuate, as 
he managed to secure a permanent residency visa without company sponsorship, but he 
was very anxious for several months. I became particularly despondent when my 
housemate was laid off.  She was a 22-year-old woman who worked in the administrative 
office of a nearby mine as a casual employee. She was grateful to be given a week’s 
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notice to try and find a new job, as her contract required no such courtesy. However, she 
was unable to find work in that time and decided to move back in with her parents in the 
regional town of Emerald. As all these friends and informants began to leave, I thought: 
what is the point of trying to build relationships if people would all move away before I 
could get to know them in the in-depth way that my methodology required? Of course, 
this thought also explained precisely the benefit of my methodology of long-term 
engagement. I began to understand for myself the lamentations related to me by many 
Moranbah residents about the transience of the community and its affective 
consequences.  
I was often told how hard it was to make friends in Moranbah, because 
relationships were often only temporary. The community relations manager at the local 
council explained that one of the biggest issues for local government was the high staff 
turnover. He explained: “We have a problem with stability. We have 20 to 35 per cent 
turnover annually in council. The big problem is that one partner tends to work in the 
mines, and so if that partner is laid off or transferred, the partner working at council will 
follow.” Many mothers reflected that this transience was particularly hard on children 
who were less jaded about these conditions and thus didn’t have the same emotional 
barriers. Children didn’t understand why their friends were always moving away. A long-
term primary school teacher was less confident that this was a particular problem though, 
telling me: “When a new kid come to town, it’s not a big deal. It’s now just part of our 
culture. I wonder if kids just don’t form that same bond…but no, there are still lots of 
tears when kids leave.”  
 163 
There is a considerable tension between the established families of Moranbah and 
the more transient newcomers, although as I mention in the introduction this is more 
about the movement towards instability and transience for everyone that workforce 
casualization induces. There is now a third generation who is attached to Moranbah as 
their hometown, but there is also a growing population who filter into and out of 
Moranbah following job opportunities in a fluctuating industry. However, it should be 
noted that the ability to stay in Moranbah is unevenly distributed. Those who have been 
in Moranbah longer are more likely to have permanent positions.  However, the mobility 
of the more transient and less secure population affects the way in which long-term 
residents relate to the community. Even if they themselves are committed and able to stay 
in Moranbah, many of the people they interact with are not. This sense of instability 
heightens the affects of precariousness that haunt many parts of social life. Further, the 
division in the community reflects contested values between different populations 
working and living in Moranbah as well as national discourses linked to the mining 
boom.   
Of particular importance is a moralised debate over appropriate forms of labour 
and its value in the context of the changing conditions of employment. As described in 
the previous chapters, the rise of FIFO and DIDO alongside casualisation, has shifted 
energy from the community building of the pioneering discourse which guided early 
Moranbah. Further, the resultant decreased union power has seen the previous 
collectivism around labour organizing devolve into individual contractors. This has 
worked to emphasize extractive relations to the community of Moranbah and more 
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broadly changed the national perception of the coal miner. Such changes are tied up in 
the political-economic conditions of the mining boom and bust. 
I will first describe how the conditions of the boom and bust represent an 
increased anxiety about the opportunities and vulnerabilities of Australia’s role as a 
commodity exporter, particularly of coal, and how these anxieties become represented in 
the figure of the CUB. The previous working-class image of the coal miner, and his 
associated social community, has been replaced by the image of an acquisitive and 
entitled miner, who is mobile and disconnected from the communal and labour values of 
physical work that marked previous mine employment. The so-called, cashed-up-bogan 
(CUB) has emerged as a class-based figure that represents this shift in perception over the 
labour and value of mining. Accusations of being a CUB are often levelled at miners by 
outsiders, primarily urban populations or environmentally-minded Australians. Further, 
they filter into the news media and social commentary on Australia’s mining industry. 
However, the designation of being a CUB is strongly rejected as insulting by emplaced 
locals, not necessarily for the class-based habitus distinctions (Bourdieu 2010 [1979]), 
but for the moral accusations of greediness and undeserved wealth that it implies. The 
derivative bogainaire, to describe mining magnates, has similarly emphasized a shifting 
association of the mining industry with financial speculation, rather than material 
industrial production. 
Emplaced locals recognize the speculative boom and bust nature of the mining 
industry and have suffered in particular ways as a result of it. However, they don’t blame 
CUBS. Instead, they blame outside speculators for exacerbating the conditions of 
instability and precarity they face. For the emplaced community, the main targets of 
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blame are real estate speculators, because of the particular way in which housing has 
been implicated in these labour transformations. 
 Later in this chapter, I will describe the condition of a local real estate speculator, 
Kate Maloney, and interrogate the schadenfreude that many community members express 
at her financial downfall. This is related to the normative politics around housing which 
her speculative endeavours disrupted. I then analyse the local reaction to Kate Maloney’s 
story to show how the figure of the speculator partially served as a counter accusation to 
the figure of the CUB and its associations with greedy entitlement. Moranbah residents’ 
reaction to Kate’s speculative practices show how systems of blaming take on varied 
patterns which come about as communities react to threats to their valued conditions 
(Douglas 1992: 7). The accusations and counter-accusations of greed, reflect anxieties 
about the precarity of mining in the context of shifting political and economic conditions 
and resultant labour transformation.  However these competing moral discourses do not 
present a legible critique or challenge to such structural transformation. Instead, because 
they are pathologized and attached to individuals over institutions, they reproduce the 
political impasse of ‘jobs versus the environment,’ refuse the acknowledgement of shared 
precarity in Anthropocenic conditions, and perhaps fuel a growing far-right populism.  
 
The Cashed-up-Bogan and the Boganaire 
The Australian sociologist Steven Threadgold describes the term ‘bogan’ as the “logos of 
precarious affect” (Threadgold 2014: np) for the way in which it gives language to a 
bundle of anxieties deriving from social and political problems. ‘Bogan’ although 
flexibly deployed mainly refers to the white working class in Australia. While it is class 
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based, it refers to a broader habitus, one which resonates strongly with the American 
‘redneck’ or the British ‘chav’.17 The term ‘bogan’ implies a lack of education, a brash 
and loutish demeanour, and a lack of sophisticated taste, which is revealed in lowbrow 
habitus, such as excessive smoking and drinking, casual forms of dress, and the driving 
of specific cars (cf. Bourdieu 2010[1979]). It is thus a term of class-based differentiation, 
applied to the lower orders, although increasingly being claimed with pride as a marker 
of a uniquely authentic Australian identity.18  
Although ‘bogan’ is a relatively recent term, with the first use of the term dated to 
the mid-1980s (Gwynn 2015: 7), the derivatives ‘boganaire’ to describe the extravagantly 
wealthy mining magnates and the more ubiquitous ‘cashed-up-bogan’ (CUB) to describe 
the newly wealthy but working-class population came largely out of the context of the 
recent mining boom (Pini and Previte 2013). The once poor working-class bogan coal 
miners were now receiving substantial salaries. Thus, the CUB still had the lack of social 
capital through their bogan status and habitus, but all of a sudden had the economic 
capital of an upper middle-class worker (cf. Bourdieu 2010 [1979]).  
The demand for labour during the boom led to high salaries in the industry, the 
increase in temporary and contract labour to fill demand and the increase in fly-in-fly-out 
workforces. All these dynamics worked to change the national imaginary of the coal 
miner. Historically “[i]n both academic and popular fields, the miner has been 
collectively imaged as a taciturn, resilient, unassuming and simple man, devoted to his 
 
17 Rebecca Scott (2010: 31-60) analyses similar class-based stereotypes applied to Appalachian 
coal miners who are described as ‘white-trash’ or ‘hillbillies’. Although there is some overlap, the 
bogan is less directly associated with poverty than these figures.  
18 This may also be linked to increased xenophobia as well as a decline in the discourse 
that celebrates Australia as a multicultural nation.  
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work, family and community, dealing with the vicissitudes of nature in work that is 
tough, dangerous and difficult” (Pini and Previte 2013: 259; see also Smith and Tidwell 
2016).  In the context of the boom, the miner became a symbol of unsustainable greed 
and conspicuous consumption. He is now a man of vices: gambling, alcohol, smoking, 
and marital affairs rather than one of difficult work, family, community, and labour 
solidarity. Thus, the CUB’s increased precarity that accompanied the mining bust is 
deemed an appropriate re-assertion of the standard class hierarchy.  
By way of illustration, let me introduce you to Slimbo, who moved in with me 
after my initial housemate was laid off. Slimbo was technically a nickname but he always 
went by it and was proud enough of it to have it tattooed on his right bicep and to insist 
that I not give him a pseudonym in my writing. He worked as an operator at one of the 
original Moranbah open-cut mines on a six and six schedule. As mentioned in chapter 
two, this involved working three 12-hour day shifts and then three 12-hour night shifts, 
followed by six days off. After their three nightshifts—which marked the end of their 
working week—several of Slimbo’s work crew would come to our place to celebrate. I’d 
often awake to the celebratory smell of bacon and eggs being cooked on the outdoor 
barbeque and be offered a breakfast beer when I wandered out of my room in my 
pyjamas. 
  I rarely saw Slimbo on his working days, as he had little time for anything but 
sleep. He also disappeared on his days off, heading off into the bush to go hunting feral 
boars on surrounding cattle stations. Feral boars are a particular nuisance in this region, 
and cattlemen welcome hunters on their land. To Slimbo, however, it was primarily an 
enjoyable sport. Instead of using guns they drove their large trucks, or utes, with their 
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dogs in the back through the station. The dogs barked when scenting a boar, then they 
were let loose to hunt it down. The dogs wore GPS trackers on their collars so that they 
could be easily followed. When the dogs were shown to be circling a boar, Slimbo and 
his friends would drive their ute to the area and then enter into the tussle with a knife. 
They would step in and slice the pigs throat. The practice ended with a ceremonial 
weighing of the pig’s body to calculate the prestige of the kill. The way in which Slimbo 
related to this hobby was primarily about dominance as he emphasized the feeling of 
overcoming an animal that was constructed as particularly grotesque. One evening as I 
asked Slimbo more about the practice, he took me into his room and showed me the 
bloody knife that he used in this hunting. As he grasped it tightly he explained, “It’s 
great, that feeling of wrestling this huge creature. But boy do they stink! Sometimes you 
just can’t get the stink off ya for days.” He subscribed to Bristle Up Magazine, which 
came with a DVD called Grunter Hunters which compiled videos of such hunting in other 
parts of Australia, glorifying the hunt and crafting a competitive community around the 
hobby. These videos were often playing in our living room and I witnessed that 
occasionally, the hunters also cut into the pigs’ stomachs to reveal the food that the pig 
had been eating. This was done to reveal the nuisance they represented to farmers and 
native wildlife. I particularly remember one such act from these videos where the hunt 
occurred in a coastal area. When they cut open the boar’s innards, dozens of baby turtles 
seeped out.  
Other times on his days off, Slimbo would travel to surrounding rodeos, where he 
rode bulls competitively, again taming a massive beast for competitive recreation and 
prestige.  Although he never seemed to win the prize money, he did win several battle 
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scars and broken ribs. The miniscule time spent on the bull—usually less than the 
required eight seconds—meant that weekends at the rodeo were primarily about 
socializing, drinking and camping out on the rodeo grounds with friends. 
 Slimbo’s hobbies quite clearly reflect a domineering relationship to nature while 
also drawing on a certain sociality and domestication that I discussed in chapter one. 
Grunter hunting took place in groups and created a community of like-minded hobbyists 
through the physical domination of feral beasts which presented a nuisance to ranchers. 
Similarly, rodeos were an important social activity which celebrated a settler rurality.  
Slimbo’s general habitus, his smoking, drinking, tattoos, hobbies, and crucially, 
his employment as a coal mine operator meant that he would not deny that he was a 
‘bogan’.  However one day while on a break from fieldwork in Sydney, I described 
Slimbo to a corporate lawyer who instantly designated Slimbo a CUB. I soon learned that 
this accusation was very common amongst Australia’s urban residents, repeated 
particularly when discussing the frustrating political impasse around climate change. 
When I returned to Moranbah, I asked Slimbo whether he would call himself a CUB. He 
seemed slightly insulted but in his characteristic lightness joked, “If I was a CUB, would 
I be living with you?” This was more than a comment on his remuneration. We were both 
aware that his six-figure salary (approximately AU$ 145,000 annually) meant he did not 
actually need my contribution to the rent. The comment, although referencing the 
‘cashed-up’ element of the moniker, was principally about his sociality, something that 
he privileged above all else. The moniker implied that he did not have a connection to 
mining other than through his wage. However, mining and particularly the way in which 
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it contributed to Moranbah as a community was an important part of Slimbo’s self-
identification. 
Slimbo was born in the local hospital in the mid-1980s to parents who had come 
to Moranbah in the early 1970s. He is very proud of his hometown; in fact, his left bicep 
bore a tattoo of ‘4744,’ Moranbah’s postcode. He is a proud member of the CFMEU 
mining union and displays the union’s stickers on his hard hat, and even would 
 
Figure 3.1 Slimbo showing off his tattoo of 4744, Moranbah’s postcode (photograph by 
author) 
call his dog a ‘scab’ when it begged from the table. He would have been eligible for 
company provided housing. However as a single man he would have had to live in a 
single person’s quarters in a camp.  Standalone houses were reserved for married 
employees. Instead, he chose to rent in town and thus ended up living with me in a house 
just a few blocks away from his parents. Slimbo’s attachment to the mining community 
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reveals a tension between the habitus of the CUB and the pathologizing effects of these 
aesthetics.  
The lack of social capital of the ‘bogan’ revealed through the more aesthetic 
elements of his habitus—his appearance and consumption choices—have been attached 
to a set of moral values. As Bev Skeggs (2005) shows morality is often invoked to police 
class boundaries. The CUB moniker implies an un-deservingness that is articulated in 
accusations of greed. A.F. Robertson’s study of greed reveals that despite attempts by 
merchant classes to turn greed into more palatable concepts like self-interest, greed 
maintains its collective moral strength through its continued embodied and guttural 
affective power (2001). This would seem to make greed accusations an effective 
“weapon of the weak” (Scott 1985). However, while greed accusations can be wielded by 
the lower classes against the elite, they do little to offer structural critiques as the moral 
accusation is attached to human bodies rather than institutions. Most critically such 
accusations shift attention to the moral subject who is defined through his or her 
individual personal responsibility (Skeggs 2005). Greed’s biomoral (Appadurai 1981; 
Bear 2007) tendencies pathologize critique and thus such claims are stronger when 
applied to already pathologized populations. As Robertson elaborates, “if your wants, 
however modest, exceed your entitlements (perhaps because you are an immigrant, or a 
girl) you are a political threat. But to be accused of greed in these circumstances is 
political trickery: your (inferior) body is being evoked to justify my (superior) 
entitlements” (2001: loc 721). Thus these accusations levelled at the well-paid working 
class, reflect the anxieties of the middle-class, particularly those that derive from debates 
over Australia’s place in the global economy. As I described in the thesis introduction, 
 172 
the recent commodities boom and bust have led to a questioning of the possibilities and 
vulnerabilities that derive from being the “world’s quarry” (Knox 2013: 78).  
  These bundled anxieties can partially be disentangled through looking at the main 
moral failures that the CUB represents: the lack of communal and labour attachment, 
environmental damage, and the changing labour conditions of the mining industry. First, 
as Slimbo’s refusal to accept the CUB moniker helps to show, the CUB is primarily 
associated with mobility and selfishness. The archetypical CUB is a FIFO worker, his 
lack of attachment to any community deemed morally dubious. This is also linked to the 
loss of labour union collectivism. As described in the introduction, the history of 
Australian labour has been intertwined with that of Australian democracy, creating a 
rather strong positive view of labour movements. Thus, the accusations of immorality 
directed at contemporary miners, must separate these associations, or re-write them into a 
new narrative.  Labour unionism thus has been increasingly linked to undeserved 
entitlement. The success of this narrative was reflected in the comments of my non-
unionized friends who complained that unionized miners would strike over a lack of 
sugar, described in chapter one. Organized labour’s role in neoliberal Australia is also 
increasingly questioned. The once progressive political positions with which it has 
historically been associated, particularly as embodied in the ALP, have become more 
conservative as the political economic conditions of Australia have changed. The appeal 
to protecting industrial, mining, and construction industries appears rather conservative in 
Australia’s urban-based immaterial economy. This has challenged the ALP to balance the 
progressive environmental demands of an urban base with its—now more conservative—
labour base, which is increasingly concerned about protecting coal jobs. The Greens party 
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has become a growing leader of progressive politics, linking these political economic 
changes to environmental concerns and pushing the ALP in this direction. As I will soon 
show, this tension is frustrating many miners who are increasingly looking towards 
populist and nationalist third parties and leaving the ALP.  
Secondly,—and further reinforcing these political dynamics—the CUB’s immorality 
is linked to the environmental damage that he contributes to. Coal has been central to 
national debates about Australia’s contribution to anthropogenic climate change, and thus 
is implicated in complex moral arguments about Australia’s global responsibilities (cf. 
Callison 2014; Gardiner 2011; Hughes 2017; Hulme 2009). This will be discussed further 
in chapter four. For now, this moral complication implicates the morality of the coal 
miner, which has also fed into the CUB’s reputation. As Barbara Pini and Josephine 
Previte argue, the CUB’s lack of environmental capital derives from the activity of 
mining itself but also from the CUB’s consumption practices, particularly the types of 
petrol-guzzling leisure items he is said to choose: big cars, boats and jet skis (2013). Of 
course, the environmentally damaging acts of middle-class leisure are less likely to 
receive such questioning despite similar carbon emissions.  As many coal miners often 
rhetorically asked, “What do those greenies think is powering their cappuccino 
machines?” Thus, habitus distinctions again are used to differentiate groups and their 
associated political positions in regards to the heavily moralized and politicized 
landscape of coal’s contribution to climate change. However, it was both the CUB’s 
consumption choices as well as the products of his labour and the damaging 
environmental effects of mining that made him doubly complicit.  Here we see the 
interaction between social, symbolic, environmental and economic capital that are at the 
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heart of moral arguments about the coal industry, and the way in which they have shifted 
through the recent history of Australia’s commodity boom and its contemporary 
aftermath. 
In a similar vein to the conditions Smith and Tidwell point out in America, this 
discourse that paints CUBs as immoral polluters is prominent in “self-professed 
progressive politics” which create stereotypes of a “kind of moral character necessary to 
commit massive ecological damage” (2016: 332). They quote Naomi Klein referring to 
contemporary miners as an example:  
beneath the bravado of the bar scene are sky-high divorce rates due to prolonged 
separations and intense work stress, soaring levels of addiction, and a great many 
people wishing to be anywhere but where they are. This kind of disassociation is part 
of what makes it possible for decent people to inflict the scale of damage to the land 
that extreme energy demands (Klein 2014, 343-344 quoted in Smith and Tidwell 
2016, 333).  
 This discourse similarly exists in Australia, where so-called progressive politics 
celebrates coal miner’s precarity as a necessary externality of climate change 
mitigation.19 The appeal to the contemporary miner’s immorality excuses the writing-off 
of their legitimate concerns for their livelihoods and communities and reproduces the 
binary of ‘jobs versus the environment’ discourse.  
Although I did not conduct systematic research in urban Australia, I  encountered 
a discourse that links coal mining to both addiction and murder often enough to recognize 
that it was common. ‘Coal Kills’ has become an almost trite phrase. Not limited to 
political protest signs, I spotted tote bags for sale at one of my favorite Melbourne based 
 
19 The distinction between coking coal and thermal coal is often overlooked in such national 
discourses.  
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clothing brand’s Gorman that had a logo reading “Coal Kills” framed by colorful coral. 
Once when explaining my research at a party in Melbourne and describing the struggles 
faced by many of the miners I knew, a slightly intoxicated man I was speaking to 
responded, “the people of Queensland are the murderers of our children and you are 
worried about their fucking murderous jobs!”  
 My interlocuters in Moranbah also told me about their own experiences with these 
accusations. A woman who had lived in Moranbah most of her life and had raised her 
daughter there explained how her daughter struggles with this discourse which she 
encounters at university. She told me:  
My daughter is in uni [university] in Brisbane and spends time with the yuppies 
there. Sometimes she gets upset when they are talking about how evil coal is. My 
husband tells her to tell them that unless they want to give up their phones they 
need to shut up, and that coking coal is different. 
Similarly, a local CFMEU official once explained to me that during a trip to Sydney he 
was chatting with a man at a bar who asked what he did for work. The man—who he 
described as “some dickhead in Sydney”—said, “‘coal is as bad as heroine’”. He 
recounted to me how he angrily responded: “Go and tell the Indians and the Chinese that 
they can’t have electricity! I’m no drug dealer!”  
The kind of passionate moral outrage that has become directed at coal miners is 
intensely frustrating for miners and represents a radical reversal of previously celebrated 
mining heritage that linked mining to the building of Australian national wealth. The 
CUB encapsulates a new lustful and murderous conception of the coal miner. As I will 
soon discuss in more detail, this perception has exacerbated the political divisiveness in 
Australia and reinforced the rise of a far-right populism in coal mining communities. As 
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outsiders portray the environmental damage coal miners contribute to as indictments of 
their murderous greed, and class-based distinctions celebrate CUB’s precarity as a 
rightful correction, they incite an anger that only further fuels miners’ desire to defend 
the industry in which they work. It also is encouraging support for populist politicians 
who refuse mainstream political discourse which questions the future of Australian coal. 
Despite the importance of organized labour in its founding, the ALP is implicated in this 
questioning of coal through its position representing the moderate political left.  
The third moral dilemma that the CUB represents is the issue of the changing 
nature of value-creation, which involves both changes to physical work and its dangers, 
and the prominence of financial speculation as opposed to physical labour that surrounds 
the value-production of the mining industry. First, is the nature of physical work. The 
increased mechanization of the mining industry, particularly through open-cut mining has 
changed the physical demands of mining labour. The image of the fit and dust-covered 
underground miner is replaced by the image of a corpulent contemporary open-cut miner, 
whose work involves driving a large piece of machinery while sitting in its air-
conditioned cab.20 The aesthetics of mining labour and their historic associations with 
working class exhausting and dangerous physical work thus further threaten the politics 
and affective associations through which miners have historically derived both working 
class solidarities and moral self-hood, particularly in the post-boom context where the 
speculative nature of contemporary mining is critiqued.  
A second change to the expectations of labour is a greater association of the 
industry with financial speculation. As I described in the introduction, mining in 
 
20 Slimbo here is an exception to this stereotypical association with the overweight body. 
However, his nickname implies that his leanness is a noteworthy outlier.  
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Australia has always been accompanied by booms and busts. However, in the context of 
the mining boom, this was exacerbated. The figure of the boganaire emerged discursively 
to capture these anxieties about the nation’s dependence on a speculative and thus 
unstable industry.  This term, boganaire, describes a small group of wealthy mining 
investors who have become a prominent face of the mining industry in the media. 
Boganaires fit the aesthetic class-based distinctions of bogans in terms of hobbies and 
consumption choices, but the primary material marker of the boganaire is the overweight 
body. Their corpulence serves as a symbolic exteriority of their internal greed (Robertson 
2001: loc 152). Although boganaires operate at a smaller scale than the multinational 
mining companies which reflect the similar extractive and speculative wealth generation, 
pathologized accusations of greed can be directed at these individuals in a way that they 
are not deployed against companies. The presence of their bodies makes their greed 
imaginable.  
Popular examples of boganiares include Clive Palmer who made his fortune in 
iron ore, coal, and nickel refining,21 or Gina Rinehart who made her fortune through her 
family’s large land holdings in Western Australia and the extraction of their massive 
reserves of iron ore. Another boganiare who I encountered personally in my fieldwork 
when he was speaking at a public hearing in favour of the Drayton South Mine 
development in the Upper Hunter Valley—the subject of chapter five—was a man named 
Nathan Tinkler.  
 
21 He also ventured into parliamentary politics under the Palmer United Party and recently 
produced political billboards mimicking Donald Trump with the catch-phrase, “Make Australia 
Great”.   
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Nathan Tinkler began working as an apprentice in the Hunter Valley coal mines, 
but by the age of 26 had started his own mine machinery maintenance company. He then 
went on to raise funds and borrow money to buy the Middlemount Coal mine in Central 
Queensland (140 kilometres from Moranbah) for AU$ 11.5 million. He sold his 70 per 
cent stake the next year for AU$57 million cash and AU$184 million worth of stock to 
MacArthur coal. MacArthur’s stock price then doubled the next year, making Nathan a 
very wealthy young man, with a AU$ 441 million net worth in 2008 at the age of 32. He 
continued investing in mining. At 35, from other lucky mining investments that coincided 
with the global commodities boom, he became Australia’s youngest ever billionaire. He 
spent lavishly during these years, following a number of pursuits, including buying local 
sports teams in Newcastle, and attempting to build the country’s largest horse-racing 
operation. In 2012, with the end of the mining boom and the drastic drop in coal prices, 
Nathan Tinkler’s net worth dropped from $AU 1.18 billion to $AU 630 million within 
the year. He is now bankrupt, and his financial woes not only affected him personally but 
left much destruction in its wake. He was an infamously bad debtor even before going 
bankrupt. He left many suppliers unpaid, continually leveraging debts into new ventures, 
and burning many bridges along the way (Long 2013). His rags to riches story, from 
Australia’s youngest billionaire to bankrupt disgrace, signals a larger critique of the 
mining industry itself (Manning 2013). Having made his fortune in the mining industry 
and choosing to spend his wealth in the sport and horse-racing, his fall from riches due to 
recklessness and conspicuous consumption make Nathan Tinkler an archetypical 
bogainaire. His biography is titled, Boganaire and the cover image is cropped to centre on 
his protruding gut (see figure 3.2 overleaf). 
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Of critical importance is why the story of Nathan Tinkler has captured such 
national attention. He serves as a cautionary tale reflecting anxieties about Australia’s 
reliance on commodities. As I described in the introduction, the recent commodities 
boom and bust has brought to the fore the precariousness of Australia’s reliance on 
international markets for its coal and iron ore.  Further these anxieties reflect the failed 
industrial dreams that have accompanied neoliberal globalization (Knox 2013). In the 
words of Stephen Long, speaking on the national news program Four Corners: “[i]n many 
ways Nathan Tinkler's story embodies some of the key themes of Australia's recent 
history. A nation of gamblers which rode the mining boom to riches, and plunged into 
debt, speculating on assets” (Long 2013).  
 
Figure 3.2 Front cover of Nathan Tinkler’s biography (Manning 2013) reproduced with 
permission of Black, Inc.  
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National anxieties about Australia’s reliance on commodity production and the 
shifting political economic conditions of the mining boom and bust have given rise to the 
discursive figures of the CUB and boganiare as “logos of precarious affect” (Threadgold 
2014, np). However, as I have shown in the previous two chapters, these broader political 
economic transformations have had specific local consequences in Moranbah. The boom 
and bust partially enabled the changing conditions of employment and resultant 
demographics, but it also had affective consequences as people question the stability of 
progressive futures. They have suffered through the instability of the boom and bust, and 
thus dislike the association of the industry with such cyclical conditions, which acts of 
speculation have exacerbated (see also Bowman 2018). Thus speculation becomes 
viewed as a destructive force to the privileged form of stable employment and normative 
emplaced families. Further, how one relates to speculation has become a point of 
differentiation that marks local Moranbah residents from outsiders whose presence in 
Moranbah is deemed opportunistic. This was seen most prominently through the local 
reaction to the story of an individual real estate speculator Kate Maloney, to whose story 
this chapter now turns.  
 
The Real Estate Speculator 
Most people I knew were excited that Moranbah was going to be on TV that night, and so 
I sat down on the couch in my living room to share in the small moment of fame. The TV 
blared out a dramatic news jingle, marking the start of the weekly Australian national 
news documentary program, 60 Minutes. A male reporter in voiceover boldly 
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proclaimed: “For a snapshot of all that’s wrong in the Australian housing market just visit 
Moranbah in Central Western Queensland.” This was followed by background video, 
shot through the cracked windscreen of an abandoned car, that showed empty streets and 
foreclosure notices on front doors. The choice of background video too simplistically 
portrayed Moranbah as a decrepit ghost town which was heightened by the choice of 
background music. The classic Animal’s song with the lyrics, “We’ve got to get out of 
this place, if it’s the last thing we ever do” played over the scene-setting footage. 
Eventually the camera panned up from a dead cockroach on the floor of an empty house 
to the feet of a young woman, and the audience was introduced to Kate Maloney, 
casually dressed, in her mid-20 with long blonde hair.  
We learned that Kate is AU$ 5.8 million in debt, with no chance of paying it 
back. In 2010 she began buying investment properties in Moranbah, getting in just at the 
beginning of the mining boom. However, with the end of the boom, prices for Kate’s ten 
properties in Moranbah dropped drastically, and the rents she was receiving to pay her 
mortgages have dried up as hundreds of houses sit empty.   
  “Were you greedy?” asked the reporter. “Yes, I did the wrong thing. We bought 
too many properties. We bought them too quickly, and with very high leverage. We 
absolutely did the wrong thing,” she admitted. Although she purchased the houses with 
her husband, she is the focus of the reporting and her husband is largely left out of the 
story except in the presence of a plural ‘we’ in her answers to the reporter’s questions.  
Kate’s interest in investing began at an early age, growing up on her parent’s 
dairy farm in New Zealand and observing how they managed the family business. By 14, 
she was reading investment books and had started buying cattle shares, saving up 
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AU$25,000 by the age of 18. She moved with her family to country Victoria, Australia, 
in 2005. She studied a Bachelor of Commerce at university and also received a diploma 
in financial planning. Her interest in investing eventually led her to the world of property 
investment education programs and seminars. She quickly got caught up in this circuit, 
attending seminars and paying thousands of dollars to have meetings with various 
mentors who would help guide her through the investment process. Through these 
mentors she learned about the potential riches that could be made investing in mining 
towns like Moranbah. 
She and her husband moved to Moranbah in 2010 to accelerate their investment 
goals. At the time, the mines were paying high salaries and hiring even inexperienced 
workers. Kate and her husband both got jobs at the mines, where their salaries meant they 
were able to borrow more from the banks. 21 years old at the time, she disliked her job 
and became more determined to reach her goal of fully retiring at the age of 25, living off 
her investments.  
They were very successful for a few years, eventually purchasing ten homes in 
Moranbah. The mining boom was at its peak throughout this time, bringing up the 
demand on the housing stock as more and more people moved to the area to work in the 
mines and on related construction. Moranbah is relatively isolated, so there was no 
significant housing nearby to help absorb some of the influx population.  
Rental prices skyrocketed. Kate describes how in May 2011, a three-bedroom 
house was renting for AU$1,000 a week, and by December 2011, it would have rented 
for between AU$2,000 and AU$2,500 a week (Maloney 2016: 14). With such high rents 
coming in as income, the Maloneys were able to borrow even more, as this income was 
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used to calculate their serviceability on future mortgage loans. With such high rents, 
investors were able to pour more money into real estate in Moranbah, further pulling up 
the prices and fuelling the frenzy (cf. Tsing 2005: 55-78).  Their success seemed to reach 
its climax when Kate and her husband were awarded the title of Australian Property 
Investors of the Year in 2012 by Your Investment Property Magazine, based on criteria of 
entrepreneurship, overall strategies and property selection criteria, contributions to other 
people, risk management, innovation, financial skills, and success against the odds 
(Devine 2013: 53). 
The crash came surprisingly quickly. Kate and her husband left for a six-month 
trip around the world to celebrate their successes just as things were beginning to slow 
down. By the time they returned, the decline was in full force, and houses that had been 
let for thousands of dollars a week in December 2012 were now attracting few if any 
tenants. The median rental price in 2012 was AU$1390 a month, by 2013 it was only 
AU$550 (by 2016 it had fallen to AU$275 a month). Housing prices fell even faster. The 
median house price in 2012 was AU$700,000, by 2013 it had dropped to AU$375,000. 
And again, the drop has continued, the median house price at the time of my fieldwork in 
2016 was only AU$140,000 ('Moranbah Investment Property Data for All Houses' 2017). 
That means that median house prices have dropped 80 per cent in four years.  
Kate is not alone in her financial troubles. Foreclosed and empty homes are a 
common sight in Moranbah, something that one easily notices walking down the street as 
catalogues and flyers pile up spilling out of unchecked mailboxes, and grass in front 
gardens grows tall and unkempt. Although many investors were affected, Kate is one of 
the few willing to speak publicly about it. She has put her story in the spotlight despite 
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the embarrassment and the shame because she wants to bring attention to the problem of 
the investment seminar culture and the problems in the banking industry that allowed her 
to borrow so much money in the first place. Kate repeats in all her public appearances 
that she takes responsibility for her situation, but she refuses to fully individualize the 
problem. She calls it a “collectively created problem” (Maloney 2016: 237) to emphasize 
the role played by the banks.  
Kate’s attempt to distribute the blame for her failed speculation between herself 
and her lenders and attempt to bring ethical order in the aftermath of her failed 
speculation (Bear 2015:422) failed to gain traction in the local community.  In the 
aftermath of this news program Kate became a local pariah. Town scorn, which spread 
over Facebook and local gossip circles, universally condemned Kate. She faced criticism, 
and there was schadenfreude, a collective glee at her financial downfall, coupled with 
anger that she blamed the financial institutions that enabled her speculation rather than 
taking responsibility for her own failure. Kate was deemed greedy and her downfall 
considered an appropriate comeuppance.  
There is a critical difference between the local reception of Kate’s story and the 
broader narrative that the producers of the television show were attempting to relate. The 
show itself is framed in the context of growing national housing prices and resultant 
anxiety over rising household debt levels. It attempts to point to the responsibility of the 
banks in proliferating the Australian real estate bubble through interest-only loans. The 
story much more engages with what David Graeber terms the “profound moral 
confusion” around debt…where “most everywhere, one finds that the majority of human 
beings hold simultaneously that (1) paying back money one has borrowed is a simple 
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matter of morality, and (2) anyone in the habit of lending money is evil” (2011: 9).  
Despite attempts to connect Kate’s story to the global financial crisis and particularly the 
subprime mortgage crisis in the USA and Europe, however, ambivalence about debtors’ 
obligations to repay their loans after the revelation of predatory lending practices (Sabaté 
2016; Stout 2016a, 2016b) was little evident in Moranbah. Instead, Kate’s greed and her 
personal moral ineptitude, was the primary way in which the community made sense of 
her downfall. The moral confusion here was precisely about what is really at question in 
Kate’s indebtedness (Gregory 2012; Peebles 2010; Stout 2016a), that is, what are the 
social and political conditions which the moral injunctions invariably reflect?  
Within Moranbah a moral unease has arisen around the practice of financial 
speculation and the related alteration of labour and established forms of value within the 
mining community. Speculation and the boom and bust of commodity cycles has 
increased the precarity of labour and social communities built around the coal mining 
industry. Accusations of greed reflect such changing political economic conditions and 
the resultant negative affects which surround shifting moral attachments.  This has had a 
particular manifestation in debates about real estate locally. Housing in Moranbah has not 
primarily been defined through the mortgage, but through one’s location in a 
hierarchically structured society and through the labour struggles in which housing was a 
sought-after entitlement. Housing is also a central point in the current threat to 
community through the increase in long-distance commuting such as fly-in-fly-out 
(FIFO). Although many of these changes are a result of mining company policy and 
banking incentive structures, real estate speculators like Kate receive the bulk of the 
blame from the local community. In order to understand the local context of the 
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accusation and to illustrate how Kate’s investments were particularly incompatible with 
moral expectations and the conditions for which she is blamed it is necessary to 
understand more about the history of housing in Moranbah.  
 
Housing in Moranbah: From labour solidarity to the long-distance commute 
As mentioned earlier, Moranbah was built specifically to house the workers at the nearby 
open-cut coal mines in the early 1970s. However, this was partially a result of previous 
labour struggles in the region, particularly a 1963 strike in the coal mining town of 
Moura. The housing conditions surrounding the Moura mines were considered drastically 
inadequate and consisted mostly of tents and a few caravans, but all without a reliable 
source of clean water. This eventually led to a six-week strike. Through intense lobbying 
by the unions, the state government ended up providing housing commission houses to 
the mine on 40-year leases (Peetz and Murray 2010: 67). This victory had a broader 
impact however, as it put pressure on the government to ensure that mining companies 
provided housing to employees and their families but also contributed to the broader 
development of towns in the localities of their mines. Thus, as companies made plans to 
build more mines, they were now expected to also build towns, eventually leading to the 
building of Moranbah several years later.  
  Two-thirds of the houses in Moranbah in the first decade were built by the Utah 
Development Company, which operated the local mines (Fitzgerald 1985: 331). Even 
though the town was not technically a ‘company town’ as it was open and run by a local 
government council, the impact of the Utah Development Company was profound. Of 
particular importance to the class dynamics at the time, the town was marked by an 
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occupational hierarchy which was transferred onto the built environment as those with 
different occupations were housed in differently styled houses and neighbourhoods. This 
was seen as a particularly American invention by residents at the time and deemed 
counter to a particular Australian sense of equality, Utah being an American company 
(Williams 1981). Higher-up staff members were provided with four-bedroom high-set 
houses—houses raised on stilts with a storage area underneath—whereas the workers 
were given three-bedroom low-set houses—houses set on the ground (see figure 3.3 
overleaf). Similarly, those in non-mining occupations were further differentiated as the 
government-provided or private housing was of lower quality than that built by Utah. The 
upper-level staff and managers were highest-placed of all, as they lived in larger houses 
built on a slightly elevated section of the town, colloquially referred to as ‘Snob hill’ (see 
figure 3.4 overleaf). This strict distinction no longer exists formally. However, 
neighbourhoods are still associated with different employers, as the same company tends 






These photos, Figure 3.3 Low-set house and high-set house in Moranbah (source: 






Figure 3.4 Map of Moranbah showing area known as Snob Hill (source: 
googlemaps.com annotation by author) 
 
As Katherine Gibson argued in her studies of this area in the early 1990s: “At all times 
involvement in class processes is overdetermined by involvement in other nonclass 
processes, such as processes of engendering, of family formation, of social organization, 
of cultural or geographical identification, and so on” (Gibson 1991: 288). While housing 
was a material marker of class division, it also became a focal point for various instances 
of class solidarity and labour organizing.  
A particularly defining moment in Moranbah’s housing history was the Housing 
Tax Strike in 1980. This strike came about when a Federal tax was proposed on the 
subsidized housing that any business or organization provided to their employees, 
including the mining companies (Murray 1996). The tax would have ended up costing 
miners the equivalent of AU$1000 a year (Peetz and Murray 2010). Employment 
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provided housing affected not only miners, but also local government employees, police, 
teachers, and even farmers who housed their staff. Thus, the shared interests in avoiding 
taxation was common across the board.  This had the effect of uniting the community 
around the provision of housing. 
As evidenced by the broad support for those who opposed this tax, housing 
ownership is far less common in Moranbah than in the rest of the state. The most recent 
data on this is from the 2011 census. Owner-occupiers represent only 30 per cent of the 
housing, compared to 65 per cent in Southeast Queensland. Within this group of renters, 
about 70 per cent of housing is provided through one’s employment, whereas in 
Southeast Queensland as a whole the figure is under five per cent (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2011). 
This complex housing geography was put under considerable stress during the 
recent commodities boom. When housing prices and rental prices soared, any residents 
who had not been provided with company housing or were not making particularly high 
salaries in service-providing to the mines, simply could not afford to live there and some 
were forced to move. So, finding employees for the local shops, hairdressers, and 
restaurants, was extremely difficult. At the same time, even the more established 
residents who might have filled these positions were pulled into mining jobs because of 
the huge demand and high salaries. Even though economic figures showed the town was 
booming, due to the increased cost of operating, those local businesses that were not 
directly affected by the increased demand from the mining industry struggled to survive.  
Although the frenzied activity of the boom has ended and reversed, with housing 
prices since dropping and enabling some people to return, it has had a long-term legacy, 
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with the trend to favouring fly-in-fly-out (FIFO) workforces during this time, as 
discussed in chapters one and two. FIFO was partially justified as a solution to the social 
problems caused by the increase in population during the mining boom, especially the 
housing shortage. This made FIFO an easier sell to the community and state regulators 
(Wright and Bice 2017). Of course, now that the boom is over, and the population has 
left, and house values and rents have plummeted, the employment conditions that 
encourage FIFO remain. This has meant that the search for blame for the current 
conditions of precarity, particularly the dislocation of labour, has been blamed on real 
estate speculation, and figures like Kate Maloney. 
This is also linked to the particular relationship to the environment discussed 
earlier in chapter one. The house is a crucial locus for the expression of labour solidarity 
and related communal security. Further, the generalized domestication that Hage (2017) 
describes as foundational to the settler-colonial relationship to nature is reflected in the 
privileging of housing as a representation of pioneering success. Thus empty and 
foreclosed homes, particularly their overgrown lawns, serve as visible reminders of social 
failure and represent the threat of an untamed nature. I will now describe in more detail 
the reaction to Kate’s story to show how personalized moral accusations distracted 
attention from a structural critique of the increased precarity that most threatens 
Moranbah. 
 
Moral Accusations of Greed  
Moranbah is the kind of town where grocery shopping takes all day. It has a modern 
supermarket, a branch of one of Australia’s major chains, with your standard organization 
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of fruits and vegetables in the entrance, milk at the back, and numbered aisles hosting the 
sundry items in between. However, the delay comes when every time you turn your cart 
around the corner of a new aisle, you will undoubtedly run into someone you know and 
are thus obliged to stop and chat. It’s a phenomenon often remarked upon by long term 
residents, a manifestation of the strength of neighbourly relations in the community 
which continue despite the increasing transience. However, it simultaneously represents 
the prominence of the related local gossip. The supermarket is in a small mall, with a 
central fluorescent lit hallway covered by high ceilings that trap the heavily conditioned 
air. There is also a small café in this hall, located just to the right of the entrance to the 
supermarket. This café is a social hub. 
When Kate Maloney suggested we meet here for an interview, I was worried. 
Sitting in this spot would surely expose our meeting to gossip, and although I certainly 
wanted to talk with her, I didn’t want to be seen with her. Even though my research could 
serve as an excuse, much of my access required that I was perceived as ‘pro-community,’ 
something that Kate had become to represent the anti-thesis of. Thinking back on it, 
perhaps Kate had chosen this location deliberately, as an act of defiance, because as she 
admitted to me it was the first time she had left the house in ten days.  
Kate had recently become the victim of town scorn after her appearance on 60 Minutes.  
While rumours and gossip circulate in person, the central location for communal 
shaming is Facebook, particularly on the Moranbah Community Notice Board, which has 
over 16,000 members, despite only 8,333 people residing in Moranbah at the 2016 census 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2016). Soon after Kate’s story aired, discussion and 
memes began to appear on the Facebook page. There were a few clear themes that 
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emerged from the criticism that reflect local conditions. First is the issue of unfair rental 
prices, and the impact of these on the introduction of long-distance commuting practices 
like FIFO. One user posted:  
You borrowed money from the bank so you could charge people exorbitant, 
unreasonable, unfair rental prices. Now you say the bank is being unfair and 
unreasonable making you pay back your exorbitant loan repayments! 
 
Another, in reply to the above, wrote: 
So true and they also blame the mines and say they tricked them into it lmao [laugh 
my ass off]. The old saying never bite the hand that feeds you is so true but they went 
even further and chewed the mines arm off at the shoulder charging $2000+ pw for 
rent on non maintained shitbox homes lmfao [laugh my fucking ass off] and wonder 
why they went to using accommodation villages. 
These posts defend the bank’s right to demand repayment, and further even defend the 
mining companies’ decisions to use accommodation villages rather than housing 
employees locally. Rather than recognizing the structural conditions and hiring practices 
of the mines, the comments blame Kate’s greed, the high rents she was charging as the 
moral failure which disqualifies her from passing the blame to the banks and obscures the 
role of the mining companies. The second comment goes as far as to paint the mining 
companies as victims of Kate’s greed having to pay high rents to house their mine 
employees. Thus, the comment implies that the mining companies’ decision to use 
“accommodation villages” rather than putting workers in local housing is a sensible 
reaction to Kate’s and other speculators’ greed.  
Although it is not unheard of for local residents to call mining companies greedy, 
particularly in the wake of lay-offs or workforce casualisation, this can backfire because 
it implicates the morality of mining company employees, that is, themselves. As the 
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above reply also warns, “never bite the hand that feeds you”. On several occasions when 
people were involved in discussions with their friends about the behaviour of speculators 
during the boom, someone offered the opinion that the mining companies were equally to 
blame. However, someone else would always stop the conversation from venturing too 
far into blaming the mines, with something along the lines of, “who do you think signs 
our pay cheques?” or “they might be greedy, but we’re the ones who work for them”. 
Accusations against the mining companies reflect a moral dilemma for coal miners, who 
often defend themselves against accusations of avarice from popular discourse, such as 
those linked to the CUB.  
A particular point of frustration was Kate’s desire to retire at the age of 25 and to live 
off her investments. This spoke directly to the changing conditions of labour-value which 
frustrate Moranbah locals. For an emplaced community which privileges physical labour 
in the mining industry, but which faces accusations of laziness and entitlement that the 
CUB represents, this is a particular insult. Not only does she desire to retire at an 
exceptionally young age, but further she intends to do this through upsetting the 
established economy around housing, in which housing is not an investment but a hard-
fought for entitlement deriving from one’s employment. Thus in this view of speculative 
wealth, Kate’s gains come from appropriating the value created through others’ work. 
Although Moranbah residents, particularly union members, would be familiar with the 
process of capital ownership and appropriation of worker’s surplus value, when these 
dynamics were mimicked in the investments of a young individual, such capital 
ownership was deemed greedy. One person wrote:  
I’m sorry but I have no sympathy for anyone who tries to make a quick buck off the 
back of others, and to try and blame someone else for their failures[.] just goes to 
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show they were doing it for the wrong reasons. Greed will get you in the end every 
time. Booms never last. 
Another added in reply, “Typical greed ‘I want high investment to get something for 
nothing’…Nothing’s for nothing” (ellipsis in original).  In reply again, another 
commented that Kate and other investors were “screwing what they can out of normal 
hard working families”. The distinction between investing and its association with greed 
was contrasted repeatedly to legitimate wealth created through ‘hard work’. This 
conception of speculation as counter to physical work at least partially countered the 
accusations that coal miners face as CUBs. The physically dangerous nature of mining 
has been a point of similar contestation  
Stepping away from the reaction to Kate’s story momentarily, during my 
fieldwork, contested understandings of the danger of work were most strongly revealed in 
the discourses that arose over the re-emergence of black lung, or coal workers’ 
pneumoconiosis. In September 2015 the first miner after more than 30 years without a 
case was diagnosed with black lung in Queensland (Moore 2016). As of May 2017, 21 
cases have been confirmed. These have primarily been people with a long career working 
in underground mines in Queensland (Mellor and Riga 2017). It seems that this disease 
likely never went away; instead no one had seriously been looking for it. Insufficient 
medical training and screening led to a diagnostic failure that was only recognized after 
these miners’ medical reports were sent to experts on the disease in the US.   While these 
findings primarily concerned underground mines, several of the open-cut miners that I 
knew drew on these findings to emphasize their own exposure to coal dust. It was 
generally thought that open-cut miners were significantly less exposed to coal dust 
because they were in the closed cabs of large trucks and machinery, as opposed to the 
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underground miners who worked more closely to the coal face itself, breathing in the fine 
particles that caused black lung. However, several open-cut operators emphasized that 
they too were exposed. Slimbo emphasized to me that although he spent his working days 
in a truck, “I still get covered in dust. You see, the window doesn’t close all the way. So 
there I am with all this dust and I have to breathe it in. They don’t give me a mask 
because they say I’m safe in there.”  Hound Dog, from chapter one, also brought this up 
repeatedly, and described how he was insisting his chest x-rays be sent to American 
experts for analysis.  
There is much that can be said about this situation regarding the failure of the 
state’s regulators, but of interest to this chapter, was the way in which the open-cut 
miners attempted to claim a relation to this danger, revealing the social framings of risk 
(cf Smith-Rolston 2010, 2013). Slimbo and Hound Dog’s insistence that open-cut miners 
were similarly at risk derived from legitimate fears, but it also countered the assumption 
that contemporary open-cut miners were engaging in safe and easy work—at least by 
comparison to historic underground miners. The disappearance of black lung—30 years 
passing without a diagnosis—seemed to imply that the mechanization of even 
underground mining had taken much of the physical danger and health risks out of the 
underground mining process. It’s re-emergence, and the evidence that it had in fact never 
gone away, showed that this perception of safety was a mere illusion.  
This dangerous nature of coal mining, even in open-cut mines, is similarly a point 
of distinction emphasized by established miners. They argue that unlike casual miners, 
they have sufficient respect for the dangers and an ability to read the conditions in the 
mine to identify risks and hazards (cf. Smith-Rolston 2013b; 589). The dangerous nature 
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of mining, historic or contemporary, has played a part in the establishment of labour 
solidarity. Further, discourses which emphasize this danger serve to counter the image of 
laziness and entitlement that are encapsulated in the figure of the CUB. The risks that 
coal miners take as part of their job is thus partially understood to justify their high wages 
and to build an association that maintained the value of physical work. This safety risk 
however, was deemed quite distinct from the form of risk that was involved in financial 
speculation. 
Returning to the reception to Kate’s story, another comment about Kate on 
Facebook sarcastically explains: “Now there’s the greed that all of us ‘greedy’ locals 
have been copping flak over for so long…And she was a greedy local, oh no that’s right I 
believe she’s from Victoria!” (a different Australian state, which is generally associated 
with a more elitist populace).  This is an articulation that weighs the greedy miner, 
commonly represented in the figure of the CUB, against Kate’s avarice. Her lack of 
belonging to Moranbah separates her moral failure from that of the “locals”. The 
comment argues that greed is not internal to the mining community but is imported from 
outsiders whose very rapaciousness draws them to Moranbah.  
Because of the strength with which greed is directed at outsiders, only once did a 
local admit to me that they regretted not selling their family home at the peak of the 
boom. I was out at a restaurant for an early Christmas party with a group of friends who 
all volunteered for the local radio station. An adjacent party at the restaurant began 
getting a bit rowdy. Someone wondered aloud who they were, and it was whispered that 
they were the employees who had just been laid off from a gas company in the area. The 
sight of another lay-off ignited the common discussion about the boom and the bust.  The 
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group began collectively rehashing a common discourse of long-term residents, that in 
some ways things are actually better now in the post-boom period. They argue that all 
that speculation during the boom just caused trouble. Many people were swept up in the 
boom and overtaken by greed.  For people like themselves who were truly committed to 
the community, no house price would ever have persuaded them to sell their family 
homes and leave their beloved community. It should be noted that many in this group did 
not own their own homes, and this discussion was largely directed at a friend, Sarah.  
Sarah is very dedicated to the community, working tirelessly at this group and 
intensely involved in two different sports teams in which her children play. However, she 
was recently facing financial stress, so much so that she was contemplating having to 
leave the organization for more lucrative work in the mines.  Her mortgage was a 
particular burden, as her family’s large house was purchased and renovated during the 
beginning of the boom years. When I first visited her home, I commented on how 
beautiful it was to which she responded, “Yeah and we’ve got the mortgage to prove it”. 
Yet in the context of this group discussion, she agreed that she loved living in Moranbah 
and would never sell the home in which she was raising her family. However, as the 
conversation moved on and the focus shifted to other people at the table, she leaned over 
to me sitting beside her and whispered that sometimes she thinks about how much better 
things would have been if she had sold during the boom. “We got offers for over a 
million,” she whispered with a tinge of regret.  
In some ways, the moral accusations that get volleyed around Moranbah reflect 
the generalized precarity and anxiety that has come to filter into many aspects of life in 
Moranbah—Christmas parties share the restaurant with the good-bye parties of laid-off 
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workers.  The continual lay-offs, the difficulty of building relationships, and the 
generalized uncertainty have led to a search for blame. Allegedly acquisitive investors, 
like Kate, have become the prime targets of blame. Her role in upsetting the local housing 
economy by turning a previously company-provided entitlement into a source of 
speculative profit makes her culpable for contributing to the demise of the local emplaced 
community that favours nuclear co-habiting families. Of lesser or no weight in this local 
account of the rise of long-distance commuting practices and its relationship to housing 
provision is a negative assessment of the banks, the regulators, or the mining companies 
whose employment practices created this situation.  
Moral accusations in Moranbah—and more broadly in Australia through the 
figure of the CUB and boganaire—which are volleyed back and forth between locals and 
outsiders as accusations and counter-accusations, tend to pathologize and encourage an 
ideology of individual responsibility.  This obscures structural and institutional failures. 
Accusations of greed are a visceral condemnation which derive their accusatory power 
from their indictment of personal moral failure, which is inherently corporeal and 
pathologized (Robertson 2001). Thus, the greedy individual or class of people, and their 
corporeal moral failure, become the site of struggle in which such allegations are flung 
about. The figures of the CUB, boganaire, and the real estate speculator reveal the way in 
which precarious affects turn political economic conditions into interpersonal moral 
accusations.  
Xenophobia and Growing Nationalist Populism  
 
The outsider real estate speculator represents only one location for the displacement of 
these precarious affects. Outsiders, more broadly defined, are also increasingly seen as 
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targets for these negative sentiments. I first began to take note of a xenophobic and 
particularly Islamophobic discourse in relation to the 2016 Federal Election which took 
place while I was in Moranbah. I will now describe how the moral accusations around 
labour transformation have become entangled in a growing nationalist populism which 
resonates with similar global trends, while taking into account the important local 
context. 
The electoral division, Capricornia, so named because the Tropic of Capricorn 
passes through it, is a marginal electorate. With a history of close contests between the 
Australian Labour Party (ALP) and the conservative Liberal National Coalition 
(Coalition), the region received considerable attention from national politicians. The ALP 
candidate, Leisa Neaton, made several trips to the region. One event in Clermont was 
poorly attended, so much so that it was only me, one other resident, and the local man 
who had organized the event. She still spent the afternoon answering our questions. She 
was a school principal in the city of Rockhampton and was more socially progressive 
than many in Moranbah. She talked quite a lot about Australia’s immigration policy, and 
the ALP’s role and support for the offshore detention of migrants who arrive by boat in 
camps in Manus Island and Nauru—a major national political issue. Leisa admitted that 
“history will not look kindly upon this period in Australia’s history, but I have to tow the 
party line when it comes to people seeking asylum.” It is more common in the discourse 
to call such people ‘asylum seekers,’ but she explained her phrasing: 
I always say ‘People seeking asylum’ because it’s important to remember that 
they are people first and foremost. There’s a list that the [Liberal National] 
Coalition is floating around to try and say that Labor is soft on immigration, and 
my name is on there because I’ve said caring things about refugees. 
 201 
 The other attendee agreed with her position on refugees and said, referring to the slogan 
‘stop the boats,’ which was used to justify the detention policy: “It’s disgusting how the 
Coalition is using a three word slogan to strip people of their human rights,” to which 
Leisa cleverly replied, “At least stop the boats had a verb, now it’s just ‘jobs and 
growth’.” 
‘Jobs and growth’ was the repetitive slogan that came to define the Liberal 
National Coalition’s campaign in 2016.  This also incorporated a not so well disguised 
anti-refugee sentiment which the immigration minister at the time, Peter Dutton, made 
clear when he stated:  
For many people, [refugees] they won’t be, you know, numerate or literate in their 
own language, let alone English. These people would be taking Australian jobs, 
there’s no question about that. For many of them that would be unemployed, they 
would languish in unemployment queues and on Medicare and the rest of it so 
there would be huge cost and there’s no sense in sugar-coating that, that’s the 
scenario (Doherty and Davidson 2016).  
Immigrants were to be feared both for taking unemployment payments, while somehow 
simultaneously taking Australian jobs. Beyond the specific anti-immigrant framing, 
campaign rhetoric on ‘jobs and growth’ was an attempt to paint the ALP as too socially 
progressive, which would in turn hurt the economy. The message emphasized the 
coalition’s management of the economy and translated its pro-business message into the 
concerns of a non-elite through the language of protecting jobs. Thus the Coalition was 
intentionally countering the rising critique both of mining companies and the major banks 
that characterised the Australian left.  A political ad from the Coalition that aired 
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repeatedly encapsulated this message. A man in a thick Aussie accent and on a coffee 
break on a worksite in a hi-vis vest says: 
Mr Shorten [leader of the ALP] wants to go to war with my bank; he wants to go 
to war with our miners…Well I’ll tell you what happens when you get a war 
going on in the economy, people like me lose their jobs, so I reckon we should 
just see it through and stick with the current mob for a while.  
Although heightened through particular local conditions, this discourse matches rather 
closely to how Kate’s message failed to resonate with the local community. The 
mainstream conservative party was clever in highlighting the connections that linked 
protecting coal jobs to protecting coal companies. This allowed the pro-business 
Coalition to present themselves as a better advocate for labour than the Australian Labor 
Party, whose progressivism is deemed a threat to coal livelihoods.  The double bind faced 
by coal communities is directly obvious here.  In choosing between the two major parties, 
one must either preference the coal industry on which they depend by voting for the 
conservative Coalition, or preference fighting the labour casualisation they face, by 
voting for the ALP. Yet, the ALP was felt to be moving closer to the left in terms of its 
climate and immigration policy, but to the right in terms of its relationship with 
multinational corporations. Thus, as particularly the 2019 federal election results reveal, 
many voters are increasingly abandoning the ALP.  However, in perhaps attempting to 
vote out of this double bind, support is not going directly to the conservative Coalition 
but to populist third party candidates.  
The increasing frustration with the ALP became particularly obvious in the lead 
up to the 2016 election. A few weeks before the vote, the ALP’s Shadow Minister for 
Employment and Workplace Relations, Brendan O’Connor, travelled to Moranbah to 
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support Leisa Neaton’s campaign. He held an event at the local pub, The Workers’ Club, 
in its separate meeting room. Leisa gave a short speech before introducing the Shadow 
Minister. After giving an overview of the ALP’s campaign, he began taking questions 
from the audience. The crowd of around 40 people was disproportionately male, with 
many dressed in hi-vis work uniforms, primarily because many would soon be reporting 
for their night shifts. Two main issues were raised in questions. First, questions revolved 
around the increased casualization of the workforce; then the questions moved to an issue 
I had not yet realized was a major concern: the 457 visa.  
The 457 visa is the foreign skilled worker visa. The visa is intended to provide a 
temporary work visa only when the required skills are not available domestically. 
Although there were a number of foreign-born people living and working in Moranbah—
1,094 according to the 2016 census (ABS 2016)—there was not a significant number of 
low-skilled foreigners taking operating jobs. Further these mostly (337 of them) were 
New Zealanders, who did not need visas to work in Australia. Others were South African 
mine management, European engineers, Au Pairs, and of course anthropological 
fieldworkers.  The outsiders who FIFO’d and DIDO’d were primarily Anglo-Celtic 
settler Australians, thus I hadn’t previously realized that foreigners were viewed as a 
significant issue in the local labour market. 
However during the public meeting, a middle-aged man in hi-vis asked what the 
ALP was going to do about the mining occupations on the 457 skill shortages list. 
Brendan O’Connor answered that if there were jobs on there that locals could fill, they 
shouldn’t be on the list. He did not back away from the need for these visas to fill certain 
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positions, but he emphasized that 457s would only be used when there is a legitimate 
skills shortage.  
Unsatisfied with his answer, another man followed up ignoring the formal 
procedure for asking questions. He simply stood up and said: “In the mine I work at, 
there used to be 14 or 15 apprentices at a time. Now, BHP is only taking 12 apprentices 
in all of Queensland. They are making a skills shortage. They want it so they can use 
cheap foreign labour.” To this,  the minister responded in an evasive manner that 
frustrated much of the room, “I can write a bunch of regulations, but the real way of 
getting job security is having the skills that will be in demand in the future. And the 
labour market is changing at a faster rate than ever. So we need to focus on education, 
technology and maths.” Hound Dog from chapter one spoke next, again out of turn, “We 
should have no unemployment in Australia before we let in 457 visas!” 
This became a frustrating exchange and the formal meeting began to unravel. One 
man began making audible grunts of frustration at the Shadow Minister’s responses. 
Finally another man asked, “Why should we trust you? You are getting all this money 
from corporations.” To which Brendan O’Connor calmly responded with a discussion of 
the ALP’s financial donation disclosure policy. The heckling man yelled out in response, 
“Same shit different shovel!” before storming out of the room. As he approached the door 
to leave, he hurled one final insult at the Shadow Minister: “You’re a pinhead!”  
The meeting ended soon after this scene and the crowd dispersed into the pub 
itself. The politicians all went to the family friendly restaurant section of the pub, 
whereas the workers moved to the sports betting and bar section where the conversation 
turned to the frustrating nature of electoral politics. Hound Dog said: “In their suits and 
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ties, these guys just don’t get what we have to deal with out here.” He continued with a 
joking wink, “Not like you, Kari”. He was poking fun at how I didn’t really fit in with 
this group of middle-aged male miners. However perhaps he was also expressing in this 
gesture that the xenophobia expressed earlier did not apply to me, for I chose to sit with 
the workers rather than the politicians who Hound Dog had witnessed invite me to join 
them.   
These discourses around the federal election pointed out a growing frustration 
with the Australian Labor Party, and perhaps the major parties more broadly. Although 
this 2016 federal election results only showed moderate losses for the ALP, the following 
federal election in 2019 saw a massive swing of +16.98 per cent to a third party called 
One Nation, mostly drawing from the ALP’s support (AEC 2019). One Nation is 
essentially a right-wing populist nationalist party. It’s leader Pauline Hanson first 
appeared on the political scene in the mid-1990s. The party is protectionist, against 
Australian multiculturalism, intensely critical of Aboriginal welfare, and fundamentally 
focused on stopping migration. The party is blatantly Islamophobic and lately has 
managed to increase its popular support by being explicitly pro-coal, denying climate 
change, and calling for Australia to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. 
One Nation did not run a candidate in the 2016 election however, so the fight for 
this xenophobic vote was primarily between the two major parties. Perhaps having 
learned from this encounter with the Shadow Minister, on election day morning the 
regional paper, the Daily Mercury, featured a full front cover ad taken out by the ALP 
which read, “Put Aussie Jobs First. Stop the Foreign 457 Visa Rorts.” The giant bold font 
was accompanied by a picture of a solemn looking man in an orange hard hat and head 
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torch—more a stock image caricature than an actual photograph of a contemporary 
miner. Further complicating this xenophobic sentiment, only days before the election 
posters appeared on what seemed like every third tree lining Moranbah’s main 
thoroughfare, which read: “Protect our Democracy from Islam.” When I saw these 
posters, I realized that perhaps wanting to avoid difficult conversations with my research 
participants, I had made a crucial oversight deriving from my own desire to empathize 
with their plight. Previous to the election, I had had many conversations where a 
discussion about labour casualization turned into diatribes of Islamophobia. I usually 
attempted to redirect these conversations back to the topic of labour and community, not 
seeing that perhaps there was something my interlocuters were trying to share with me, 
but that I was refusing to hear.  
In Mazzarella’s review article of the anthropology of populism, he discusses that 
although the explicit study of populism is new to the discipline, anthropology has a 
populist tendency, in that we are primarily concerned with “the common sense of the 
common people” (2019, 46). However, in the current political context with the rise of far-
right populism typified in Trump’s election and the Brexit referendum, this “puts 
pressure on the anthropological imagination, as the common sense of the common people 
is becoming increasingly hard to swallow” (Mazzarella 2019, 46).  I certainly felt this 
pressure and realized too late in my fieldwork that I needed to pay attention. Therefore, 
this section is somewhat speculative and draws from experiences in my fieldnotes rather 
than a systematic investigation.  
The 2016 Australian federal election was taking place at the same time that 
Donald Trump was securing his position as the Republican Party’s nominee.  Eventually 
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the connection between Trump’s campaign promises to bring back coal jobs and his anti-
immigrant and Islamophobic messaging started to connect with what I was observing in 
my fieldwork. I was often asked if, as an American, I would be voting for Trump. 
Although there was some criticism of his general demeanour, there was also excitement. 
“I love to hear him talking about coal miners. He’s on our side,” Hound Dog told me. As 
Jessica Smith has argued, “Trump aligned himself with the discursive power of miners as 
an icon of white working-class masculinity whose labor ‘made America great’” (Smith 
2017, np). Trump’s alignment with coal miners also crossed national borders.  In 
Australia, he also appealed to this symbolic coal miner, the non-CUB morally righteous 
figure whose labour built Australia. However, this is not only a working-class 
phenomenon. As Smith argues this emblematic figure also appealed to the middle class in 
the US “who copiously consume the cultural mythology surrounding miners as 
emblematic of their own cultural and economic anxiety” (Smith 2017, np).  Hugh 
Gusterson similarly tells us that to understand support for the populist right, it is 
necessary to look at the petty bourgeoise who are “resentful of the educated 
cosmopolitans above them, and intensely fearful of slipping into the working class below 
them” (Gusterson 2017, 212).  
The class dynamics in Australia do not match perfectly with those in America, 
however these authors are suggesting something critical that does apply to the Australian 
example. Coal miners in Australia, through their relatively high wages, are perhaps more 
accurately related to this middle-class who are particularly fearful of slipping into an 
impoverished working class, yet they maintain a positive moral association with the 
emblematic figure of the proud coal miner whose physical, male labour has made 
 208 
Australia great. They are also simultaneously threatened by a cosmopolitan elite who 
critiques the moral value of their labour and regulatory regimes seeking to limit carbon 
pollution and the future of their valued industry. This fits Kalb’s definition of populism:  
More broadly conceived, populism refers to the moods and sensibilities of the 
disenfranchised as they face the disjunctures between everyday lives that seem to 
become increasingly chaotic and uncontrollable and the wider public power 
projects that are out of their reach and suspected of serving their ongoing 
disenfranchisement (Kalb 2009, 209).  
The boom and bust of commodity cycles and the speculative nature of global markets 
creates instability in Moranbah lives, but so does the threat of decisions on climate 
change that threaten the broader industry of which they are a part.  Further climate 
change and moral accusations that arise around it undermine the moral associations and 
self-conceptions of their labour’s value.  
The relationship between Islamophobia, climate change denial, and the appeal of 
nationalist third parties is complex. It was of course attached to a global discourse spread 
online and in conservative media, but it also resonated locally. These Moranbah locals, 
like the Polish nationalists Kolb studied, “articulate their bricolages of critique from 
combined bits of direct experience and mediated right-wing protest frames” (Kalb 2009, 
208). However, why did Islamophobia resonate locally, what was the “direct experience” 
(ibid) on which this critique drew? There were very few Muslims in Moranbah. The 2016 
census counted 32 out of Moranbah’s 8,333 residents (ABS 2016). So why did 
Australia’s Democracy need protecting from Islam, as the election posters claimed? In 
order to make sense of this, I noticed a particular trend in how many miners framed their 
Islamophobia.  
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Paying more attention to the discourse of my close informants, in this case always 
white male Australian miners, what was expressed was a specific critique of Sharia law. 
Although there were many times when a conversation about workforce casualization 
turned into a discussion about Islam, Hound Dog used to get particularly worked up 
about it. This is only one of many conversations we had that followed a similar pattern. 
This time we were having dinner at a local Chinese restaurant, he was paying because he 
had just won $500 at the pokies (slot machines). The conversation started with a 
discussion of the importance of the union in protecting workers, particularly their 
physical safety and how many of the new younger miners didn’t realize how much they 
owed the unions. All of a sudden, the conversation changed and he asked me, “Did you 
know that parts of Australia are under Sharia law now?” I tried to change the topic: “I 
don’t think that’s true. There might be some communities that follow different traditions 
but they are still under Australian law.”  He persisted: “No, in all the Muslim 
neighbourhoods it’s the law. They don’t have to follow Australian law.” “That’s not true” 
I repeated. Then trying to appeal to me as the feminist he knew I was, he said, “No, they 
let these old men marry girls, like ten-year-old girls. It’s disgusting!” I replied, trying to 
keep a calm and reasoned voice, “That isn’t legal in Australia. Most Muslims are just like 
you and me. Plus there are plenty of Christians who do despicable things too, and we 
don’t think they represent all Christians.” He responded, “Look I don’t have any issue 
with Muslims, but if they’re going to be here, they have to follow our law.”  This focus 
on Sharia law, rather than Muslims themselves was repeated often. It often slipped easily 
into a general racism, but the intensity of disgust was focused on the intrusion of this 
foreign normative system.  
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As Australian social theorist Ghassan Hage has asked, “how do some subjects 
come to think that in acting Islamophobically they are protecting what makes their lives 
worth living?” (Hage 2017, 13). In his book Is Racism an Environmental Threat? he 
answers the provocation by arguing that the forms of othering and domination behind 
both racism and environmental destruction are the same and can’t be separated from the 
colonial foundations from which they have arisen and further reproduce. This is quite in 
keeping with theorists that emphasize the fundamental ontological modern-colonial 
foundations as a sufficient explanation for the Anthropocene, which I argue against in the 
introduction. However, Hage has a particular nuance that I find critical to understanding 
the specifics of how this works out in the Australian context, that is, his theory of 
generalized domestication (Hage 2017, 15). This, as described in chapter one, is a mode 
of inhabiting the world in a settler-colonial framing, through which concepts of home are 
directly tied to the control and domination of the natural world (Hage 2017, 94). As I 
have also shown, this control is felt to be slipping away, less through the rise of extreme 
weather events than from the increased labour and social precarity that limits the 
community’s ability to control and respond to them. Thus home, and concepts of 
belonging, including who does and does not belong, can be related to the domesticated 
environment as a product of white male labour and emplaced nuclear family. The settler-
colonial moral framing which emphasize the human co-constitution of nature in the 
making of home and the positive association around mining labour’s productivity is 
undermined through what is felt to be outside forces: climate negotiators meeting in 
Paris, mining company boardrooms in London, urban Australian Greenies, or real estate 
investors.  
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Further, the accusations that Moranbah miners face, particularly those that 
critique their moral character, such as those linked to the CUB accusation, are 
experienced as threats to valued normative (settler-colonial) frameworks from the 
outside. Whether these are in the form of critiques of greed, laziness, and environmental 
destruction, they are in contrast to a local moral ideal that is still linked to a form of 
extractive labour which builds social community. This analytical frame helps explain 
why it was less the presence of Muslims than the threat of a foreign moral order, in the 
form of Sharia law, that received the primary focus of this Islamophobia. As I have 
shown thus far, this is a settler-colonial framework, it is conservative and patriarchal, and 
the critique is misplaced. However, as Hage further provokes, “If Western societies are 
feeling besieged, it might be because they are” (Hage 2016, 45). 
Conclusion 
The increased precarity of labour and emplaced community life in Moranbah derive from 
a dialectic between the increased automation of the mining process, casualisation, 
decreased labour unionism, and the increase in FIFO, which have led to changing 
attachments to local mining communities and established forms of male-headed nuclear 
households. These changes undermine the symbolic and historic associations of the 
mining industry with a community minded ethic. The representations of the coal miner as 
a CUB partially reflect these conditions but do so in a way which highlights personal 
moral ineptitude rather than structural causes of this precarity. This shifts the moral 
rhetoric around the coal industry, which becomes saturated with images of consumption, 
greed, and speculative wealth. Partially in response to these moral indictments, locals 
distance themselves from the practice of financial speculation, which saw them direct 
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particularly strong counter accusations at real estate speculators like Kate. The 
accusations of greed directed at Kate reflect the moral anxieties about the increasing 
precarity of the coal mining communities and reflect their search for someone to blame. 
Numerous other Facebook comments reflected this anxiety, linking Kate’s interest as 
directly opposing those of the community: “Thanks Kate Maloney—looks like your 
personal interests will continue to come before Moranbah’s.” 
Within Moranbah the local moral economy privileges an attachment to the 
community, including a domesticating relationship to nature (Hage 2017), which is 
increasingly under threat due to changing labour conditions, particularly the increase in 
FIFO. Although FIFO is a direct result of mining company employment practices, the 
creation of the conditions in which FIFO was able to take hold are more easily attributed 
to people like Kate and her husband through their outsider status and their speculative 
motivation for buying housing. Contemporary class differentiations have been 
increasingly enforced through outside discourses and symbolic associations in which 
personal responsibility and pathologized morality become a form of distinction (Skeggs 
2005) which enforce social and political division and may help explain the rise of far-
right populism locally.  
Rahul Oka and Ian Kujit have argued that, in the aftermath of the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis, greed has “remerged as a global narrative” to explain increased 
inequalities (Oka and Kuijt 2014: 3). Yet the back-and-forth volleying of greed 
accusations around Australian coal mining shows that they reveal certain inequalities 
while obscuring others.  I have argued that accusations of immorality around speculation 
and the changing value of labour turn structural inequalities or institutional failures into 
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pathologized moral ineptitudes assigned to particular individuals or groups of people. 
While accusations of avarice can be mobilized by the lower classes, they do little to alter 
the inequalities which they attempt to highlight, for they require the presence of bodies 
and are most easily deployed against already pathologized lower classes, such as a young 
female speculator, Queensland ‘bogans’, or Muslim refugees.  
Such moral accusations instead distract and divide populations in a back and forth 
contest for blame over experienced insecurities deriving from shifting political, 
economic, and social conditions. In the particular case of coal mining, they reinforce the 
political impasse of ‘jobs versus the environment’ which haunts political action on 
climate change for they obscure the shared structural conditions of precarity. This has 
particular consequences for the politics of climate change mitigation in Australia, where 
political positions become linked to pathologized accusations divided by class and 
occupation.  The thesis will now continue with questions of moral accusation but also 
introduce my second research location amongst pro-coal lobbyists in the Upper Hunter 
Valley. Pro-coal lobbyists similarly face the moralized atmosphere of Australian coal in 
the Anthropocene.   
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PART TWO: Precarious Environmental Futures in the Upper 
Hunter Valley, NSW 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Photograph of the Upper Hunter Valley taken from a horse racing track, with 
an advertisement for a local winery, grazing cattle, and an open-cut mine in the 
background (photograph taken by author) 
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INTRODUCTION TO SINGLETON AND THE UPPER HUNTER VALLEY 
 
Although Moranbah celebrated a pioneering self-conception in the 1970s, it was towns 
like Singleton, New South Wales that served as the inspiration for this settler-colonial 
imagination.  As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, not far from Sydney, the 
town of Newcastle, formerly called Coal River, became the hub of a growing coal mining 
industry as convicts—many transported from the town’s namesake in England—were 
sent to mine underground in the first decades of the 19th century (Comerford 1997: 117).  
The river which met the sea in Newcastle, the Hunter River, inspired explorations along 
its banks and into the country’s interior to the Upper Hunter Valley.  William Parr led the 
first official expedition to the area today called Singleton in 1817. Subsequent 
expeditions led by John Howe and Benjamin Singleton, saw the men granted land 
concessions there in 1820. Singleton, for whom the town is named and on whose original 
land grant the town is built, settled in the area.  When he established the Barley Mow Inn 
on the Hunter River in 1827, a larger settlement began to emerge with 300 land grants 
given to 206 settlers in the next five years (Singleton 2004). 
 In 1860, the first coal mine opened at Rix’s Creek, five kilometres north of town. 
The railway arrived in 1863, spurring further growth, and by the late 19th century there 
were 16 coal mines in the district (Singleton 2004). Surrounding the town were both large 
landowners and small farmers who built an agricultural base which coal mining 
supplemented. As more settlers moved into the area, the aboriginal population, primarily 
the Wonnarua, were massacred and displaced. Many were moved to the aboriginal 
mission at St. Clair once it was established in 1893 (Singleton 2004). 
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This settler-colonial history is visible in the architecture of the town still today. 
The original town courthouse and goal—built in 1841—now holds the Singleton 
Historical Museum. Several pubs built in the mid-19th century are still serving rum and 
beer, including the Caledonian Hotel, built in 1851. I often met friends for drinks at the 
‘Cali’ not knowing at the time that its claim to fame was that the infamous aboriginal 
bushranger, Joe Governor’s body was laid out here after being killed by two farmers 
(Walsh 1983).  
 The early underground coal mining here was smaller than the mining that 
occurred closer to Newcastle, in the areas around Maitland and Cessnock, in the earlier 
20th century. However as technology changed and open-cut mining grew, the Upper 
Hunter Valley and the area around Singleton (and Muswellbrook, 50 kilometres north) 
became the hub of modern open-cut mining in New South Wales. The major expansion 
started in the early 1980s and has continued since. This area produces high-quality 
thermal coal, most of which is destined for export. Today there are 35 mines producing 
approximately 150 million tonnes of coal per year. This feeds the Hunter Valley Coal 
Chain, the rail-link that connects the Upper Hunter’s mines to the world’s busiest coal 
export terminal in Newcastle. Much of the coal is destined for Asia, 85 per cent of it 
going to Japan, Korea and Taiwan (HVCC).  There are several mining companies 
operating in the region, including the major international companies like BHP, Glencore, 
Anglo-American, Rio Tinto (which operates locally as Coal & Allied), and Peabody, as 
well as smaller companies, such as the Australian owned private company Bloomfield.  
No matter in what direction you travel to or from town, you must pass by at least 
one large open cut mine. Within the town itself, the most constant reminder of mining’s 
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presence is the activity on the railway line. Almost two-kilometre-long trains, 
transporting 8,500 tonnes of coal each pass by the town approximately every hour.  
Mining is also represented symbolically. The more contemporary local bar is called the 
Singleton Diggers, a popular local restaurant is called the Coal Rock Café, and people 
wearing hi-vis uniforms fill the streets and supermarkets. Singleton is also connected to 
the broader coal industry, partly through the transience and short-term contracts that have 
come to define working in the industry today. There were several people I knew in 
Moranbah who had previously lived in Singleton or who had friends who had moved 
there recently.  
However, the much longer settler-colonial history than Moranbah’s, and the 
presence of large and small-scale agriculture, means that the Hunter Valley is not only 
known for its mines. Today, the region hosts many other rural industries, including a 
thriving thoroughbred horse breeding industry and a number of wineries. The larger 
population—22,987 residents (ABS 2016)—further means that unlike Moranbah, not 
everyone here has a direct connection to the mining industry.  
The town faced similar dynamics in terms of increased labour casualization in the 
mines. There was an increase in the number of contractors and decreasing permanent 
employment which affected the coal workforce here. Drive-in-drive-out was also 
relatively common, but because of the alternative industry around and the fact that the 
area was much more densely populated with many smaller towns and settlements, the 
dramatic effect of these practices was reduced, and the social impact was buffered. Town 
gossip did not entirely revolve around rumours of lay-offs in the same intensity as 
Moranbah, nor was the union as fundamental a local presence. However, the town had 
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also experienced the recent commodities boom (2008-2012) and subsequent bust, through 
which the town’s optimism about the industry’s role in its future was increasingly 
undermined. As a key informant Mark—who will be introduced in more detail shortly—
told me, “Now that everyone isn’t making tons of money from the mining boom, we [the 
coal industry] can’t get away with as much as we used to.”  
Because the town was not as dependent on the mines, critiques of the industry—
particularly its environmental impact—were much more prevalent. When introducing 
myself and explaining that I was in town to do research on the coal industry, most people 
instantly gave me an express opinion of being anti-coal, pro-coal, or “I’m not against 
coal, but…” followed by their particular point of concern. This political division in the 
community made talking about coal difficult sometimes, particularly for local 
government officials who had to manage these competing interests. Through attending 
many local council government events, I noticed a pattern in how officials managed to 
neutralize the disagreements with a statement like, “We might not agree on when it is 
going to happen, but we can all agree that eventually mining is going to leave the 
Hunter.” This was either from the actual depletion of the reserves, from political action, 
or shifting economics.  
Therefore, unlike in Moranbah where there was practically no opposition to 
mining, in the Hunter Valley the coal mining industry funded an active lobbying effort to 
garner and maintain community support. Community relations managers were more 
critical figures than they were in Moranbah. Similarly, the state’s Coal Lobby 
Organization set up a branch in Singleton to actively promote the industry locally. This 
local branch, the Coal Community Conference, became the primary location for my 
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participant observation in Singleton, and I travelled with those who worked in it to events 
in the broader valley, particularly the town of Muswellbrook.  
This second section of the thesis will focus on the moral and political contests 
around coal mining and its future in the Upper Hunter Valley, particularly a growing 
environmental precarity in the context of landscape transformation and climate change 
concerns. I will first describe the organization in which I did my fieldwork in more detail 
and explain the moral contests through which pro-coal lobbyists related to the commodity 
in the context of the moralized discourse around climate change. Then chapter five 
describes the contests over regional planning regimes and land-use conflicts between the 
mining industry and thoroughbred horse breeding industry. Finally, chapter six will 
discuss the political and affective debate over mining landscape rehabilitation and the 
speculative knowledge it engenders. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: The Moral Case for Coal: Ambiguity and Complicity with Pro-
Coal Lobbyists 
 
Mark and I spent many days sitting under a marquee at local community shows in the 
region.  Most were sponsored by Glencore, a major international mining company 
operating in the area. The main events of these shows—or local fairs—were always 
various competitions: wood chopping, handicrafts and farm animals. There were 
numerous stalls selling fried foods and sugary treats and long lines at the few small 
mobile amusement rides. We were always the only non-entertainment or non-
consumption related booth. Resultantly, these were very boring days as hardly anyone 
wanted to talk to us. We were not particularly appealing to the passing crowds. All we 
had on our table was a stack of empty forms and a few posters hanging up with far too 
few pictures and far too much text to catch the eye. We rarely stood up from behind the 
table and hardly ever greeted passers-by. When anyone dared approach, we attempted to 
get them to fill out a short questionnaire. This asked them questions about their 
perception of the mining industry, but it primarily served to get their email address for the 
listserve. The forms were then counted as a ‘contact’ with a community member. We 
often joked that this language of ‘contact’ was oddly tactile, but Mark dutifully tallied 
each brief interaction to legitimize these community outings as important work of the 
organization we were there representing: the Coal Community Conference (CCC) of the 
New South Wales’ Upper Hunter Valley. This group, as I will soon describe in more 
detail, was essentially a local lobbying effort of the state’s Coal Lobby Organization 
(CLO). 
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Mark and I’s passive involvement at these shows reflected a general ambivalence 
with which the pro-coal lobbyists that I came to know often acted in their work as 
defenders of the coal industry. They often fulfilled the requirements of their formal 
employment but as these moments at the community show reveal, with little zeal. Often 
lobbyists were open to critical discussion about the coal industry with me and were quite 
aware of the inconsistencies between the industry rhetoric they crafted and the reality 
they encountered. I was privy to these internal critiques as I became a co-worker. 
However, over ten months observing and participating in their work, I came to recognize 
a pattern in the moments in which their usual ambivalence transformed into a strong and 
passionate defence of the industry. Their lobbying efforts were strongly motivated to 
counter interpersonal moral accusations coming from outsiders to the lobbying group, 
particularly friends or family. These moral accusations were perceived to impugn their 
character by connecting them directly to the perceived untrustworthiness or immorality of 
the coal industry.  
This chapter adds to a growing body of climate change reception studies, which 
look at the way in which moral and ethical claims are linked to climate change and 
energy use (Ferguson 2012; Nader 2004; Rudiak-Gould 2011, 2014; Smith and High 
2017). However, it speaks most closely to those that look specifically at the relatively 
privileged and those who are most closely implicated in climate change (Hughes 2013, 
2017; Norgaard 2006; 2012). These authors have attempted to explain the forms of denial 
and complicity of those whom they deem variably guilty of perpetuating climate change. 
Both Norgaard and Hughes believe that this denial and complicity comes from the 
insufficient integration of morality. For Norgaard, Norwegian denial comes not from 
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ignorance of climate change but from an unwillingness or inability to integrate the moral 
demands of climate change into everyday lives (2006, 2012). Hughes emphasizes that 
complicity with climate change comes from the construction of oil in Trinidad as “energy 
without conscience” and that those working in the industry are complicit because their 
work is insufficiently moralized (2017). I saw something different amongst the coal 
lobbyists I got to know. It was precisely when morality became the topic of discussion 
that they became passionate in their pro-coal position. This occurred primarily in relation 
to questioning from their children, which gave a moral weight to their defence of the coal 
industry. Thus, it was precisely the integration of the moral and ethical concerns of their 
work into their everyday lives that produced and reinforced their complicity with 
anthropogenic climate change. As I became more involved in their work, and similarly 
complicit in this moral terrain, I began to question how I could critically engage with 
discourses of the coal industry while also taking seriously the everyday lives and 
experiences of those defending it. And I began to ask, what does such attention to the 
everyday lives of these actors tell us about the role of ordinary ethics in the production of 
complicity?  
This chapter thus introduces the growing anthropological attention to ordinary 
ethics into the literature on climate change reception studies to argue that the everyday 
ethical deliberations of pro-coal lobbyists must be taken seriously if we are to understand 
the workings of power that reproduce the moral weight of the coal industry for its 
defenders. The ethical turn in anthropology has brought increasing attention to the way in 
which everyday life is imbued with ethics (Fassin 2014). Of particular relevance is the 
framework of ‘ordinary ethics’ (Das 2012; Lambek 2010; Stafford 2013) which seeks to 
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highlight ethics in everyday speech and acts. The emphasis of this approach is less on the 
sort of moral breakdowns (Zigon 2007) or large-scale value hierarchy destabilization 
(Robbins 2007), but rather how such cases “are drawn into and draw from the ordinary” 
as habitual tacit acts (Lambek 2010: 3) or most relevantly to this chapter, as explicitly 
reflected upon judgements (Stafford 2013: 101). Therefore, explicit moralized discourse 
can present the space in which people craft ethical decisions within their everyday lives, 
sometimes explicitly acknowledging them as such and at other times not, but nonetheless 
engaging in ethical deliberation. In this framework, to be ethical is not necessarily to 
follow a universally defined good, rather it is to be evaluative. Ethics refers to the field of 
action, speech, and reflection in which this takes place.  
Of particular inspiration is Hans Steinmüller’s application of ordinary ethics to 
understanding how complicity with state corruption is produced through entangled 
intimacies and interpersonal relations in China (Steinmüller 2010, 2013). It also draws on 
Steinmüller’s emphasis on the ironic and uttered asides through which forms of moral 
ambiguities between official discourse and lived socialities are acknowledged within 
intimate relationships, or what he terms “communities of complicity”. Although inspired 
by Steinmüller’s attention to the everyday production of complicity through intimate 
relations, this chapter also contrasts this to how such shared understandings are countered 
by forms of interpersonal moral accusation. I will show how such moral accusations end 
up reproducing another form of complicity, for the way in which they inspire pro-coal 
lobbyists to more stridently defend the industry in which they are implicated as co-
conspirators.  
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 I will first describe the context of my fieldwork and introduce some of the 
lobbyists that I got to know, framing the context that this second section of the thesis 
draws from. I will describe how my role within this organization—and the interpersonal 
relations I developed with the pro-coal lobbyists—allowed me to witness the ambiguities 
through which they related to the industry, often through whispered asides of critique. I 
will then move on to discuss how the coal industry is increasingly represented as morally 
dubious and show how this moral framing filters into the way in which the coal lobbyists 
became implicated in the moral debates which frame the context of their work. However, 
rather than this moralized landscape causing lobbyists to question their role in propping 
up the coal industry (Hughes 2017; Norgaard 2012, 2016) it causes them to rise more 
strongly to its defence, encouraging their lobbying efforts and reinforcing their 
complicity with climate change.  
The Work of the Coal Community Conference 
The Coal Community Conference (CCC) is fully funded and ultimately under the 
direction of the New South Wales Coal Lobby Organization (CLO), the state’s main 
mining lobby group. The CCC was started in 2011, at the height of the mining boom in 
order to address a number of community concerns that arose as a result of the increased 
mining activity at the time. The CCC is presented as being neither pro nor anti-coal, but a 
neutral body for expressing community concerns. However, because the CCC is fully 
funded by the CLO this is a false neutrality. The head of the CCC, Sam, expressed this to 
me using the example of the CCC’s logo. The logo is exactly the same as the CLO’s, 
except that it is in green instead of blue. Further, all decisions ultimately rested in the 
executive committee composed of mine representatives and the head of the CLO, and all 
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local meetings to which community members were invited were always preceded by an 
industry only meeting in which the itinerary for the joint meeting would be worked out in 
private. Sam understood that this was a necessary condition of the funding which came 
from the larger lobbying organization—of which he was a direct employee—but he also 
recognized that this led to a perception problem for the CCC. Many saw the CCC as a 
further lobbying effort rather than a legitimate organization that wanted to deal with 
community concerns.  
The everyday activities of the CCC was a series of meetings held monthly around 
a large conference table. The main topics of discussion were reports on the progress of 
the projects that had been started in the earlier years of the group. The three main projects 
that continued throughout my fieldwork were a pilot study that was grazing cattle on 
rehabilitated mine land; a weather monitoring system that was meant to reduce dust from 
mining blasts limiting them to preferable wind conditions; and a water accounting 
framework that was recording the amount of water used and released back into the local 
river by the mining industry. There was an earlier project meant to deal with the 
increased housing pressure caused by the mining boom—reflective of the conditions in 
Moranbah described in the previous chapter—but this project was ended as the 
subsequent mining bust had relieved the housing demand.   
The members of the CCC could loosely be considered those who attended these 
regular meetings, this includes the few employees of the CLO who served as the 
secretariat, including Sam and Mark who directed the general operations. There were also 
a number of representatives from each mining company that was a member of the CLO. 
These included the major players: Rio Tinto, Glencore, Anglo American and BHP, as 
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well as the Australian mining company Bloomfield. Each mining company was 
represented by either a community relations manager or an environmental manager who 
attended meetings. Meetings were also attended by a representative of the surrounding 
local council governments, although not regularly. A member representing a state 
government department, often the Department of Planning and Environment, would be 
invited if there was a point of order that related to state regulatory policy. There were also 
a number of so-called community members who attended occasionally, one woman who 
was previously a journalist and a friend of Mark’s showed up irregularly, as did a 
representative of the local irrigators’ association, but the only regular ‘community 
member’ attendees were two local environmentalists.  
These two local environmentalists were the only strong critical voices in this 
space. They were often politely listened to, but the conversation would then move on 
without taking into account their views. By the time I left the field, one of them, a retired 
professor of agricultural science, Drew, stopped attending, having grown too frustrated 
with the process. I will discuss him, particularly his views of the final voids, in chapter 
six. The other, Sally, was an elderly woman with a long family history in the region as a 
landowner and dairy farmer. She had already once been forced to sell a piece of her land 
to an encroaching coal mine. Interestingly because her family had such a long history in 
the region, she also owned the sub-surface rights which were once granted along with 
land rights in the mid-19th century. This meant that Sally also received royalties for the 
coal mined on her former property. This financial benefit was often used to try and 
discount her environmental activism as hypocritical by some of the lobbyists. However, 
Sally was now singlehandedly standing in the way of another mine expansion, refusing to 
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sell her remaining land. This saw her win a very prestigious global environmental award 
during my fieldwork.  
There are many more activists who actively oppose coal mining living in the 
region, some of whom I will mention in chapter five. However, having interviewed 
several, they actively chose not to participate in the CCC because they viewed it as 
merely an extension of the industry lobbying efforts. Thus they felt it could not 
sufficiently address their concerns about the environmental harm they felt the industry 
was causing. In the words of a local environmental activist, “Look, this is an organization 
commissioned by the mining industry to either placate us or to sell us on how good they 
are. It isn’t going to solve any of the serious issues we have with the mines.” 
The underlying motive of the CCC was partially about securing the social licence 
of the mining industry to operate in the region through engaging in dialogue with local 
residents, taking into account their concerns, and designing various projects that might 
address them. The fundamental tension, however, was that although there was a 
willingness by the mining industry to try and come up with solutions, they would only 
consider those that were compatible with keeping mining operations more or less 
undisturbed.  
The CCC thus reflects broader trends towards corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) analysed elsewhere (Ballard and Banks 2003; Barry 2004; Cross 2014; Frynas 
2005; Gardner 2012; Rajak 2011). The CCC particularly fits into Benson and Kirsch’s 
(2010) typology of corporate responses to critique. They argue this follows three phases: 
“denial, acknowledgement, and token accommodation.” (2010: 459). The CCC represents 
this third phase, where the threats to the corporation are strong enough that they begin to 
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appropriate the strategies of their critics, in this case, taking into account community 
concerns and engaging in small projects that accept the problem but do little to resolve 
the underlying disagreement (Benson and Kirsch 2010).  
However, I am less concerned in this chapter with the operations of the group 
particularly as viewed as a monolithic entity. Welker has pointed out how much analysis 
of CSR looks at the corporation as a monolithic, rational, calculating, profit maximizing 
machine, or as Welker calls it, the “Homo economicus model of the corporation” (2014: 
2). Instead she calls for attention to the corporation as “inherently unstable and 
indeterminate, multiply authored, always in flux, and comprising both material and 
immaterial parts” (2014: 4 see also Shever 2012). Welker shows that despite the political 
usefulness of the monolithic view of the corporation for critique, it “comes at an 
ethnographic and epistemological cost, severing corporations from the ordinary materials, 
human practices, ethics, and sentiments (such as desire, fear, shame, pride, jealousy, and 
hope) that sustain them” (2014: 16).  This chapter thus continues to refuse a monolithic 
view of the mining corporation or the coal lobby, as it refuses such a view of the 
Anthropocene. I argue that attention to the inconsistencies and ambiguities with which 
members of the CCC engaged in their work defending the coal industry is helpful for 
understanding the way in which the Anthropocene is made and reproduced.  
By the time I arrived for fieldwork in 2015, community concerns had changed 
significantly from those of the boom and altered the group’s foundational mission. 
Originally set up to address concerns over the impacts from the high levels of mining 
activity, there was now a greater concern within the town and local government about the 
future of the region after the mining industry left. The local community members, 
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especially those who were not or no longer directly employed in mining, considered the 
local economy to be less reliant on the industry than previously and thus would now more 
readily make anti-mining arguments on the moral grounds of intergenerational and 
international justice linked to climate change or the anxieties over the region’s 
dependence on a threatened and threatening industry. Mark once explained: “Now that 
everyone isn’t making tons of money from the mining boom, we can’t get away with as 
much as we used to.”  
This higher level of disagreement from the community meant that the focus of the 
dialogue shifted. Previously centred on immediate concerns that pragmatic interventions 
like weather monitoring for blasting dust reduction could address, it now began to 
concern itself with the broader moralized demands about the end of the coal industry and 
the need for diversification. As a result, the focus of the CCC shifted to communication, 
essentially becoming a local lobbying effort of its own. This is why I consider all those 
who were formally employed in the coal industry, were actively involved in the CCC and 
were promoting the positive image of the industry through it, as lobbyists, regardless of 
whether or not they were formally employed by the CLO.  
Mark was hired to set up a local office—the CCC had previously been based at 
the CLO’s offices in Sydney—and to run their new communications strategy in order to 
communicate the work the CCC was doing, increasing the lobbying focus of its work. 
Mark previously worked in journalism, managing local newspapers for a large media 
organization, but was laid-off as these papers had their budgets severely cut due to the 
disrupting influence of the internet. Other than the regular series of repetitive meetings 
that took place in the office, much of the work that the CCC did was part of its new 
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communications strategy. This included attending community events like the local 
show—described above—as well as Mark attempting to use his journalistic connections 
to get positive news stories into the local newspapers that described the cattle grazing 
study and the weather monitoring program in order to spread the news about the CCC 
and its ‘positive contributions’. The work of the CCC, especially as run locally, focused 
more on communicating the projects that were already running than doing anything to 
address current community concerns. It thus largely became a locally oriented lobbying 
group of its own. The only new project that was implemented was the education project I 
will outline later in this chapter. 
The CCC office in Singleton was the main base for my participant observation. 
However members of the CCC including Mark, Sam, and I travelled to many other events 
in the region representing the organization. The office itself was in a mostly empty 
shopping centre on Singleton’s main street. I sat at a desk in the front room of the office 
suite which gave me a vantage point through which to observe and meet those who 
filtered in and out. Mark had his own separate office beside me, but he mostly kept his 
door open so we could talk throughout the day. There was a second separate small office 
room which Sam would use on the days he travelled to Singleton. Sam split his time 
between the CLO’s office in Sydney and the CCC’s office in Singleton. Finally, there 
was a large conference room where official CCC meetings were held with a long table 
and telecommunication capabilities. Occasionally the office also held other mining 
related meetings that were not related to CCC business, such as the employment 
counselling for laid-off mine workers, which I will discuss in chapter five.  
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The Community of Complicity in the CCC 
Throughout my time at the lobbying group, I was struck by the overarching sense 
amongst industry representatives—those working in management for the mines and those 
employed as lobbyists—of being unfairly demonized. Having heard so much about the 
power of the Australian coal lobby, I was surprised to find an actual sense of fear and 
trepidation in the private spaces and reflections of lobbyists. They recognized that there 
was a need to be careful about every public record that they produced because they feared 
it would be picked over by environmentalists looking for any opportunity to find even a 
minor inconsistency which would then be misrepresented as intentional deceit. There was 
a genuine sense of anxiety about this. While the goal of the CCC was meant to be about 
transparency and genuine dialogue, this could not be achieved because of the fear of 
misrepresentation. I often heard the phrase “the greenies are out to get us” used to justify 
not publicly releasing some piece of information. They would also argue that, even when 
they attempted to be open about information, they weren’t trusted. “The studies we fund 
aren’t trusted; any information we put out isn’t trusted,” one said in an industry only 
meeting. In a similar meeting, a mine environmental manager said: “They’re treating us 
like the tobacco lobby. We’re being persecuted like the tobacco industry.” (cf. Oreskes 
and Conway 2010). Critical to this was an insider/outsider distinction.  
In moments with me, lobbyists were often relatively open to critical discussion 
and reflection on the industry. Once I had been around for a few months and proven 
myself willing to work with them on projects, I was let into what Steinmüller calls a 
“community of complicity” (2010). Communities of complicity are formed through 
shared knowledge of the boundaries between public discourse and lived ambiguities. My 
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co-implication in their work allowed me to be privy to a shared understanding of the 
ambiguities of the group’s work. However, when an outside audience was expected—
someone who did not belong to this same space of shared understanding—the official 
pro-coal discourse was more strongly enforced due to the fear of being misrepresented. 
By way of example, one of the tensest moments during my time at the CCC was 
when I became involved in a study that the CCC had hired an outside research group to 
undertake. The study was meant to address the problem of low community participation 
by interviewing former members who had stopped participating. As I mentioned earlier, 
only two so-called community members attended regularly. There was a head researcher 
who designed and implemented the study, however Sam and Mark thought that they 
should have me conduct a few of the interviews. Since I was a ‘researcher’ they thought 
this was a perfect opportunity to give me a useful task. The main finding of the 
interviews we conducted was that most people stopped participating because they thought 
the CCC was controlled by the CLO, and thus unable to address community concerns that 
were counter to the profitability of the mining companies.  
The head researcher had another appointment on the day that the research was 
going to be presented to the joint meeting of the CCC—the meeting which includes 
community members and the minutes of which are publicly posted on the CCC’s website. 
Because of her absence, I was asked to present the findings of the research. I did not 
think this would be at all problematic. For, as I described earlier, Sam had expressed this 
same finding to me many times in one-on-one conversation, pointing to how the two 
organizations had the same logo but in different colours.  
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An hour before the meeting was set to begin Sam asked me what I was going to 
present. I showed him my PowerPoint. When I got to the slide with the finding that the 
main reason that many former CCC participants cited for deciding to leave the group was 
that they felt the CCC was too controlled by the CLO, he became upset. He implored: 
“Who said that?”. I explained to him that we promised the research participants 
anonymity and that I couldn’t disclose identities but that it was several people. He 
became exasperated, “Who said that about me?” When I repeated that I couldn’t disclose 
that, he relented: “Fine, I know who said that!” He asked me to change the wording of the 
slide to downplay the finding. I accepted his edits.  
Mark noticed how much I had downplayed the criticism, and in the aftermath of 
the presentation asked what had happened. I told him about my interaction with Sam. He 
laughed and showed me a video he had seen on YouTube. It was a comedy sketch about 
two stone age men refusing to make the transition to the bronze age. It was an ironic 
comment on Sam’s refusal to accept critique and change and thus partially re-established 
our shared understanding of the ambiguity of our work. As was often the case, such 
ambiguities were often framed through comedy, irony or whispered asides (Steinmüller 
2010). There were many cases, some of which will be discussed in the next two chapters, 
in which Mark, Sam or another lobbyist would whisper an ironic comment to me as we 
witnessed a particularly strident moment of pro-coal rhetoric.  
Aside from highlighting the importance of my positionality, this anecdote with Sam 
shows how he personalized the critique that the CCC was controlled by the CLO. Sam 
could express this same point to me, but when it came from someone outside he 
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interpreted it as an accusation that he was untrustworthy and co-opted. It fed the common 
fear of being “persecuted like the tobacco industry”.  
Steinmüller’s choice of the term complicity, in his phrase “communities of 
complicity” points to another important element of this social dynamic. That is, 
belonging to this group is not just about shared understanding, but about being co-
implicated in the morality of the group and its activities. I struggled with whether or not 
to accept Sam’s edits. Ultimately I decided it was a minor issue and was necessary for 
maintaining my relationship with Sam and the other lobbyists. As I discussed in my 
thesis introduction, my complicity with the pro-coal lobbyists was more than Geertzian 
rapport, but also related to my role within a contested moral discourse (Geertz 1972; 
Marcus 1993). In the case of the coal lobbyists, their work takes place within a heavily 
moralized context, in which their work is deemed to implicate their moral character. My 
co-implication thus allowed me to share in the ambiguous ironies through which we 
commented on our work, without impugning the morality of my friends, for to do so 
would impugn my own. For lobbyists, who work in defending the industry, the particular 
view of the industry as immoral was often used to critique the personal morality of the 
lobbyists themselves. This was particularly reflected upon in the Upper Hunter Valley. 
An astute mining executive in the region once explained: 
Our employees live in the communities that we operate in. And they walk down the 
street in their uniforms. On one side their name is printed, on the other is the logo of 
our company. Those people sometimes have to feel the backlash of our failures. 
This embodiment of the industry—where the work of the industry, particularly its 
negative impacts became attached to the person wearing the uniform—was clearly 
experienced by coal lobbyists. Lobbyists’ active involvement in defending the industry 
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through their participation in the CCC and CLO meant that much of their work involved 
explicit engagement in debate over its rightness or wrongness. This is similar to the way 
in which the reputation of the industry becomes pathologized to the workers through the 
figure of the CUB discussed in the previous chapter.  However, this group of lobbyists is 
also relatively distinct from those employed in the mines themselves as operators whose 
lives have been the focus of much of the thesis so far.  For those physically working in 
the mines, there were fewer moments in everyday life where one would have to defend 
the morality of the industry explicitly, as almost everyone in Moranbah or even in 
Singleton, to a lesser degree, similarly relied at least partially on the industry. However, 
the lobbyists I knew mostly did not live in the mining towns themselves but commuted 
from larger towns and cities nearby. Beyond the geographic proximity, these lobbyists 
were more traditionally middle-class, as opposed to working-class miners. Of course, as 
described in the previous chapters, these distinctions are more about social capital and 
habitus than economic (Bourdieu 2010[1979]). Yet because these lobbyists were mostly 
tertiary educated and had previous employment in industries like journalism or state 
government, they faced regular questioning outside the workplace, as climate change and 
the environmental damage of the mining industry are a regular point of political 
discussion in urban Australia. Therefore, it was not only through their employment as 
lobbyists defending the coal industry but also the social worlds they inhabited in their 
non-work life that they had to manage their moral and ethical position. As Webb Keane 
has emphasized, “[b]laming and holding responsible, denying and justifying, are acts 
that both the agent, and his or her interlocutors, are doing, and they are doing them for 
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one another… Ethical life means that people are reflexive, evaluative, and creative—but 
not alone” (Keane 2014: 455). 
Before moving on to describe the way that the lobbyists I knew reacted to these 
accusations of their immorality due to their employment, I will first outline some of the 
major discourses that have made coal a particular material around which moral debates 
revolve. 
Moral Discourses of Coal and Climate Change 
In October 2015, the then federal Energy Minister, Josh Frydenberg, argued on national 
television that: “There is a strong moral case [for coal].”  He was speaking in relation to 
the Carmichael coal mine that was being proposed by the Indian company, Adani. This 
thermal coal mine is to be built in northern Queensland. If it is to go ahead, it will be one 
of the world’s largest coal mines and will export its coal primarily to India. The mine has 
encountered substantial opposition from indigenous groups and environmentalists, 
particularly for the significant contribution to greenhouse gas emissions that burning this 
coal represents as well as the potential environmental effects of shipping it through the 
Great Barrier Reef. However, Frydenberg argued in support of the mine:  
There is a strong moral case here. Over a billion people don’t have access to 
electricity. That means that more than 2 billion people today are using wood and dung 
for their cooking. The World Health Organization said that this leads to 4.3 million 
premature deaths. That’s more people dying through this sort of inefficient energy 
than malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS combined, so there’s a strong moral case 
that the green activists sometimes don’t comprehend (Milman 2015).22  
 
22 It should be noted that Frydenberg omitted ‘coal’ from the “coal, wood and biomass 
stoves” that the report describes the negative impacts of. This same report also says that 
3.7 million people died from outdoor air pollution, such as “ transport, energy, waste 
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The argument that mining Australian coal is a moral act linked to energy justice and 
international development is prominent in the pro-coal political discourse.23 It is an 
argument that often draws, very selectively, on available data such as the WHO report 
invoked by Frydenberg. A somewhat different moral case for coal is made by those who 
point to the local benefits and the pragmatic concerns of energy security, energy prices 
and the local and national economic impact of mining royalties and mine employment. 
It is significant that this debate is being explicitly made in moral terms. Although, it is 
clear that the economy is not a separate neutral ground of exchange but deeply implicated 
in social life, value, and thus morality (Mauss 1974 [1950]; Polanyi 2001 [1944]; 
Thompson 1971; Weber 2003[1905]), this is not often explicitly recognized in the 
economic and policy discourse itself. Webb Keane has identified what he calls the “moral 
narrative of modernity” (2010: 79). This describes how in modernist narratives the 
‘moral’ is largely relegated to the sphere of religion, and thus “to treat economics, 
politics, or even education in moral terms too seriously exhibits a failure to be modern” 
(Keane 2010: 79). Frydenberg’s “moral case” is thus a counter to this modern division, 
 
management, and industry,” and globally 40 per cent of energy production comes from 
coal (Milman 2015). 
23 There are two main points behind this ‘moral case’ for exporting Australian coal to 
India. One is at the level of energy justice. This states, as already noted, that because 
many Indians still do not have access to electricity, Australia should sell them its coal in 
order to grant them this access. The second, related argument, is that Australian coal is a 
cleaner and more efficient form of coal than Indian coal. Therefore, if Australians refuse 
to sell their coal to India it will cause emissions to go up even more since, it is argued, 
India would simply burn its own dirtier coal instead. These arguments are not unique to 
Frydenberg but have been repeated by numerous Australian Liberal-National politicians. 
Nor are such “claims to virtue” unique to Australia, as they have also been identified in 
Norway (Norgaard 2006: 360). They also underlie the thinking of the American pro-
fossil fuel advocate and climate sceptic Alex Epstein, whose book the ‘Moral Case for 
Fossil Fuels’ I was sold by the young pro-coal lobbyist I will discuss shortly (Epstein 
2014).   
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and the quote itself reveals that this is an intentional subversion. Frydenberg’s comment 
that “there’s a strong moral case that the green activists sometimes don’t comprehend,” is 
precisely meant to point out that his “moral case” is an attempt to use their own 
moralizing against them, for green activists are often seen as being excessively 
moralizing and impassioned. Therefore, Frydenberg’s claim to a moral case for coal is an 
intentional attempt to use morality against them in the context of coal and its implications 
in international development as well as climate change.  
In order to understand this shift in the ‘moral case’ for coal it is necessary to 
understand that Adani’s Carmichael mine has been represented in ways that frame it 
directly in the context of climate change. Although there has been some concern about 
endangered species and the impact on the Great Barrier Reef from shipping routes, and 
resistance from the Wangan and Jagalingou Indigenous People, the most successful 
opposition has been that which links the mine to climate change. This has made the mine 
a national political issue, in which inner-city Melbourne parliamentary campaigns focus 
on stopping the Adani mine. Thus the ‘moral case’ for coal is constructed as a 
counterpoint to the moral claims made around climate change because of the potentially 
significant contributions to greenhouse gas emissions that the mine represents.  
The proposed Carmichael coal mine is located in the Galilee basin, a geological 
basin which borders the Bowen basin on which Moranbah lies. The initial proposal was 
for five underground pits and two open-cut mines, which would produce 60 million 
tonnes of coal annually, although Adani has scaled this back to a proposed 25 million 
tonnes a year (Long 2017). It will export thermal coal, shipping it from the coast and 
through the Great Barrier Reef to India. Taylor and Meinshausen have calculated that the 
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carbon emissions from Adani’s mine alone would exceed 0.5 per cent of the remaining 
global carbon budget (2014; see also Reside et al. 2016). This is significant in the context 
of Australia, a country that has signed on to the Paris Agreement, committing to prevent a 
temperature rise above two degrees Celsius. According to the Climate Council, this 
means that more than 90 per cent of Australian coal reserves cannot be burned under such 
carbon agreements (Steffen 2015). 
  Thus, it seems that the mining of the Carmichael basin is largely incompatible 
with Australia’s commitment to lowering global emissions. However, as the coal would 
be burned in India, its emissions would not count towards Australia’s tally. This 
accounting trick places responsibility on the emitting country only. However, this process 
of ‘rendering technical’ through the accounting frameworks of international climate 
politics has not successfully evaded the moral contests in which such frameworks are 
questioned (Li 2007; see also Hughes 2017). Rather, the entire coal industry is implicated 
in the moral contests over responsibility for climate change. 
Stephen Gardiner has described climate change as a “perfect moral storm” due to 
its “fragmentation of agency” and “dispersion of cause and effects” in both space and 
time (2011: 24).  Briefly this means that actions to halt climate change must take place 
now, but the positive consequences won’t be felt until the (variously defined) future. 
Those nations and people most vulnerable to the effects of climate change are often those 
with the least power to address it.  At the same time, however, concepts of responsibility 
and vulnerability in this context are far from clear-cut (Hughes 2013, 2017).  This 
temporal and spatial displacement means that coordinated action is not only difficult but 
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also involves complicated moral and ethical questions regarding justice and its 
intergenerational and international effects (Callison 2014).  
Climate change thus becomes more than simply the measurable phenomenon of a 
warming climate due to the greenhouse effect. Rather, it constitutes a moral and ethical 
framework through which broader questions about justice are being debated. Callison 
refers to climate change as “[a] science-based problem with moral and ethical contours” 
(Callison 2014: 4  emphasis in original).  
I will discuss further in chapter five how these global and national discourses are 
utilized by environmentalists in local land-use conflicts. However, what is critical for this 
chapter is that the ‘moral case’ for the Adani mine is a response to those who would see 
this mine as directly implicated in the production of climate change, and thus as an 
immoral project. More generally, criticism of the apparent immorality of the coal 
industry’s contribution to climate change incite a defence in similar moral terms. People 
working within the coal industry frequently face such moral language and reflect it in a 
bid to organize their everyday ethical positions in relation to the industry.  
This is quite a different context to that analysed by Hughes’ study of oil in 
Trinidad and Tobago (2017). He shows how oil has historically been constructed as 
“energy without conscience”. He traces the local history of energy to show how this is 
not inevitable; the ethical and moral debates that once framed energy that relied on slave 
labour have been replaced by a relationship to oil and gas that is naturalized and amoral, 
despite its contribution to anthropogenic climate change. This amoral representation 
allows Trinidadians to maintain their complicity. As he writes: “Oil, in other words, is 
most dangerous when it behaves ordinarily and when people treat it as ordinary—that is, 
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as neither moral nor immoral, but amoral” (Hughes 2017: 2). This amorality, he argues, is 
unique to oil, contrasting it to global representations of coal, which has not been 
constructed with the same ubiquity. I agree with this, as I have shown how coal is at the 
heart of a moral debate in Australia precisely through its connection to climate change.  
However, I differ with McDermott Hughes’ position that the integration of the moralized 
relation to the commodity would undermine complicity.  
McDermott Hughes’ political position is that action to address climate change 
“begins with filling the moral void around energy. In that space, high emitters would 
express a growing sense of responsibility for climate change” (Hughes 2017: 150). 
However, I did not find that to be the case.  As I will now show, operating in a moral 
landscape did not lead coal lobbyists to accept ethical responsibility. Rather people made 
sense of this moralized framing within their own ethical positions which draw on the 
ordinary, particularly their relationships with their children.  The moral framework which 
paints the coal industry as a matter of moral debate presents a challenge to coal lobbyists’ 
sense of their ethical selves, primarily through the ways in which it is questioned through 
everyday interpersonal relations (Keane 2010, 2014). Thus, their complicity does not 
derive from an amoral relationship to the commodity, but through their conscious moral 
deliberations enacted through projects which defended the industry as ways of shaping 
their moral reputation.  
Intergenerational Moral Accusation and the Education Project 
There was no individual with whom I spent more time during my fieldwork than Mark. 
Since he ran the local operations in Singleton, he was my immediate boss as my role as 
researcher began to merge with that of unpaid intern. Mark and I became close as our 
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relationship exceeded that of our shared workplace. Our common North American 
accent, and the age gap between us, saw us often mistaken for father and daughter. The 
ease with which we occasionally slipped into these roles ourselves reveals the intimacy 
we had developed, in a way that sometimes embarrassed us. I remember one day in 
particular as Mark dropped me off at my house after a day working together. He asked 
me as I was getting out of the car, “Do you have your keys?” As a grown woman, living 
alone, I of course had my keys, and Mark’s question was clearly a slip into a habit 
developed with his own teenage step-daughters. He apologized when he saw me roll my 
eyes. Through the close relationship we developed, I felt comfortable sharing with him 
my critical observations of the coal industry, the lobbyists we both knew, and my 
concerns about climate change. He often voiced similar sentiments, and in fact many of 
his critical insights opened my eyes to some of the less obvious workings of the CLO. 
Further, when we did disagree, we would have a frank but respectful exchange of views 
during our long drives through the region.   
It took me by surprise when one evening over dinner, Mark took a very different 
tone in the face of criticism coming from his teenage daughters. Occasionally, I would 
accompany Mark home, an hour’s drive from our shared workplace, spending the night at 
his house before we returned together the next morning. This particular evening we had 
just sat down to dinner when his eldest daughter, about 17 years old, began to challenge 
him about his contribution to supporting coal and thus his immoral complicity with 
climate change. His younger daughter, 13, joined in, “Don’t you feel bad about what 
you’re doing to the environment?” Whereas Mark generally was open to critical 
discussion with me about the topic, when it came from his teenage step-daughters his 
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position hardened instantly. He argued strongly in defence of the coal industry, repeating 
arguments I knew from our own discussions he did not find convincing. Then he invoked 
a statistic: if the internet was a country, it would be the fourth largest emitter of carbon. 
This was a successful statistic to utilize against his teenage daughters. He continued that 
all those YouTube videos of cats and all those Instagram pictures that they shared and 
watched online were the real problem. He asked them: “Have you ever turned off your 
smartphone in the whole time you’ve owned it?” They had to admit that they hadn’t. He 
continued: “How are you going to criticize coal when you use it all the time, are you 
willing to give up the internet? If not, then stop criticizing coal.”  
This hardening of his position stuck with me, as it seemed to derive directly from 
their indictment of his moral character, which he rose to defend through implicating his 
own daughter’s technology use. The interpersonal accusation he received from his 
daughters which linked him directly to the coal industry, thus impugning his moral 
character, did not seem to lead Mark to think more critically about the industry and his 
own role in it. Instead it did the opposite. Whereas I could critique the industry with 
Mark, I always did so from within a community of complicity in which I could not 
associate a critique of the industry with Mark’s moral character. However, coming from 
his daughters and particularly, when that criticism was seen to impugn his morality, he 
rose to the industry’s defence.  
Of course, this dinner time conversation could have derived from variety of other 
intergenerational and familial tensions. However, this anecdote was part of a pattern, 
where although there was a certain ambivalence with which the lobbyists tended to relate 
to their work, there were particular moments at which they become particularly strident in 
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their support of the industry, that is when they were felt their morality was being 
questioned. This is most clearly seen in what became the major focus of the CCC during 
my ten months there.  
As I mentioned earlier, the CCC was somewhat stalled, as the community 
demands were shifting towards concerns about the end of the coal industry. This was 
obviously difficult for the CCC to address due to its connection to the CLO. However, a 
new project emerged from internal concerns which seemed to reinvigorate the CCC’s 
work. 
An education program became a focus of the CCC and received considerable 
support from the lobbyists and mine management involved. From what I was told, the 
earliest projects such as the weather monitoring were set up as a direct response to 
demand from people living in the region, but this came about as an internal project. A 
particular concern amongst members of the CCC, many of whom were also parents, was 
the way in which their children learned about the mining industry. It was a common 
lament that children would come home from school and challenge the morality of their 
parents’ work through describing the negative things they had learned about mining or 
climate change at school. 
There was considerable energy put into this education project designed 
particularly to counter these negative lessons. The goal was to reach every child in the 
region once in primary school and again in secondary school. Importantly, it was decided 
that they would take children on bus tours of the mines. This meant reaching out to every 
school and getting the number of students, securing the funding to transport them in 
buses to the mines and organizing the schedule with the mines who would host the school 
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trips. It is important to understand that this was logistically complex and required 
substantial expense and lost time by the mining companies, which are usually very 
hesitant to allow visitors. Going onto mine sites is a carefully managed process with tight 
security. With a large group of school children on a bus this was more complicated as it 
meant that no blasting operations could take place during the visits and a number of 
members of mine management would have to stop their other duties in order to escort the 
buses. I attended the pilot event which ended up involving three separate vehicles to 
handle the number of children from just one small primary school.  Delaying blasting in 
good weather for a few hours and taking at least three managers away from their other 
duties was a significant disruption to operations and would normally be a difficult sell to 
the mines, but the mine managers were surprisingly excited about this project and agreed 
to make the necessary sacrifices to participate.  
There was broad support for the project, but it became the pet project of a former 
mine engineer who now worked in mine management, Susanne, who became active in 
the CCC. I assisted her on the development of the program. Susanne has two daughters 
and she often told me about her frustration by the anti-mining messages that they brought 
home from school, particularly the emphasis on environmental damage that it causes. She 
told me about an exercise that her children’s teacher used to teach the class about mining. 
The teacher gave the students a chocolate chip cookie and told them to mine out the 
chocolate chips, which they were allowed to eat. The teacher then told the students to put 
the cookie back together. They obviously could not do this, and thus they were taught 
that mining destroys beyond repair.   
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This was particularly frustrating to Susanne; she certainly did not conceive of her 
work as destructive. Her image of mining was that it was fundamentally constructive and 
was a necessary and beneficial service that provided much of the comforts of modern life. 
Once in an early meeting about the program between Mark, herself, and I, she showed us 
a presentation about how she envisioned the program and the main message she wanted 
to teach children. To make her point she played us a video.  The dramatic video portrayed 
what life would be like without mining. In the video everything started to fall apart. 
Buildings collapsed in an apocalyptic scene, and people held onto each other in fear as 
metals dissolved and the structures of the city collapsed around them. As her choice of 
video indicated, Susanne did not see her work as destructive, and thus it angered her that 
her children learned that her work was bad. She was motivated to get involved in 
countering this message as a personal and ethically motivated project.  However, after the 
meeting finished and Susanne had left, Mark asked me the rhetorical question: “Can you 
imagine what Sally [one of the two environmentalists who actively attended the CCC 
meetings] would say if she thought we might show that to kids?” He laughed before 
continuing: “We may have to tone Susanne down a bit.”  
The image of mining as productive rather than destructive was the main message 
that was pushed in these school tours. The guides, including myself, were given a set of 
questions to keep the kids engaged in the educational mission of the tours. The drive to 
the minesite was meant to be filled with brainstorming the different things that the 
students used everyday that were made from mined materials.  Guides had a list to help 
students realize that “most things we use today come from some sort of extractive 
industry.” The list included the obvious items like jewelry, transport infrastructure, and 
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energy, but it also included everyday items like body and hair care products with 
petrochemicals in them, the zippers or buttons on clothes made from metals and plastics, 
even food required fertilizers that contained the by-products of mining like phosphate and 
sulphur.  
The desire to paint mining as fundamentally constructive was an attempt to 
counter the negative environmental reputation of the industry, which also implicated 
these miners and lobbyists individually. Susanne, like many others, recognized the moral 
critique of mining as a personal indictment, which takes a particular strength when it 
comes from her children. Her reaction to this form of critique of her moral and ethical 
self is refracted in a way that encourages her active work in support of the mining 
industry. Rather than accepting the moral frame through which her work with the mining 
industry was questioned, she chose to actively pursue a project that reconciled her moral 
sense of self with the representations of others. The self-fashioning exercise of ethics that 
coal lobbyists such as Susanne engaged in was about crafting themselves into the kind of 
people that they wanted to be, but this was simultaneously the kind of person that would 
be perceived by others as morally righteous, thus leading directly into a defence of the 
coal industry.  
Her active involvement in the education program was just the start. She also 
became a national spokesperson for the mining industry appearing in a television 
commercial that aired repeatedly on national television. The commercial was part of a 
broader campaign that the Australian Minerals’ Council—the national lobby—had 
recently launched entitled “Australian Coal: Making the Future Possible”. The 
commercial begins with Susanne putting her two daughters onto the school bus with their 
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matching rucksacks. She then introduces herself to the camera and describes her 
successful career in mining. The commercial follows her to Japan where she visits a low-
emissions power plant there and contemplates the busy streets of Tokyo and its energy 
needs.  She sums up the commercial’s message which mimics the ‘moral case for coal’ 
described above: “Globally there are billions of people that are going to need a lot more 
power but at the same time reducing emissions. That’s a big challenge that Australian 
coal can be part of. I’d like to be part of that.” 
As I spent time with Susanne assisting in the organization of the project, I learned 
that her interest in the role of education was also related to a desire to share the benefits 
that the mining industry had given her. As a mine engineer herself, Susanne lamented the 
decreasing popularity of mine engineering degrees at Australian universities. The number 
of young people enrolling in these degrees has declined significantly in recent years. She 
saw this not only as a potential problem for the industry, but also worried about the 
young people, and particularly young women, who are missing out on the opportunities 
and benefits that a career in mining gave her (Boyd 2016).  
Similarly, in my time with the CLO, I met a university student, Hamish, who had 
initiated a Youth for Mining group. He explained that he started the effort because of the 
backlash that he was facing from his fellow university students who were adamantly anti-
coal and challenged why he would study mine engineering and want to work for such a 
damaging industry. In fact, when I met him he was selling copies of the book by Alex 
Epstein entitled the Moral Case for Fossil Fuels, extolling the book’s message which 
closely matches that described above in relation to the Adani mine (Epstein 2014). The 
negative moral portrayals of the industry, Hamish told me, meant that his fellow 
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university students would accuse him of being greedy and selfish when they found out 
that he wanted to work in the mining industry. He told me, “As soon as I thought about it 
as a career, I just realized that mining was perfect for me. I love math, so I thought I’d be 
a good engineer, but I also love getting my hands dirty.”  He also said that “We need 
mining for almost everything, so it’s actually really important.” Mining felt like the right 
industry for his particular skills and interests and would enable him to make a positive 
contribution to the world. He thought that if he could help people—especially young 
people—understand the importance of mining they would see the benefits the industry 
provided. Hamish reacted to the moralized framing of the mining industry and the 
accusations of his own immorality that this inspired from his peers by becoming a young 
lobbyist and activist for the industry.  
These personal attachments, in which Susanne and Hamish felt personally 
implicated in the moral rightness or wrongness of the coal industry, inspired them to take 
part in explicit projects of ethical self-making. Their activism in support of the industry 
grew as they became personally invested in defending it. Although Susanne is employed 
by the mining industry these educational programs are above and beyond this official 
employment. Therefore, to say that she has simply been co-opted by the industry would 
be a misrepresentation. Further, Susanne eventually became a public spokesperson for 
arguments similar to those underlying the ‘moral case for coal’ as she appeared in a 
national commercial. Hamish reacted to the negative accusations from his classmates, not 
by questioning the morality of mining, but by actively starting a student group which 
spread the positive moral case for the coal industry.  
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These fears of being unfairly accused of immorality reflect the importance of 
social relations for the exercise of ethics. Charles Stafford (2013) draws on the work of 
psychologists to describe the forms that moral evaluation and ethical judgement take. 
When judging others, people tend to engage in dispositional attribution, that is that a 
person’s bad actions are symptomatic of them being a ‘bad person’. Whereas when 
judging their own bad actions, they use situational attribution that takes into account the 
circumstances that led their usually good character to do something bad. Stafford argues 
that this is unlikely to be a universally true dichotomy, but nonetheless which form of 
attribution is used and in which circumstances is a fruitful way for thinking about the 
enactment of ordinary ethics (Stafford 2013:102). The questioning that came from the 
friends and families of coal lobbyists served as a form of dispositional attribution. These 
moments were felt as personal attacks, in which not only were the circumstances of the 
coal industry challenged but the lobbyist’s character as its defender was denigrated.  The 
lobbyists related to this negative moral framing of the coal industry as an indictment of 
their own morality and thus their defence of themselves also required a defence of the 
industry for which they worked. Thus, these negative dispositional attributions incited 
forms of ethical self-fashioning, as they took more active roles in their lobbying efforts, 
often above and beyond those required by their employment. As I have shown, despite 
often being rather ambivalent, they solidified in their defences in these moments of moral 
accusation.  
Laidlaw argues, drawing on Foucault, that a theory of ethics must also operate 
with a theory of freedom (Laidlaw 2002, 2013). Ethics requires conscientious action even 
if such freedom is within constraints. This emphasis is not inconsistent with Foucault’s 
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earlier writings on power. For Foucault, power is the force of compelling one to act in a 
certain way, but this requires freedom for the power is not merely exercised over an 
object but on the action of the subject. This then leads Foucault to define ethics as “the 
considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection” (1997: 284 quoted 
in Laidlaw 2013: 104). Ethics, then, is the conscious and reflected upon actions that 
subjects undertake—or their techniques of the self—within the possibilities offered by 
prevailing power structures. In line with this view of power, I am not arguing that the 
ethical reflections that coal lobbyists make are somehow devoid of the forms of coercion 
that are structured by power, but I am saying that their conscientious reflection is an 
exercise of ethical self-fashioning even within these constraints. Further, their ethical 
self-fashioning feeds back into the power structures, thus producing their complicity and 
reinforcing these conditions. 
Conclusion 
The moral framework in which the coal industry is debated has led those who defend it to 
also frame their work in such moral and ethical terms. However, rather than the 
moralized landscape encouraging them to question their work, they craft alternative 
moral framings. This both derives from and feeds into national discourses, as shown in 
Susanne’s eventually becoming a national spokesperson for the industry. Complicity is 
not just something that insufficiently ethical people engage in. It is something that is 
made and reproduced precisely through the everyday and ordinary operation of ethics 
(Steinmüller 2010, 2013). Rather than the moralized discourses around coal and climate 
change and the integration of these into everyday lives causing lobbyists to renounce 
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their work, it actually serves to heighten it as they frame themselves as ethical actors to 
counter the negative accusations of others.  
To argue that pro-coal lobbyists are acting ethically I am not myself endorsing 
their position. Instead, I am saying that they are evaluative. Their complicity with the 
coal industry is crafted through a conscience ethics that draws from their ordinary and 
everyday experiences. The ordinary is where ethical decisions take place and moral 
frameworks are made meaningful, and thus a close attention to these elements of the 
ordinary is crucial for understanding the working of power and the active production of 
complicity. 
However, I have also shown how my own complicity enabled me to access the 
ambiguities that the lobbyists maintain in relation to their work. Complicity is rapport’s 
dark shadow, in that it is a morally ambiguous condition foundational to the shared 
intimacies of fieldwork (Marcus 1997). However, when this complicity is with those 
deemed morally questionable, the co-implication in their work reveals the shared 
intimacies and understandings that create a safe space for critique in gestures of irony, 
joking asides, and the sharing of sarcastic videos (Steinmüller 2010, 2013).  
The borders between lived ambiguities and official discourses is closely policed 
by lobbyists. This is of course partially a result of the demands of their formal 
employment, but as I have shown, the zeal with which they defend the industry is 
radically different when it is merely a formal part of their job (passively attending the 
community show) and when it is inspired by a morally-inflected defence of their 
character against the accusations of their family (the education program) or accusations 
of untrustworthiness (the study results).  
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The larger political project of this thesis is to take seriously the multiple sides of 
the debate over the future of Australian coal and to navigate the complexity of lives 
entangled in the industry. It has been easier to empathize with the working-class miners. 
They are less well positioned to find alternative sources of employment, and thus a 
shrinking coal industry represents the loss of livelihoods and valued communities. It may 
be more difficult to garner similar empathy for pro-coal lobbyists, but this does not 
decrease the importance of understanding their ethical positions. Understanding the role 
of the everyday and intergenerational forms through which they relate to moral 
discourses can help illuminate the crafting of alternative moral and ethical frameworks 
that receive better reception within this population. The back-and-forth volleying of 
moral accusations may in fact undermine the alliance building necessary to address the 
climate crisis and Australia’s double bind.  Taken alongside the previous chapter, I have 
shown that despite the understandable panic that has arisen alongside Anthropocene 
awareness, the appeal to morality as the basis for organizing a politics of the 
Anthropocene may serve to undermine it.  Moral accusation does not enable the 
intersectional and structural critiques necessary to address the ways in which we (mostly) 
are all complicit, even if unevenly so. Weighing moral responsibility—although 
motivated by concerns for justice—is more likely to reinforce already existing 
inequalities. This speaks to what has motivated this thesis throughout, that is, the political 
divisiveness through which debates on the future of Australian coal undermine the shared 
sense of precarity in the Anthropocene.  
I will now describe a different form through which climate change was brought 
into the political discourse and decision-making process in the Upper Hunter Valley. 
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Here it was not the particular moral claims that failed to resonate, but the scale at which 
climate change claims must be made. I will show how the scaling-up of climate change 




CHAPTER FIVE: Mine, Vines and Equines: The Scale-Making of Land Use 
Conflicts in the Upper Hunter Valley 
 
“It’s hard to be too morally indignant about the coal industry around here,” Frank, a 
middle-aged man who organizes tours of the mines for the odd tourist, explained to me. 
He continued, “we’ve basically got the coal industry versus the gambling industry versus 
the alcohol industry.” This former teacher has a small office in a mostly empty office 
suite, cluttered with mine memorabilia, including pieces of coal, hard hats, high visibility 
vests, and models of mine machinery. The centrepiece of the room is a large map that 
shows the location of the mines on the landscape of the Upper Hunter Valley (see figure 
5.1 overleaf). Frank directs me over to the map, pointing out where we are, in Singleton, 
New South Wales. He points out a few other landmarks: the second major town of 
Muswellbrook to the northwest, and the smaller Bulga to the southwest, and Scone to the 
northeast. When he reaches the town of Jerry’s Plains, the site of the proposed Drayton 
South coal mine expansion, he asks me if I’ve heard about it. This was my first day in 
this new fieldsite, so although I’d picked up bits in the media, I didn’t know much then. 
He began to explain the basic situation to me.  
An open-cut coal mine, called Drayton and run by Anglo American, had recently 
requested an extension of its mining plan.  The original mine was nearing the end of its 
life, as recoverable coal had been running low, so Anglo American was hoping to 
develop an adjacent site to the south and take advantage of the existing infrastructure. 
The new conglomerated mine would be called Drayton South. He explained how this had 
divided the community, as the proposed mine was near to two major thoroughbred studs 
and a small winery. The New South Wales Department of  
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This map, Figure 5.1 Map of Drayton Mine Location in Upper Hunter Valley (Brereton 
and Forbes 2004), has been removed as the copyright is owned by another organisation. 







Planning had twice approved the mine, but the plans had to go through a secondary 
process and be approved by a body called the Planning Assessment Commission (PAC) 
who received submissions and held a public hearing to determine whether the project was 
in the ‘public interest’ (New South Wales Environment Protection Authority 1979: 
act79c(1)(e)). Three sets of public hearings had already been held before the PAC, but the 
issue still wasn’t fully settled, as Anglo American had recently submitted a revised plan 
which was due for a fourth public hearing. The Hunter Valley is not only a coal region. 
Unlike Moranbah, the Upper Hunter Valley has a number of large rural industries mixed 
in with its numerous coal mines in a delicate, and at times quite strained, balance. 
“Mines, vines, and equines,”24 is an oft repeated phrase to describe the diverse economy 
of the region and is meant to celebrate the coexistence of the coal mining industry with 
the wine and horse breeding industries. Frank’s framing of these industries as ‘coal, 
alcohol and gambling’ was a striking rewrite of the tagline. His twisting of the celebrated 
imagery of the grape vines in the wineries dotting the landscape into the ‘alcohol 
industry,’ and the regal thoroughbred horse breeding industry into the ‘gambling 
industry,’ made a rather acute moral claim about the underlying sinfulness of even the 
more aesthetically pleasing and prized agricultural heritage of the region. It was a 
purposeful attempt not to argue for the morality of the coal industry, but to posit the 
moral ambiguity of its competitors.  
 
24 While there are also a number of small dairies in the region, adding the rhyming, 
‘bovines’ to the list, this industry has shrunk significantly since economic reforms in the 
1990s and is now limited to a few small dairies and not a major source of land-use 
conflicts (McManus and Connor 2013). 
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The Hunter Valley is often divided into the Upper and Lower Hunter, as a way of 
marking the somewhat distinct economies of the area, although there is much overlap. 
The Upper Hunter is more generally associated with the coal and horse industry, whereas 
the Lower Hunter is associated with wineries and includes the coastal city of Newcastle. 
The Hunter Valley wineries are renowned for the quality of their Semillons, and the 
industry relies heavily on its close proximity to Sydney. It is possible to visit on a day 
tour which is popular with domestic and international tourists, and it serves as a weekend 
escape for city dwellers.  The prevalence of Mandarin signage at the wineries serve as 
evidence of the region’s increasing popularity with Chinese visitors. Although Frank does 
offer tours of the mines, he does little business. Most tourists come to the Hunter Valley 
for its wineries. 
The Hunter Valley is thus largely known amongst outsiders for its wines, rather 
than its mines. Most tourists do not know that one of the world’s busiest export coal 
chains runs through it. The Upper Hunter Valley is also one of the world’s three premier 
thoroughbred breeding centres of excellence, alongside Lexington, Kentucky, in the US 
and Newmarket in the UK. The existence of these industries means that, although much 
of the region’s recent growth has come from the coal mining industry, it is not the only 
powerful economic force, and as such, the possibility of coexistence between industries is 
a matter of debate.  
When introducing myself in Singleton and as a researcher on the coal industry, 
most people automatically told me how they felt about coal mining: something along the 
lines of, “I’m not against coal, but…” followed by a worry about the cumulative impacts 
of living in close proximity to so many mines and the environmental or health impacts. 
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Alternatively, they praised the industry with a strong endorsement of coal’s contribution 
to the growth of the area, and its role providing employment and support for community 
sport and events. Divergent perspectives on the coal industry’s trade-offs, as well as its 
long-term viability, created dividing lines along which broader community political and 
social disagreements took shape.  
As discussed in the thesis introduction and previous chapter, coal is mapped onto 
larger political questions and is often the topic of national debate in the context of energy 
security and climate change. However, it is also entwined in more localized concerns. It 
is deeply embedded in local livelihoods, both through direct and indirect employment and 
because of the health and environmental impacts on residents. The affective attachments 
to the labour of mining and its symbolic importance in the region’s history also contrast 
markedly with similarly strong attachments to a sense of rurality and associated 
agricultural industries (Connor 2016b; Sherval et al. 2018). These agricultural industries 
are less divisive than coal mining. The tour organizer I quoted above who referenced the 
alcohol and gambling industry, Frank, was making a clever joke rather than voicing a 
popular critique. However, within the context of a direct conflict with the mines, the 
moral problems posed by these industries become salient, and the dividing lines are 
revealed as people make and defend their claims through divergent conceptions of the 
region’s past and future.  
This public weighing of claims took place in the context of the planning approval 
process for the Drayton South Mine Expansion, most performatively in the Planning 
Assessment Commission (PAC) hearings that were part of this process. Public hearings 
were held over two days in the town of Muswellbrook, the nearest regional centre to the 
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proposed mine. These meetings make up the bulk of the ethnography in this chapter and 
will be analysed alongside the PAC’s final determination document. The chapter looks 
particularly at how the planning process defines the scale to which claims can be 
legitimately made and incorporated, thus shaping what issues are compatible with 
planning regimes and state projects. Of particular importance was the way in which the 
regional scale-setting limited the ability of local environmentalists to connect the struggle 
over an individual mine to global climate change.  
Planning has become a ubiquitous form taken by state processes in the modern 
world. It has been shaped by neoliberal developments (James 2011) and austerity (Bear 
2011) and remains a constant presence in statecraft from international bodies to the local 
council (Abram 2014; Abram and Weszkalnys 2011; Baxstrom 2011; Lund 2011; 
Weszkalnys 2010). Planning is deeply rooted in modern rationality, which emphasizes 
that development and progress can be achieved through the proper policy prescriptions, 
thus it is deeply connected to state governmentality (Scott 1999). Further, planning, 
particularly as it is applied to land-use through regional planning, represents the point at 
which the progressive narratives of modernity interact with emplaced nature, revealing 
the modernist myths of control that are foundational to Anthropocenic logics.  Arturo 
Escobar goes so far as to claim that “[p]erhaps no other concept has been so insidious, no 
other idea gone so unchallenged” (1992: 132) as planning, for it is foundational to 
processes of social control, from the rise of Western modernity to contemporary third-
world development programs. However, as Abram has argued, although planning is 
inherently modern with its attendant progressive and universalizing tendencies, “close 
attention to planning practices indicates that such temporalities are doubted, contested, 
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and mediated” (2014: 129). For this reason, Abram and Weszkalnys argue that planning 
is an ‘elusive promise’ as it is inherently partial, leaving numerous gaps between the 
conceptual plan and the actually existing world it attempts to describe and order (2011: 
14). Just as this thesis attempts to untangle the conflicting ways in which the modernist 
ontologies of the Anthropocene are experienced in social life without assuming their 
universal and total dominance, so too must ethnographies of planning look at the specific 
unfolding of planning practices and the gaps and inconsistencies which persist despite 
their outdated modernist foundations.   
The essential inconsistency with the hegemonic conception of planning that the 
planning process around Drayton South revealed was a peculiar setting of scale. It led to 
quite specific scale-making claims as local imaginations rubbed against global 
connections (Tsing 2005). This chapter uses the public hearing and planning process 
about the proposed expansion of a coal mine to reveal how current tensions between 
different scalar imaginations are foundational to the political disagreements over resource 
projects. Rather than assuming the pre-existence of nested scales from local to global, it 
conceptualizes scales as imagined and actively produced through encounters and frictions 
(Tsing 2005). This is particularly related to precarity within Anthropocenic conditions as 
appeals to the global, linked both to climate change and international corporations, evoke 
feelings of insecurity over futures made outside of an imagined localities’ control.  
This perspective is partially inspired by Thomas Eriksen’s (2016; 2018a; 2018b) 
analysis of the industrial boomtown of Gladstone, Queensland. His research here led him 
to focus on the clashing of scales as a fundamental tension in local resource conflicts as 
well as broader disagreements facing the contemporary world. A fundamental finding for 
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him is that large-scale interests overpower smaller-scale concerns. Although inspired by 
this focus on scale, my findings in the context of the mining bust, seem to reverse the 
dynamics he observes, as the benefits of global connections are being questioned through 
increased awareness of precarity.  
As much as precarity is directly linked to the loss of stable Fordist employment, it 
is also more broadly “an acknowledgement of dependency, needs, exposure, and 
vulnerability” (Puar 2012: 163). In the precarious Anthropocene, the global is 
increasingly imagined as a source of instability and contingency, particularly as it raises 
awareness of inherent connectivity and dependency on others: nations, markets, and the 
earthly atmosphere.  In this context, a retreat to the imagined local reveals a nostalgic 
longing for stability rooted in historic conceptions of the region. Such conceptualization 
of the local and global are imagined, as all scales must be made through particular 
interactions in which they become meaningful entities or ideas. As Narotzky and Besnier 
argue, “the ways in which people get hold of their future through political mobilization in 
the present is structurally tied to the limits of uncertainty that are materially produced by 
economic and political structures, institutions, and agents” (2014: S11). 
The planning process is such a particular conjuncture in which these limits of 
uncertainty are translated into political conflict and are made meaningful. In this chapter, 
I will first describe in more detail the context of the Drayton South conflict, and from 
there move on to describe the public hearing in the planning approval process. I show 
how the specific scale-setting of the PAC, at the level of the regional economy, privileged 
economic arguments but also enabled the slipping in of affective concerns. This shows 
how the separation of the economy from other spheres of social life and the resultant 
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commodification and alienation is not a complete project, despite the need to articulate it 
within the language of the plan. However, the same appeal to locality that enabled 
affective attachments to regional understandings of belonging, disabled claims that linked 
an individual coal mine to global climate change.  Despite the PAC ultimately ruling 
against the mine expansion, the PAC’s decision left out attempts by environmentalist to 
scale up their concerns. Here, the ‘global’ again becomes an imagination that is deemed 
illegitimate in the context of the planning process.  
  This reveals the tension between localism and Anthropocenic awareness. The 
precariousness of global connection brings a retreat to the local, beneficial in re-
incorporating community and social concerns into economic logics, but this localism also 
excludes the kind of coordinated action or scalability (Tsing 2012) required to address 
planetary crises like anthropogenic climate change.   
Drayton South and the Planning Assessment Commission’s Scale-Making  
With the initial development application submitted in May 2015, there had already been a 
long struggle over the future of Drayton South before I arrived for fieldwork in August 
2016. Reminders of the struggle remained. One day while writing my fieldnotes I 
realized my pen was inscribed with the slogan “I Support Drayton South” (I am still 
unsure of where I had picked it up). Driving down the highway to an interview I would 
occasionally spot a ‘Save Drayton South’ campaign sign fading in the sun or see a neon-
orange cap with the same phrasing shading a man’s face as he wandered around the local 
community show. At the height of the contest in late 2015, I was told, the issue caused a 
palpable division in the community. The fact that the issue was still not resolved, despite 
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numerous hearings and previous determinations, frustrated many who told me that the 
ongoing process delayed “community healing”.  
The New South Wales Planning Department had recently undergone a number of 
reforms, one of which was the 2008 introduction of the Planning Assessment 
Commission (PAC). The NSW Planning Assessment Commission is an independent 
body of experts who review major development projects if they have been approved by 
the Department of Planning and Environment but have received more than 25 objections, 
or if the development is objected to by the local council in which the project is located, or 
if there is potential for corruption, for example if the proponent of the project has made 
substantial political donations. The goal of the PAC is to provide an independent review 
of department recommendations and ultimately to determine whether or not the project 
should go forward in the public interest. The proposal will then go through ‘review and 
determination’, which means that up to two public hearings are held for each proposal. In 
the case of Drayton South, the project had already resulted in three public hearings by the 
time I arrived in Singleton. When their proposal had been rejected twice by the previous 
PAC, Anglo American submitted a revised proposal for a smaller mine. This meant that 
the proposal went through the ‘review and determination’ stage a second time. Therefore, 
by the time I was sitting in the PAC public hearing, it was the fourth time that many 
people had to make submissions to and speak at the meetings. Fed up with the process, 
many felt that the PAC process was a way for the planning minister to avoid making 
politically unpopular decisions in disputed electorates (see also Connor 2016b).   
The Drayton South project is Anglo American’s plan to establish two new open-
cut pits near its current operations of the Drayton mine which was running out of coal. 
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The two new pits would have a disturbance area of 1,477.5 ha with a 15-year mine life, 
hoping to recover 74.9 million tonnes of coal. The mine would operate 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week. The proposal also included the incorporation of this new mine plan for 
Drayton South into the previous mine plan for the Drayton mine, their already operating 
adjacent mine thus incorporating the old mine into the new expansion as a single mine for 
regulatory purposes (New South Wales Planning Assessment Commision 2017). 
During previous hearings, Anglo American threatened that if they didn’t receive 
approval for Drayton South to expand their operations they would have to close the 
existing Drayton mine and lay off the employees there. After receiving the third rejection 
from the PAC, they did just that, dismissing the majority of their workforce and leaving 
only a few employees to work on rehabilitation projects.  
Anglo American had also recently announced that they were getting out of the 
Australian coal business. In an announcement in February 2016, the CEO Mark Cutifani 
announced that they would be selling all of their Australian coal assets, describing them 
as “non-core” after posting a $US 5.6 billion loss (Saunders 2016). Thus, by the time the 
fourth PAC hearing was held, all those who were previously working at Drayton had 
already been laid off. Therefore, the company’s appeals for the PAC to approve the 
Drayton South mine expansion, as many critically noted, was primarily about having a 
more valuable asset to on-sell to another mining company, and with it, Anglo American’s 
rehabilitation obligations on the existing mine.25 A new owner would likely go ahead 
 
25 This has in fact happened, even though the PAC ruled against the open-cut mine expansion. 
The Drayton assets were subsequently purchased by Australian company Malabar Coal, for 
AU$86 million in December 2017. They will develop an underground mine in the area, which 
they argue will cause less disturbance to the surrounding industries (Caruana 2017). Had the 
open-cut expansion of Drayton South been approved, Anglo American would likely have 
received a substantially higher price for the assets.  
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with developing the new mine, even if it had seemed uncommercial for Anglo American. 
Thus, the outcome of the PAC hearing was still critical to whether or not the mine 
expansion would eventually proceed.  
Importantly, this particular project was located close to two large and prestigious 
thoroughbred stud farms, Coolmore and Godolphin. Coolmore is a business which offers 
services for fees to clients, primarily the covering (insemination) services of renowned 
racing stallions to mare owners who hope to produce future racing or breeding offspring, 
with covering fees as high as AU$250,000. Godolphin, owned by Sheik Mohammed bin 
Rashid al Maktoum, of the Dubai Royal Family, is primarily for the breeding and 
improvement of Godolphin’s own racing operations. With more than AU$500 million 
spent each year on breeding in the Hunter Valley, these two studs are paid about AU$100 
million annually for their services (New South Wales Planning Assessment Commision 
2017).  
They are major global players, but also are of critical importance in the upholding 
of what has been designated as the equine Critical Industry Cluster by the Upper Hunter 
Strategic Regional Land Use Plan. This includes not only the major studs mentioned 
above, but also the related facilities and services, including mare boarding, veterinary 
services, feed suppliers, farriery, etc. This plan identifies that the entire equine industry 
contributes AU$565 million in the Hunter region alone, and AU$2.6 billion to the NSW 
economy annually, and it employs around 5,000 people in the region (New South Wales 
Department of Planning and Infrastructure 2012). The thoroughbred industry thus makes 
substantial contributions to the local state and national economy, although not at the scale 
of the mining industry. The Drayton South project alone was estimated to provide 500 
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jobs, and indirectly employ 984 people, over its 15-year lifespan. While this is significant 
itself, the real benefit comes through the royalties and taxes, which the project proponents 
estimate at AU$233 million in royalties to the state, and AU$93 million in taxes to the 
national government (New South Wales Planning Assessment Commision 2017: 8).   
The PAC ultimately –for the fourth time—ruled against the mine and in favour of 
the thoroughbred horse studs.  They based this decision on the basis of the economic 
reach of the project, primarily through the sustainability of the equine industry in contrast 
to the short life-span of the proposed mine, yet even this seemingly simple calculus 
involves complex moral claims and clashing temporal, spatial, and conceptual scales.  
The PAC’s mandate is to decide in the best interests of the locality as relating to the 
project’s environmental, economic, and social impacts. However, in the PAC’s 
determination, it decided to define the locality as the ‘economic reach’ of the project. 
This meant they were privileging the economic aspect, or perhaps more accurately, 
subsuming the social and environmental aspects into the category of the economic. A 
direct quote from the determination highlights this reductive exercise, which forced 
claims into an economic calculus:  
In accordance with s79C(1)(b) of the EP&A Act, the commission has considered the 
likely impacts of the Project including the environmental, economic and social 
impacts in the locality. The Commission has defined what it considers to be the 
locality of the Project. The Commission considers that the locality is most readily 
defined as being the economic reach of the Project which is most relevantly contained 
by the extent of employment and services expenditure and subsequently this reach is 
largely contained within the broader geographical region known as the Hunter Valley 
(New South Wales Planning Assessment Commision 2017: 9).  
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This of course had an impact on the relevance of claims to belonging to this locality for 
the PAC’s decision-making process, and specifically limits the geographic and 
conceptual scale at which arguments could be considered relevant. Defining the locality 
through ‘economic reach’ would seem to make it global in character, given the 
worldwide reach of both the coal export industry and the racing industry (with a major 
opponent of the mine being the Dubai monarchy). However, the PAC constrained the 
global economic reach to its regional limits of the Hunter Valley, and even further, 
reduced the meaning of economic reach to “employment and service expenditure.” As 
Abram and Weszkalnys argue, “plans may be seen to perform a particular kind of work, 
which frequently seems to be less about a specific content than the kind of conceptual 
orders that they lay out” (2011: 14). In the process, they often reduce complexity and thus 
limit the way in which claims to futures can be made.  
This scale-setting is part of a broader privileging of the economic and may at first 
seem to represent the disembedding of the economy from social life characteristic of 
neoliberalism, which works “to translate political issues into economic or managerial 
ones, thereby avoiding debate about fundamental values, social justice and conditions for 
long-term human well-being” (Eriksen 2016: 131). However, although incorporating the 
social and environmental into the economic, the limiting of the economy to the region set 
the scale at a local and emplaced level and resultantly more localized social and 
environmental concerns were reincorporated back into the PAC’s considerations as the 
two main industries both claimed regional importance. The scale-setting as the regional 
economy required all parties to claim a localness based in a particular conception of the 
 269 
region’s history and future, even though these claims to localness were translated into the 
planning regime through economic language.  
The region is both a geographic delineation, as in the physical bounds of a valley, but 
it is also conceptual in that it includes particular identifications with a historic conception 
of the Hunter Valley, thus drawing on affective connections and historical narratives. 
This resonates strikingly with a trend Katherine Gibson (2001) identified in a different 
coal region in Australia, the LaTrobe Valley of Victoria.  She describes the social 
embeddedness of the conception of the region as opposed to the economized logics of 
neoliberal planning regimes. She traces the history of planning in the LaTrobe Valley and 
shows how the region as an object for planning arose in post-WWII Australia to create a 
vision of the economy which included social and community concerns. The neoliberal-
informed planning that followed led to individualism and competition between the towns 
in the area. Residents began to incorporate this vision of the disembedded economy in 
their own subjectivities. They formed an “attachment to the truthfulness of numbers and 
submission to the Economy’s right to direct action” (Gibson 2001: 644). However, 
Gibson argues this economization can potentially be countered by an emphasis on the 
region to re-embed the economy (657). Even as scales such as the region draw on specific 
geographic markers, Gibson’s analysis show how scales are more importantly conceptual, 
shaping the way in which people relate to places. As Tsing shows: 
Place making is always a cultural as well as a political-economic activity. It involves 
assumptions about the nature of those subjects authorized to participate in the process 
and the kinds of claims they can reasonably put forth about their position in national, 
regional, and world classifications and hierarchies of places. The specificities of these 
subjects and claims contradict and misstate those of other place makers, even as they 
may form overlaps and links imaged as ‘flows.’ The channel-making activity of 
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circulation, then, is always a contested and tentative formation of scales and 
landscapes (Tsing 2000: 338).  
Thomas Eriksen similarly emphasises how attention to scales is important for 
understanding the contemporary moment, particularly in Australian land-use conflicts. 
His insights draw on research conducted in the Australian industrial town of Gladstone, 
Queensland, in conversation with a larger group of researchers around the world. The 
work is united by a shared conception of the contemporary world as “overheated,” which 
directly speaks to climate change, but also includes the increased speed of globalisation 
and interconnectedness which is often in tension with the local. The clash of scales is 
fundamental to the frictions and tensions of the overheated world. He locates these 
particularly in contests between industry and environmentalism, such as “when a local 
community is being overrun by large-scale interests, when short-term concerns take 
precedence over long-term survival” (Eriksen 2016: 131). This clearly has resonances 
with the Hunter Valley, however Eriksen’s research was conducted during the mining 
boom, and thus his work emphasizes the conditions of the larger and more powerful 
industrial interests overpowering local environmental concerns, and the short-term but 
momentarily high wealth of the mining industry trumping the smaller but more 
sustainable economic activities of rural industries (Eriksen 2018: 212).  Although he does 
identify a common trend, by not sufficiently interrogating the way in which scales are 
constructed, his analysis leads to a unidirectional view that causes him to conclude that 
“[d]ecisions taken on a large scale affect small-scale life-worlds without in turn being 
affected by them” (2018: 224). I did not find such uni-directionality within the specific 
context of the planning process over Drayton South, or even more broadly in my research 
with the coal mining industry as they did respond to community concerns. Our research is 
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of course in different locations, and the agencies studied are not equivalent, but even 
more importantly is the difference in temporal context that only a few years between our 
research makes.  
Between 2014 and 2016, the mining bust revealed the instability of reliance on 
continued global economic growth, and regionalism has slowly re-emerged as a critical 
actor. Even though the planning conflict over Drayton South revolved around two large 
and wealthy industries with numerous global linkages, they both made particular appeals 
to their localness and claimed their critical role within a regional identity that is economic 
but also inherently historic, place-based, and affective.26  
The two main claimants—the thoroughbred horse breeders, Godolphin and 
Coolmore and the international mining company Anglo American—both (along with 
their supporters) claimed their own localness and highlighted their opponent’s globalness, 
which was negatively linked to instability and vulnerabilities to forces outside of the 
region’s control.27 Thus although scale in terms of ranked complexity may exist in some 
material sense of the particular flows of finance and decision making, what is crucial to 
understanding the local land-use conflicts is not the clashing of scales as some pre-
existing entity of the small or large/local or global (Eriksen 2018a), but the way in which 
scale-setting and appeals to particular scales are imagined, performed and enacted by 
actors and institutions.  I will now describe Anglo American’s appeal to regional 
 
26 By way of illustration, in May 2017, BHP-Billiton, dropped the ‘Billiton’ from its name which 
it had picked up when it merged with the South African firm in 2001. A massive rebranding effort 
has attempted to reassert BHP’s original founding in Australia and to de-emphasize its 
multinational status (Ryan 2017). 
27 The wine industry was less active in their opposition, largely due to a fear of being associated 
with mining for reputational reasons, to be discussed shortly. 
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belonging, and the particular way in which this claim is contested by the horse breeding 
industry, before proceeding to discuss the horse breeding industry’s claims to the same.  
Community Sponsorship and History: Anglo American’s claim to the region 
The PAC hearings were held over two days, on the 16th and 17th of November 2016, in 
the town of Muswellbrook, NSW. Mark picked me up at the office in Singleton, and we 
drove together to the hearings. We arrived at the hearings in Muswellbrook to find a 
packed room of a few hundred spectators and participants. It was standing room only. 
There were a number of journalists in the room with their large cameras around their 
necks. I came to learn that these numerous journalists were primarily there for the same 
reason that Mark wanted to attend. Nathan Tinkler, the infamous boganaire described in 
chapter three, was scheduled to speak. Most of the journalists left after he spoke and they 
had captured his image. Mark similarly got bored soon after and decided to leave.  
The audience that remained after the spectacle of the boganaire had passed were mostly 
wearing khaki trousers and polo shirts emblazoned with Coolmore or Emirates (for 
Godolphin) logos. This revealed that the majority of the audience represented the 
interests of the thoroughbred horse breeders. The rows of seats for the audience faced a 
podium with a projection screen and a long folding table. Seated behind were the three 
members of the Planning Assessment Commission and a secretary who kept time and 
notes. The format of the meeting followed a pre-set schedule of speakers that was printed 
and placed on each chair. Individuals were given five minutes to speak, whereas those 
representing groups were given 15 minutes. The speakers presented their case at the 
podium, sometimes using PowerPoint. There was little interaction between the speakers 
and the PAC members who largely sat quietly behind the table, taking notes. The 
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secretary, with a few exceptions, strictly enforced time limits. It was a relatively formal 
affair, and although the speakers often spoke very passionately, the audience was 
generally silent. Nathan Tinkler’s appearance was the main exception to the usual 
decorum, as the sound of constant camera flashes brought a frenzied disorder to the 
space.  
The first speaker, a representative from Anglo American, faced a room that was 
largely in opposition, something that was clear through the uniformed division of the 
room. The neon collared work shirts—referred to as hi-vis—required on the mine site but 
also commonly worn by miners in everyday life, were largely absent from the room. The 
politics of clothing have a longer history in the dispute. The hi-vis work shirt became a 
main symbol of support during previous hearings as they were hung on a fence along the 
major highway to represent the workers of the currently operating Drayton mine, whose 
jobs were threatened if the expansion was not approved. The representatives of Anglo 
American mentioned these workers, the 196 employees who had been fired last month 
when the Drayton mine closed down. One such representative, speaking to a common 
critique of the international mining company, said, “Drayton is part of the community,” 
pointing to the apprenticeships and skills training provided by the mine and highlighting 
that 90 per cent of its employees live in the Upper Hunter region.  
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Figure 5.2 ‘Hi-vis’ shirts hung in support of the Drayton South Mine expansion (Carr 
2017) 
 They also emphasised the financial support to local sport teams and community groups, 
which were part of the industry’s general embrace of Corporate Social Responsibility 
measures to ‘give back’ to the community. These programs not only create general 
goodwill in the community but serve to fill gaps in the provision of social programs 
within the context of the neoliberal rollback of the state and increasingly create 
relationships of dependence on the mine (Frynas 2005; Gardner 2012). 
The role of the mining industry as the provider of employment and financial 
support in regional areas is continually brought to the fore. It is a crucial discourse of the 
industry that is also repeated by proponents of the mine (cf. McManus and Connor 2013). 
At the PAC hearing, a pro-mine community member said: “Mining in the surrounds of 
Muswellbrook has supported the town and helped it grow into the town it is today. The 
Muswellbrook indoor swimming pool and gym is a great example of this.”  
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Another pro-mine advocate at the hearing took this further to emphasise the 
critical role of mining in regional and national history: “Mining has been a part of the 
Muswellbrook community for over 100 years…Mining has seen our community and 
Australia survive the GFC and the current mining downturn. Without strong mining 
business, Australia would not have come through this time as strong as we have.” The 
appeal to mining’s historic presence is linked to the particular regional identification, 
which links the more contemporary open-cut mines in the Upper Hunter to the earliest 
convict coal mines of the Lower Hunter, in the area around Newcastle. As I described in 
the introduction, Australia’s first international export was a shipment of coal that had 
been collected from the Lower Hunter in the first years of the colony. Later in the early 
years of the colony, prisoners mined coal under harsh conditions in the area’s 
underground mines. Thus, the claim to “over 100 years” of history of mining as a marker 
of the industry’s local connections is a particular claim to the region’s role in national 
historical narratives, for these early underground mines were quite distinct from the open-
cut mines that came to the Upper Hunter in the 1970s. The specific scale setting of the 
‘region’ of the entire Hunter Valley, however, allows such a claim to resonate with the 
PAC’s vision of the locality.   
Such an appeal to history reveals how industry workers’ arguments are not driven 
purely by economic interests but also involve complex moral claims that are linked to 
identity and a moral sense of community interest. David Trigger’s study of competing 
discourses over natural resource development in Western Australia demonstrates how 
foresters similarly: 
reject characterizations of their aspirations as solely related to economic interests and 
stress the sociocultural aspects of their work and broader community lifestyles…the 
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cultural value of local practices is celebrated for its centrality to maintenance of both 
rural lifestyles and the ‘development’ of the wider society (1999: 174).  
This is clearly seen in the argument of the Drayton South mine proponents. They link 
their pro-mine stance to the history of the community, the important role they feel the 
mines play in the broader development of the region, and its support of community 
activities through mine attempts to retain their social licence to operate. However, within 
this claim of the critical importance of the mining industry to the region, they also 
recognize that the town is suffering, partially from this very reliance.  A third pro-mine 
speaker stated:  
But Muswellbrook is now dying; the community that relied on mining to survive is 
dying. Shops are closing. People are moving away, there are no jobs for the builders 
…Unemployment is rising and will continue if Drayton South is not approved. What 
will happen to the jobs of the 500 workers at Drayton? What will happen to their 
wives and their families? 
Here, the defence of the coal mining industry as a provider of employment to the men 
(and financial support to their wives and children) also highlights the increased 
vulnerability of reliance on the mining industry.  
Such responses, from community members who support the mine, highlight a 
problematic issue at the heart of Anglo American and the Drayton mine’s claim to 
localness. That is, that although the mines are responsible for a significant amount of 
employment and investment in the town’s facilities, these jobs and financial support are 
reliant not only on the approval of more mines, but also on the global commodity cycle. 
The experience of the mining bust has made this instability particularly profound, leading 
to a complex contradiction through which this appeal to the local is made. Given the 
region’s reliance on the coal industry, the loss of coal jobs is a problem, but this 
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simultaneously requires admitting that the mining industry is subject to the contingent 
economic forces that create vulnerability and global interdependencies.  
The coal industry is reliant on global commodity cycles, representing a clash of 
scales between its local impacts and its global conditions. Despite attempts to delineate 
the local and privilege the region, these local livelihoods are inherently entwined with 
global processes. This resonates with the growth in precarity as an experience of the 
Anthropocene, that links the dependencies on decisions made in seemingly distant places 
to a sense of insecure and increasingly contingent futures. Here, concerns about 
globalization, are exacerbated by concerns about global climate change. Globalization’s 
interdependencies are made worse through the double bind of Australia’s position in the 
Anthropocene. They are vulnerable to climate change as carbon emissions occur in a 
shared atmosphere, and they are vulnerable to the potential economic consequences that 
global policy to limit carbon emissions might induce.  
In the 1990s, globalization became “the definitional characteristic of an era” 
(Tsing 2000, 331) through the fall of the Soviet Union, signalling the triumph and global 
spread of capitalism and international free trade. It may be too early to diagnose the era, 
but signals point to the late 2010s, particularly the post-GFC era, as one of a retreat from 
the global. The increased precarity linked to the neoliberal triumphalism of the last few 
decades have signalled a return to a privileging of the local. “Globalist” has become a 
slur used by the new nationalists, reflected in political movements from Brexit to the 
election of Donald Trump.   
Stepping away from the PAC hearings for a moment, such discontent was clear 
among the Drayton workers who had recently been laid off and began showing up in the 
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CCC office in Singleton. The CCC office was loaning a room to Anglo American to use 
for the purpose of meeting with the laid-off employees of Drayton. Since I had the desk 
that best overlooked the office, I became the de-facto secretary, directing these men to the 
employment counsellor who had rented the small office that Sam occasionally used. The 
employment counsellor was meant to help them find new work. Some of them had 
managed to turn their redundancy payments into early retirement. Others, for whom a 
longer period in their working lives remained, had to worry about finding work in a 
shrinking industry, as senior workers, experienced but often in a very particular and not 
easily transferable skill of mine operations. Many of these men got their first job in this 
same mine by calling up a friend. Now they are reduced to sitting in an office room with 
a young woman who worked for an employment counselling service. Her image and 
mannerisms, as a Canadian young woman, seemed to exasperate the power dynamics as 
she seemed to speak down to these men, upsetting gendered and age-based expectations 
of expertise, which were worsened by her foreign accent.  
  The embarrassment that this process represented to many of the men was clear. 
For example, I overheard the employment counsellor go on for several minutes about the 
specific details of how to best present oneself for online job applications, before a man 
finally stopped her and said he didn’t know how to get an email address. This revealed an 
incompatibility between these men’s skills and the demands of contemporary 
employment. These men often left the office visibly upset and flustered. Mark and I 
continued on with our work in the office, but the presence of these men coming in and 
out provoked many discussions. For Mark, they represented the very real consequences 
of anti-mining activism. As I mentioned earlier, Mark had recently been laid off from a 
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job in journalism. He therefore understood the emotional difficulty of changing industries 
late in one’s career. This is another location where the emphasis on employment and 
protecting jobs gets its moral weight for the coal industry and its defenders.28 These 
workers might have retained their jobs if Drayton South had been approved. Then again, 
perhaps this would not have happened, as Anglo American was exiting the coal business 
as a result of decisions made in the London headquarters and based on a global cycles 
and forecasts for a mix of diversified commodities. Importantly, as evidenced in 
Moranbah in chapters one and two, the new company that would operate the expansion 
would likely have preferred hiring casual workers.  
Here as in Moranbah there was increased precarity of employment in the mining 
industry and a loss of male stable employment. Such circumstances seem to lead 
inexorably to a regionalism that is historically constituted and tinged with nostalgia. The 
boom and bust nature of the mining industry, on the other hand, reveals 
interdependencies on global considerations, Anglo American’s corporate boardroom in 
London or climate policy makers in Paris. These vulnerabilities to global forces—and 
particularly the temporality of cyclical commodities cycles and a looming end of coal 
through climate action—further intensify the tendency to retreat to a privileging of the 
region and the local. The insecurity that derives from this sort of global imaginary, and 
the retreat from it through the increased focus on the region as the limit of consideration, 
highlight how precarity is linked to a retreat from the global scalar imagination, which as 
I will show below has consequences for the scaling-up of environmentalisms.  
 
28 I had a similar interaction with Sam, in which he explained that much of his emphasis on protecting coal 
jobs derived from his former job as a policeman. As a policeman, he responded to many suicides in public 
housing which he attributed to these people’s lack of sense of purpose and meaning that their 
unemployment generated.  
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Rurality and Reputation: The thoroughbred industry’s appeal to the region  
The horse-breeding industry also appealed to its regional belonging. The industry’s 
connections to the local region are forged less through CSR activities (though there is 
some sponsoring of local events) than through the invocation of historical and affective 
connections. Its main appeal was an appeal to a rural identity, its history, and critically—
in contrast to the mines—its sustainability.  
Despite the presence of over 40 mines, the Hunter Valley also has a lasting regional 
identity that rests on rural agricultural industries– of which horse-breeding is one. The 
mining industry argues for the possibility of ‘co-existence,’ but representatives of the 
agricultural industries are more critical of this possibility, particularly through concerns 
for their own reputations.  McManus and Connor discuss the scripts of the ‘rural’ used in 
land use conflicts in the Upper Hunter Valley between mining and other industries and 
residents. They argue that ‘rural’ has become a critical term to describe a new identity 
politics around land conflicts with competing industries: 
The thoroughbred breeders, vignerons and food producers argue that farming is an 
essential activity that has been, and can continue, to operate for generations. They 
construct themselves as stewards of the land, knowledgeable about local conditions, a 
source of jobs and wealth and caring about issues such as water—unlike the coal and 
gas industries which are seen as temporary activities that damage the land 
permanently (McManus and Connor 2013: 181) (see also Sherval et al. 2018). 29 
 
29 Representatives of the wine industry did appear at the public hearing, but the 
major vineyards are a bit further away from the Drayton South mine proposal. Away 
from the PAC hearing, I followed up with a wine industry representative in an interview 
to ask why the wine industry wasn’t as active in opposing mine developments as the 
horse breeders.  The wine industry lobbyist told me that he actively discouraged the wine 
industry from getting into the political fight over the mining industry’s expansion. He 
didn’t want anyone making any association between the Hunter Valley’s wines and its 
mines. The task of the wine industry lobby was to keep the cognitive association of the 
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The aesthetic and spatiality of rural livelihoods is linked directly to the temporality of 
sustainability, which agricultural industries claim for themselves. While they may not 
promise the immediate riches of the mining industry, they represent wealth creation over 
multiple generations, without the instability of mining booms and busts and the resultant 
social and environmental damage.  
These scripts of rurality were clearly seen in the appeals of the thoroughbred 
horse breeding industry, as many speakers spoke about the heritage of the Upper Hunter 
as a pristine rural environment that was threatened by the encroaching mines. However, 
the PAC in its determination took these claims of the region as rural in a different 
framework that allowed their incorporation into the regional economy, as in their scale-
setting such social and environmental concerns had to be translated into the economy in 
order to fit the PAC’s conditions for consideration. This came through the economic 
arguments about the importance of the region’s reputation. Through the concept of 
reputation, affective arguments were incorporated into the economic calculus of the PAC.   
In weighing the impacts of the coal mine on the stud farms, the PAC recognized 
that the thoroughbred stud farms, as the backbone of the regional equine industry, relied 
on what they defined as “brandscape,” that is the importance of the landscape for the 
brand of the industry. This included the aesthetic element of the rural farmland 
undisturbed by the proposed large open-cut pits, but also the precautionary approach 
 
Hunter Valley with pristine rurality and beautiful wineries over rolling hills. He argues 
that as soon as the industry started fighting the mines, people in Sydney would read in the 
newspapers that the wineries are being threatened by dirty coal mines and soon the 
wineries would be tainted by this association in the public imagination. The fact that the 
mines were closer to the horse breeders, however meant that the shared concern over 
‘reputation,’ to be discussed shortly, could not override engagement in the struggle over 
Drayton South.  
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horse owners might take, as the industry is fuelled by elite reputation (New South Wales 
Planning Assessment Commission 2017: 32).  
This focus on the reputation brought up an interesting debate within the PAC 
hearing, particularly over the expert report of economist Greg Houston, who argued that 
the studs would not leave the Hunter Valley as they threatened to do if the mine was 
approved. He argued that, as rational economic decision makers, they would stay in the 
area because of the costs of relocating and the already existing presence of support 
services of the industry, including the mare farms. This was constantly countered by 
equine representatives who argued that their industry was not one of rational economic 
calculus, but that they were dealing with high wealth individuals who want the best and 
are not so concerned about the cost. Interestingly, while in many planning contexts, 
emotional appeals to identity and belonging may be readily disregarded (cf. Weszkalnys 
2010: 130), in the PAC hearings, such affective invocations were claimed to be an 
important part of what constitutes the valley’s reputation and thus its unique ‘brand’. 
Despite the business language of the ‘brand’, the more subjective and affective 
elements of decision making were able to find room within the context of an 
economically informed decision-making process such as the PAC. In their determination, 
the PAC concludes, “[t]he Commission finds that in the context of the thoroughbred 
industry business model, a decision by Coolmore and Godolphin to move would be 
rational and based on sound economic principles, which are relevant to their specific 
operations” (New South Wales Planning Assessment Commission 2017: 39). These 
include “the international reputation and image of Coolmore and Godolphin; [and] horse 
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owners’ expectations and perceptions of the services provided and of the environmental 
conditions of their assets” (2017: 38).   
In their determination, the PAC maintained a privileging of rational economic 
decision making but allowed for the embedding of aesthetic and particularly reputational 
issues to be incorporated into the rational. This distinction between the aesthetic or 
reputational and the economic is of course not a clear-cut dichotomy, for as I argue at 
various points in this thesis, the economy is always, at least partially, embedded in and 
inalienable from the affective and emplaced dimensions of life.  
However, this appeal to reputation also references a global, an elite who can make 
the decision to leave. Even a regional economy depends on a fickle elite whose whims 
the planning body must take into consideration. As one anti-mine speaker at the PAC 
hearing explained that the ongoing dispute over Drayton South led the royal family of 
Qatar to decide against investing in the Upper Hunter “because of coal mining concerns”. 
The particular role of Middle Eastern monarchs looming over this dispute was pointed 
out by many mine proponents. A number of speakers in favour of the mine expansion 
pointed out this contradiction: employees of Godolphin who stood up at the hearing and 
extolled how the horse industry belongs to the Hunter Valley’s local heritage were 
wearing the word “Emirates” emblazoned on their backs. The regional rurality was being 
upheld not to protect this rural heritage for its own sake, but rather to please the aesthetic 
desires of a Middle Eastern monarch with an expensive—and world-making—hobby. 
These contradictions are largely inescapable in contemporary Australia. The local and 
global can only be crafted as distinct in moments where lines are drawn in relation to 
specific conceptual configurations. Size, complexity, and geography may be materially 
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real, but the limits and connections which are highlighted or ignored are made and re-
made in constant encounter. 
From NIMBY to Paris: Scales of Environmental Engagement 
The environmental concerns which did not fit into the ‘economic reach’ framing of the 
PAC’s vision of locality were largely left out of its decision-making process. By defining 
locality as the regional economy, they effectively discounted environmentalism rooted in 
social and historic place-making that did not directly have a financial component. 
Arguments that relied on the aesthetic or affective attachments to the environment 
without a link to ‘brand’, while made passionately at the hearing, were not reflected in 
the PAC’s determination.  These concerns also draw on specific scales, and although 
primarily rooted in local experiences of environmental change and particular place-based 
attachments, environmentalists attempted to scale up these concerns in order to make 
stronger arguments to the PAC that highlighted the importance of considering the mine 
expansion’s impact on global climate change and cumulative landscape destruction. 
At the PAC hearing, the clearest calls to environmental protection as a reason to 
oppose the mine drew on affective connections to place similar to the claims of local 
belonging attempted by the mines and horse-breeders. These claims were most 
passionately made by aboriginal members of the community. Uncle Kevin Taggart, an 
aboriginal man belonging to a native title claimant group called the Wonnarua Traditional 
Custodians, lamented the environmental destruction of the landscape and waterscape. He 
emphasised the degradation of the Hunter River, calling mining “environmental 
terrorism” and described his deep attachment to an alive but ill Country: “It’s Mother 
Earth to us, she got her belly cut open and she’s bleeding toxins into our river”. Scott 
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Franks, another Wonnarua man, although a member of a different native title claimant 
group, the Plains Clans of the Wonnarua People, forcefully emphasised his longer 
connection to the land and purposely countered the claims of the horse breeders and the 
mine opponents to their regional belonging, proclaiming “You are here on my land.” He 
recounted the spiritual and historical connection that he and his fellow Wonnarua 
maintain to the land.  He intentionally emphasized that the two opponent positions’ 
claims to belonging were entirely farcical in the context of his people’s belonging, and 
perhaps he was also mocking the appropriation of this sense of belonging by the white 
settlers Australian environmentalists who were also speaking at the hearing. Interestingly, 
these two speakers were the only two that I noticed had clearly exceeded their time limit. 
The secretary of the PAC attempted to stop their comments, but when they ignored him 
and continued, he allowed them to keep going until they finished. None of the other 
speakers received this leniency.  
The leniency these speakers received, as well as Scott Frank’s claim to his unique 
relation to country speak to an interesting dynamic in aboriginal claims to place-based 
belonging, particularly as they are utilized in land-use conflicts in Australia.  Although 
indigenous land claims and their use in political contests has been the subject of key 
anthropological work on opposition to extractive industry (Ballard and Banks 2003, de la 
Cadena 2010, Kirsch 2006; Sawyer 2004), this has been a particularly strong focus in 
Australian anthropological literature which has studied the relation between aboriginal 
and settler-Australian relationships to land (De Rijke 2012; Povinelli 2002; Strang 1997; 
Trigger 1999; 2008; Trigger et.al. 2014). Foundational to these studies are contested 
representations over the maintenance of deep attachment. This is particularly problematic 
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through the requirements of native title law in which the preservation of attachments 
becomes a legal matter. The native title system as well as settler-Australians’ discourses 
of belonging rely on, as Trigger and Mulcock argue, “deeply embedded assumptions 
about hierarchies of 'spiritual belonging' to land [which] give priority to those individuals 
who can make the strongest claims to autochthonous status” (2005: 307). Thus aboriginal 
Australians come to represent the ultimate form of connection, against which settler-
Australian claims to belonging are measured (see also Strang 1997).  This is utilized by 
environmentalists as they draw on these discourses, and frame their own connections to 
landscapes in similar terms (de Rijke 2012).   
For example, speaking after Uncle Kevin Taggart, a white settler Australian and 
regional resident turned environmental activist, Robert McLaughlin, stated at the PAC 
hearing: “It’s not until your land is directly threatened that you truly realise how strong 
the feeling of place is—and how irreplaceable the land is.” Further, he argued in rather 
academic language, “It’s well recognized that the construction of place identity is a 
fundamental human activity, and the need to belong within a shared geography, is the 
equivalent to such basic human needs as liberty, sustenance, and security from violence.”  
These discourses, however, also enable political alliances between aboriginal 
people and settler-environmentalists. In fact, Robert McLaughlin and Uncle Kevin 
Taggart often protest together. Sometimes, settler-Australians appropriate a romanticised 
ideal of aboriginal relations to land, and other times they form a pragmatic alliance with 
aboriginal groups (de Rijke 2012; 2013). I will come back to these issues when 
discussing solastalgia in the next chapter, but my particular interest here is in the scaling 
of these claims of place-based belonging to regional and global concerns.  
 287 
It is crucial to understand that, in the specific case of Drayton South, the 
community members whose comments at the PAC hearing are cited above, such as 
Robert McLaughlin and Uncle Kevin Taggart, do not live in the direct vicinity of this 
mine. Although they were active in the fight against the expansion of Drayton South, 
their activism is rooted in another mining land dispute in the nearby town of Bulga. Bulga 
is surrounded by two large open-cut mines, and the town has shrunk considerably as a 
result of the deterioration of the rural life-world in the shadow of these mines. They have 
been particularly politically active over Rio Tinto’s (formerly Coal and Allied) Mount 
Thorley Warkworth mine, which after numerous struggles has received permission to 
mine through a buffer separating the town from the mine. These people’s presence at this 
PAC hearing over Drayton South represents a broadening of the scale of their 
environmental engagement from a directly experienced threat to their local town, to a 
broader regional concern, and as I will show shortly, global concerns over climate 
change.  
Eriksen’s study in Gladstone, which emphasises the unidirectionality of large-
scale interests, seems less applicable to this particular conflict (Eriksen 2016). But his 
emphasis on how environmentalist engagement can scale up aligns with my own 
observations (Eriksen 2018a, 2018b). Of particular interest is a form of environmentalism 
he discovered in Gladstone, which he terms “expanding”, which “moves from its initial 
local scale to a larger, even planetary scale, but remains anchored in local life-worlds” 
(Eriksen 2018a, 134).  He argues that the common critique of people who only oppose 
mine developments when they directly affect them as NIMBY (not in my backyard) 
environmentalists, is thus seen in a new light in this expanding form of engagement.  This 
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analysis applies well to the environmentalists speaking at the PAC hearing. Their concern 
largely started with experienced environmental changes around their home, but they have 
since become engaged in a broader environmental politics, both in standing up to the 
growth of mining in the region of the Upper Hunter Valley, and even increasing into the 
scale of the global through appeals to the cumulative impacts of mines to global climate 
change. 
However, climate change does not fit neatly into the scale of the planning regime 
particularly when the PAC defined the locality as a regional economy.  For as this chapter 
has argued, the way in which the plan is conceptualized, and the scales with which it 
engages, crafts the possibility for particular forms of engagement. Or, as Abram and 
Weszkalnys succinctly state, plans “both encapsulate and exclude worlds of imagination” 
(2011: 15). Thus although the scale-setting of the region enabled some affective 
dimensions to be incorporated into a concern with the economic through reputation and 
branding, this privileging of the region also inhibited the ability of environmentalists to 
scale-up. This disempowered environmentalist claims to incorporate cumulative impacts 
and climate change in the decision making process over the mine expansion.  
This point was made clear in an interaction between Bev Smiles, a regional 
environmental activist from Wollar, and a PAC commissioner during the public hearing 
(for more on this area see Askland 2018). During her presentation Bev argued:  
There is a need for a transition in the Hunter. We are vulnerable to international 
decisions on carbon, regardless of New South Wales continuing to prop up the coal 
industry. …The Hunter could be at the forefront of this structural change, instead of 
the most vulnerable…we should be looking at the cumulative impacts. 
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As she got to this point, she was interrupted by a member of the PAC sitting at the front 
of the room. He sternly, and in a tone which sounded rude to my ears, directed her to 
“stick to this mine”.  As he attempted to cut her off, he inadvertently pointed out the 
problem she was attempting to highlight, that is, the need to see this mine as part of a 
larger phenomenon of coal mining and its global environmental impacts, particularly 
climate change. However, this was incompatible with the scale of the regional economy 
to which the PAC’s considerations of public interest was limited.  
Further, Bev’s appeal to the Hunter’s vulnerability to “international decisions on 
carbon” also contrasts with the sense of control that is privileged in the notion of 
planning. The modernist logics of control crumble in the face of decisions that derive 
from outside the region. The precariousness of localities to international forces, whether 
in the form of Anglo American’s boardroom meetings, Sheikh Mohammad’s aesthetic 
tastes, or climate negotiators meeting in Paris, all shape the conditions of precariousness 
in the Hunter Valley, despite attempts to translate them into regional concerns.  
While some of the alliance formation in Australian environmental politics, 
particularly the Lock the Gate alliance, have purposefully avoided discussing climate 
change due to its politically polarizing effects (Mercer et al. 2014), in the case of the PAC 
hearing, climate change took a prominent role in the oppositional language of 
environmentalists speaking at the hearing. Robert McLaughlin argued, alongside his 
appeals to the importance of place-based identity, that “the signing of the Paris Accord 
demonstrates that the Government knows we need to keep fossil fuels in the ground. If 
we are to keep global temperature rises under 2 degrees, there is no valid reason to keep 
mining our coal deposits.” Or Bev Smiles, further argued in her comments to the PAC:  
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Australia has become signatory to the Paris Agreement and the NSW Government has 
announced a policy of 100% renewable energy by 2050... Intergenerational equity is a 
key consideration in weighing up the social benefits of extracting a further 73Mt of 
coal against substantial economic, social and environmental costs already being felt 
around the world and here in the Hunter from extreme weather events. 
The prevalence of this appeal to the Paris Agreement is a likely consequence of the 
timing of the PAC hearing. Australia announced its ratification of the Paris Agreement on 
November 10, 2016; these meetings were held a week later on November 16th and 17th. 
Thus, this was used as evidence that the Australian federal government had made 
commitments that the environmentalists hoped would trickle down to the state planning 
bodies. The underlying assumption was that large-scale political decisions affect local-
scale ones. Here the assumption of the unidirectionality of global to local is revealed as 
inefficient, for climate change and carbon emissions appear nowhere in the PAC’s final 
determination document.  
Conclusion 
A final quote from the PAC hearing explains the importance of alternative imaginations 
for the region. A mine opponent stated,  
We all use coal powered energy in some way and there will be many of you who 
would be critical of those that oppose this mine because of that, however this is not 
about picking apart different issues within each industry, it is about the best outcome 
for all of our futures…Our current government may only be in power for the 
foreseeable future but that isn’t what they are here for—they are meant to be looking 
after our country for the long term. It is time for the government to stop looking for 
the quick dollar and invest in long term, sustainable industries. A lot of these 
industries already exist in the Hunter, such as tourism, horse breeding, viticulture, 
dairy farming, and many other agricultural industries. With some forethought and 
more diversification the Hunter Valley will survive a decrease in coal mining…Coal 
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prices may fluctuate up and down but there is no disputing that coal mining is in 
global decline whether we like it or not. 
The above quote describes a call to shift the attention of planning towards the coming 
transition facing the region. The unsustainability of the coal industry is the main starting 
point of the argument, not only in cyclical market terms but also through an inevitable 
‘end of coal.’ This ‘end of coal’ argument draws primarily on economic arguments that 
global seaborne coal is in structural decline and that building any new thermal coal export 
capability is a sunk asset risk, as is evidenced by Anglo American’s own corporate 
decision to exit the Australian coal market. However, the inevitability of the coming 
transition is also spurred by the shifting social expectations and affects, which, as I have 
shown in this chapter, involve temporal, spatial, and conceptual scales that contest the 
PAC’s definition of the locality and draw on the affective and symbolic attachment to 
historical place-based subjectification.  
This chapter has argued that the scale-setting of the planning body, the PAC, in 
the context of the Drayton South mine land-use conflict, performed a type of work which 
enabled and excluded particular imaginations of the Hunter Valley’s past and future. The 
PAC’s decision to define the locality in favour of whose best interest it was meant to 
decide, at the level of the regional economy, reflected a privileging of the economy 
consistent with neoliberal planning regimes. However, the regional limitation also 
enabled affective and historic conceptions of place-based imaginations to be incorporated 
into the language of the plan. Yet, this regionalism also disabled the attempts of local 
environmentalists to scale up their concerns from an individual mine to a global concern 
with climate change.  
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This contradiction between the regional as a way of incorporating the affective 
and as a way of re-embedding economic considerations into planning logics, and the 
inability to scale up place-based environmental concerns, represents an ambiguity at the 
heart of Anthropocene awareness and alternatives. Scalability, Tsing has argued, has been 
fundamental to the spreading of environmental destruction and the destruction of 
diversity through the logics of capitalist expansion, best exemplified in the form of the 
modular plantation (Tsing 2012). She argues that “[w]e need a nonscalability theory that 
pays attention to the mounting pile of ruins that scalability leaves behind” (2012: 506). 
This presents a complication at the heart of how anthropologists have attempted to deal 
with the acknowledgement of the Anthropocene.  Can we avoid the Anthropocenic 
“global designs” (Mignolo 2012) of modernity and capitalism that ignore the local 
histories in which they are embedded, without political engagement being limited by the 
non-scalable? Can we avoid new “global designs” without simultaneously ignoring the 
interconnections between local lives and their global consequences? This is an inherent 
contradiction with imaginings of how to think with possibilities in the Anthropocene, 
especially when it comes to Anthropocenic ruins, the topic of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX: The Final Voids: Solastalgia and Speculative Knowledge 
 
Alongside my participation in the CCC, I attempted to reach out on my own to the 
aboriginal community in the Upper Hunter Valley. They were largely not represented 
within the CCC. My focus was to try and understand the complex native title process and 
the various divisions amongst the competing clans of Wonnarua for native title 
determination. One person I eventually contacted was an elder named Uncle Neil. He 
agreed to meet with me for a coffee. We sat down one morning but our interview was cut 
short as he said that he didn’t know much about mining and wasn’t interested. He didn’t 
care so much about the native title claims. He just wanted to share his culture. I changed 
my questions and began asking him about this. However, after about ten minutes he 
stopped me again. He said: “Why don’t I just show you?” A few minutes later I was 
riding in the passenger seat of his truck. He drove me around the region, pointing out 
landmarks and telling me the dreamtime stories associated with them. It was a beautiful 
sunny day, and the landscape took on a new liveliness through his stories. He had an 
intimate knowledge with so many of the landmarks we passed, but our main destination 
was the sacred Baiame cave.  
The Baiame cave is a large open cave that holds an aboriginal cave painting 
depicting Baiame, the creator spirit who crafted the Hunter Valley according to the 
Wonnarua people (see figure 6.1 overleaf). The cave painting is located on private 
property, although the owner keeps the gate open to allow visitors to this sacred site. We 
drove through the open gate, and the cave appeared on a large hill, overlooking the 
Milbrodale Valley. Stairs have been built to allow easy access.  We ascended the stairs to  
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Figure 6.1 Baiame Cave (photographs by author, with permission of Uncle Warren, 
Wonnarua elder).  
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the cave’s large opening, and the figure of the ochre Baiame with his outstretched arms 
and bulging eyes grew larger and more imposing.  
Uncle Neil said the painting itself was around 2,000 years old. He explained that 
the depiction is meant to emphasize Baiame’s role as protector of the valley. His 
outstretched arms and his large exaggerated eyes emphasize that he is all-seeing, 
watching over and protecting the valley and its people. Uncle Neil posed for a picture and 
took one of me in front of the large painting. After appreciating the painting for a few 
minutes, we turned around to descend back down. We then looked over the valley, taking 
in Baiame’s view as overseer. The rolling green hills stopped abruptly in the horizon, 
turning into a grey expanse. In the distance, we could see the Mount Thorley Warkworth 
open-cut mine. I pointed it out to Uncle Neil. In this context he was willing to talk about 
the mines. He told me that this is all sacred land to him and that seeing the mines there 
upsets him. He said “they want to turn all of this” as he outstretched his arms to mimic 
Baiame’s, “into a mine”. He looked despondent. In this sacred space, the mines could be 
felt encroaching closer and closer.  
There are fewer and fewer vantage points in the Upper Hunter Valley that don’t 
have a mine somewhere in the background. Even if carefully obscured behind ridges, a 
keen observer can still notice their presence from the puffs of smoke rising up from the 
mine blasts. This landscape transformation has led to affects of loss and melancholy, 
similar to those Uncle Neil seemed to be experiencing as we took in Baiame’s view of the 
valley. The aboriginal relationship to land is often used as an ideal against which white 
settler Australians conceptualize and measure their own affective attachments to 
landscape (Trigger and Mulcock 2005) and I present it here to highlight how such affects 
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serve as complex and perhaps contradictory inspiration for place-based belonging. It is of 
course difficult to study affect ethnographically without access to people’s interior 
emotive life. However, in the case of the Upper Hunter Valley, a term was developed—
which inspired by aboriginal dispossession—is intended to capture the shared sentiments 
of melancholy evoked by the landscape transformation for settler Australians: solastalgia 
(Albrecht 2005).  
 This chapter will first describe this concept of solastalgia, and the way in which it 
has been taken up to describe affects deriving from environmental destruction. 
Solastalgia, according to its originator Albrecht (2005) is an affect that is evoked from 
the experience of the mined landscape’s transformation. It is also discursively taken up 
and crafted by environmentalist community members into an oppositional politics and 
reclamation of a pre-mining heritage through calls for a specific form of land 
rehabilitation. They call for the mining companies to fill in the mine final voids, the large 
holes left in the ground after mining has finished. However, the coal industry lobbyists 
are attempting to shift the final voids from being understood through these affects of loss, 
or in industry terminology, a “legacy issue”. Instead they emphasize the potentiality of 
the final voids, emphasizing them as a source of alternative regional futures. This chapter 
engages in this contested understanding of the mine final voids, showing that what gets to 
be counted as a ruin is political. It thus speaks to recent anthropological interest in 
Anthropocenic ruins and blasted landscapes (Tsing 2015) in which ruins appear as 
potential sources of hope, leading to the question: should we celebrate the potential of 
these ruins or should we mourn them and insist on their repair?  
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Solastalgia 
Early in my fieldwork with the CCC, I set up an interview with Drew and Sally, the two 
environmentalists who actively participated in the CCC’s meetings. We sat down to a 
coffee on Singleton’s main street. I began by asking them how they felt about the changes 
that had happened in the Hunter Valley from mining. In response, Drew asked me if I had 
heard of the word ‘solastalgia’. I would soon find out that he was a retired professor, 
hence his familiarity with the scholarly concept. He was in fact an environmental scientist 
and while he could easily have explained the specifics of the ecological damage, he 
instead focused on this concept.  
Solastalgia was developed by a local philosopher Glen Albrecht in 2003. The 
term was largely inspired by the emotional distress he recognized amongst friends and 
acquaintances living in the Upper Hunter Valley, in the vicinity of the massive landscape 
changes from the growing number and size of the open-cut coal mines. He found the 
emotional distress they experienced to be very similar to the concept of nostalgia, 
primarily in its original usage as an illness caused by the inability to return home 
(Albrecht 2005). However, in the Hunter Valley, people were still in the same 
geographical location, only the landscape was changing drastically around them. Hence 
Albrecht coined the new term solastalgia to represent the melancholy felt by those whose 
home place was being destroyed. As Albrecht argues, solastalgia “is manifest in an attack 
on one’s sense of place, in the erosion of the sense of belonging (identity) to a particular 
place and a feeling of distress (psychological desolation) about its transformation” 
(Albrecht 2005; see also Albrecht et al. 2007).  
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It is noteworthy that this term was developed in the Upper Hunter Valley to 
describe these specific affective responses to the open-cut mines. It has thus been further 
applied as an analytic by anthropologists working with other Australian communities 
who oppose open-cut mines or other fossil fuel projects (Askland and Bunn 2018; 
Connor 2016a; Eriksen 2016; Eriksen 2018a). 30 It has also been linked with the 
experience of aboriginal dispossession and draws on the representations of aboriginal 
people as ideal environmental stewards through their autochthonous belonging (Trigger 
and Mulcock 2005). This reflects the appropriation of indigenous discourse by settler 
Australian environmentalists at the PAC discussed in the previous chapter. Albrecht 
himself, drew inspiration from indigenous dispossession and the supposed pathologizing 
effects of their nostalgia for their home to explicitly link lost places to experiences of 
pain (2006: 34). This is problematic as he goes as far as to link this pain to increased 
alcoholism in indigenous populations, without properly taking into account the 
continuing violences and discrimination they face. However, it is intended as reflective of 
this idealized conceptualization of indigenous belonging to nature and the experience of 
dispossession (Trigger and Mulcock 2005). 
 However, the new concept of solastalgia does not require dispossession, for the 
landscape is changing around someone who is emotionally attached to its previous form. 
For this reason, it appeals for the way in which it appropriates this indigenous sense of 
belonging but without requiring the full dispossession they experienced. 
 
30 The concept of solastalgia has also been taken up more globally (Klein 2014: 165), and  
in a variety of contexts: everything from psychiatric hospital design (Wood et al. 2015), a 
study about facebook (Heath 2012), natural disaster recovery (Silver and Grek-Martin 
2015), to African climate related migration (Tschakert and Tutu 2010). 
 299 
To show how this concept enables the affective sense of historical belonging but in a way 
that is compatible with settler-colonial history, it is helpful to hear more of my interview 
with Drew and Sally. In this interview, immediately after describing solastalgia, Drew 
explained further, “The sense of place and the importance of it tends to get devalued here 
in the Hunter.” Sally interrupted: “Australia is not older than 200 years, so we need to 
hold on to our history. And these companies come, mainly from overseas and they just 
destroy, and it happened so quickly.” Sally added, “The first river they [white settlers] 
took was the Hawkesbury. Then they discovered the Hunter when they crossed over the 
ridge. It is an early settled area. My family has been in the valley for 150 plus years. It’s a 
sense of place thing.” Sally’s settler colonial view of Australian history—and her own 
family’s direct relation to it—allows her to feel this “sense of place thing,” but obviously 
her historical depth contrasts significantly to Uncle Neil’s and Baiame’s much longer 
timeline, with which I start this chapter.  
 Drew brought this scholarly concept, solastalgia, to my attention in this first 
interview, but he and Sally were certainly not the only informants with an activist bent 
who deployed it. Its reception within this same population suggests that it accurately 
represents this feeling of loss they experience, even as it problematically draws on 
indigenous dispossession. The comments of local environmentalists during the PAC 
hearing, particularly Robert McLaughlin, in the previous chapter—“It’s not until your 
land is directly threatened that you truly realise how strong the feeling of place is—and 
how irreplaceable the land is,”—reflect such solastalgia. For even when not directly used, 
such a sense of melancholy over lost places was palpable when people reflected on the 
aesthetics of the landscape.  
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By way of illustration, I spent a summer afternoon at a small winery whose owner 
I had befriended as a helping hand during the harvest celebration. A number of local 
friends of the winery gathered for a lunch. It was a beautiful day and I was struck by the 
beauty of the landscape, ripe with thick grape vines on the green rolling hills. As I was 
pouring organic rosé for the attendees, I commented on this beauty. A couple of women 
quickly corrected my romanticism, as I seemed to have interrupted a discussion on the 
mines.  One of them, actually the land-owner on whose land the Baiame cave is 
located—her family equally implicated in this history of dispossession—told me that 
although it might be beautiful right here, that driving to the winery today had made her 
sad. She had been living here her whole life, but as she passed the huge mines that were 
just over the hill,31 she felt them encroaching closer and closer, threatening the remaining 
beauty of her home. She told me it looked like a “World War landscape” and she hardly 
recognized it anymore, the once familiar landmarks were so different that she first missed 
the turnoff. She continued, “so much for all this rehab they’re supposedly doing. I don’t 
even know where I am anymore, and I’ve lived here my whole life.” 
Even on a day that was meant to celebrate the harvest, my attempted small talk 
about the surrounding landscape was not taken up. Instead, I was shown a nuanced 
lamentation. A sense of loss hung over the celebration of nature’s harvest, not unlike the 
clouds of grey smoke sometimes seen rising over the hills and signalling the presence of 
an open-cut mine’s blasting operations just over the sightline. The aesthetic of the mined 
landscape is very evocative, very powerful, as it induces such affects of loss (Navaro-
Yashin 2009) for many. Even the mining industry is quite aware of this, as is shown by  
 
31 From this location it was the Mount Thorley Warkworth Mine she was most likely referring to.  
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Figure 6.2 Aerial photo taken from an airplane flying above an open-cut mine 
(photograph by author). 
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the fact that views into the mine pits are often very carefully obscured from the roads 
which pass by them. Mark once whispered to me while we were in a Coal Lobby 
Organization meeting at which a video was played which showed sweeping aerial images 
of the mines on the landscape (see figure 6.2 overleaf), “Why would they worry about the 
mine voids? They’re so beautiful” as he raised his eyebrows in obvious sarcasm.  
The terminology itself, ‘final void’ was something Mark similarly discussed with 
me. “It’s just such an evocative phrase, they really ought to call it something else. They 
call them something else in Canada. It’s just such an obvious PR mistake.” His 
recognition of the terminology’s problematics reveals that the material characteristics of 
the final voids make them especially problematic. As a physical hole in the ground, the 
final void is a particular type of ruin, which through its materiality  
evokes emptiness and absence. Ruins are physical reminders of loss or destruction, 
although often associated with historic acts of violence and destruction, such as war, 
ruins are also the partially devastated environments of the sacrifice zones of 
anthropocenic extraction, such as the plantation or the blasted landscape (Kirksey et al. 
2013; Tsing 2015). The mine final void thus represents a particular form of ruin of 
extractive industry, one that—through its material emptiness as a physical hole in the 
ground—is amenable to producing affects of melancholy and loss. However, it is human 
subjects interacting with their experiences of landscape alteration, as well as the political 
constructions and rhetoric around them, that produces such affects in relations with the 
material void. This view of the void as ruin thus represents the critical role of materials 
within resource assemblages, without assuming over-determination or an inability to 
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differentiate forms of agency within these assemblages (Richardson and Weszkalnys 
2014).  
Solastalgia resonates with Navaro-Yashin’s “anthropology of melancholia” in 
which she describes the affective impact of ruins as both subjective and object-oriented 
(2009). Recognizing the object-oriented stand of Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2005) 
she argues that ruins exude their own affect as actants, but that “[a]t the same time, those 
who inhabit this space of ruins feel melancholic: they put the ruins into discourse, 
symbolize them, interpret them, politicize them, understand them, project their subjective 
conflicts onto them, remember them, try to forget them, historicize them, and so on” 
(Navaro-Yashin 2009: 14-15). This represents a middle-ground between object-oriented 
approaches which emphasize symmetrical agencies and subject-oriented approaches 
which discount materiality (see also Empson 2011: 22-3). The evocative mined landscape 
induces affects through its networked materiality.  However, these have also been put 
into discourse through the concept of solastalgia, and further politicised through a 
discourse that has attempted to reclaim lost landscape through a particular form of mine 
rehabilitation. Of critical importance has been a strong call to fill in the mine final voids.  
Mine Final Voids: Geology, Hydrology and Political Demands 
In order to understand the presence of final voids, both materially and politically, it is 
necessary to grasp the basics of the open-cut mining process. In the region, the coal seam 
is a layer of coal that runs largely parallel to the surface though at a slight incline. Thus in 
order to get to this geological layer of coal (the coal seam), the mining process is to blast 
holes in the layer of rock above the coal seam, and to remove it. This mix of soil and rock 
above the coal seam that is blasted and removed in order to reach the coal seam is called 
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overburden. The overburden is piled up behind the exposed coal seam which is then 
mined. The mine generally starts where the coal seam is closest to the surface and the 
mining process moves forward as the seam angles down deeper. The mining moves 
forward with the overburden being pushed behind the advancing mine front, filling in the 
previous void created. However, at the point where the mine is no longer economically 
viable, where the coal seam is so deep that the cost of removing the overburden is higher 
than the value of the coal underneath, the mining process ends. Thus at the deepest point, 
mining stops. This leaves a gap where there is no further overburden to backfill the 
previously advancing void, leaving a final void.  
One might assume that the final void would represent the volume of coal that is 
extracted from the ground throughout the mine’s life, but in actuality this depends on the 
strip ratio: the ratio of overburden to extracted coal due to the expansion effects of the 
overburden.  The actual missing volume is significantly smaller than the volume of 
extracted coal because, in the process of removing overburden, the layers of rock above 
the coal seam are blasted into smaller pieces before being dug up. This breaking up of the 
rock causes it to expand, as there are now air gaps between the rocky mix, rather than 
solid sheets of compacted rock.  
This expansion is called the swell or bulking factor and accounts for a 20-30 per 
cent growth in the volume of the rock overburden. This counters the volume of the 
extracted coal, which is often less than or relatively close to this swell factor. Therefore, 
the final void is actually a product of how the overburden gets moved throughout the 
mining process. Often, instead of moving all the overburden to backfill progressing mine 
voids, overburden heaps are left in various places if—based on the location and depth of 
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the coal seam and mine plan—it is economically prohibitive to move it. In the USA, 
where leaving final land voids is less permissible (although this is not strictly enforced 
and there are special conditions for mountaintop removal operations) mine plans take this 
into account, thus shifting the pattern of mining to ensure that minimal final voids are 
left. However, no such requirement exists in Australia, hence mine plans are crafted on 
optimizing the profitability of the mine rather than taking into account minimizing final 
voids (Walters 2016). This reveals how, as Jessica Smith argues, “[t]he practice of 
engineering a mine is…an ethical and political one, embedded in specific socioeconomic 
universes as well as natural processes” (Smith-Rolston 2013b: 591).  
Final voids are part of the broader rehabilitation plans of mines, which have 
traditionally privileged attempts to return the land to its pre-mine form. Rehabilitation is 
largely focused on attempting to regrow vegetation on the previous mine site and to 
stabilise the landscape. The overburden is not particularly amenable to growing 
vegetation because, as it has been dug up, it is piled into large overburden heaps which 
sterilizes the land. Therefore in order to grow anything on the overburden which has been 
re-spread, it is necessary to put down organic soils. This requires considerable amounts of 
effort, even to grow simple grasses—hence the possibility of grazing cattle on this land 
was one of the projects of the CCC, discussed in chapter four. While the need for 
rehabilitation is a source of community concern in general, the final voids have become a 
particular source of discontent.  
There are currently plans to leave at least 45 voids, with a total of 6,050 ha of 
voids in the state of New South Wales. This is a total area greater than Sydney Harbour. 
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Just within the Hunter Valley coalfield, 3,924 ha of voids will be left (Walters 2016). 32  
Most of these mine voids will eventually become large pit lakes and be terminal 
groundwater sinks.  The life of a terminal sink void is that it will first begin to fill with 
groundwater, because the void is deeper than the groundwater level. Evaporation will be 
relatively slow at first, as the surface area of the forming lake will be smaller. The void 
must be thinnest at the bottom and wider at the top in order to stay stabilised. Eventually 
as the groundwater and precipitation continue to fill the void further, the water level will 
rise and the surface area of the lake will expand, eventually reaching an equilibrium 
where inflows equal evaporative losses.  
In most cases, this occurs below the groundwater level, so the voids will act as 
permanent groundwater sinks. Reaching this equilibrium will take a very long time. For 
the Drayton mine mentioned in a previous chapter, it is estimated that it will take more 
than 200 years. For another mine, Liddell, the estimate is 50 years, whereas for the 
Bengalla mine, it is 1,000 years (Walters 2016: 10). Over time, most of these pit lakes 
will also become more saline, as evaporation continues and inflows from groundwater 
continue to contribute salts and, in some cases, heavy metals. Because the majority of 
mine voids will act as terminal sinks, they will decrease the pressure of groundwater and 
be a permanent draw on aquifers in the world’s driest inhabited continent. However, this 
is still deemed preferable to allowing the water to flow from the void into the 
groundwater, called groundwater seepage. This has the more devastating potential to 
 
32 This comes from 14 approved mine plans and does not count those in the project stage. These 
measurements draw from Energy and Resources Insights report, which measures the area of the 
voids by measuring the planar area at the lowest point of the void’s crest (the spill point if the 
void filled with water) (Walters 2016: 6).  
 
 307 
contaminate the groundwater supply with saline water from the pit lakes. Mapping 
groundwater, potential heavy metals and leachate, and predicting temperatures and 
rainfall predictions at such a vast timescale, are extremely difficult, and no two mine 
voids will be exactly the same. While mine plans make predictions, these are full of 
uncertainty. However, as mine plans have already been approved leaving these final 
voids, changing the plan in retrospect or backfilling the voids would be prohibitively 
expensive, and doing so is not required by regulators.  
This merging of the void and the underground hydrology resonates with 
Empson’s study of the shifting coastline in the village of Pagham, England. She argues 
that the shifting boundaries between water and land provoke ways of thinking beyond 
distinctions like nature-culture. Emphasizing the agency of water, her ethnography 
reveals the way in which these distinctions are consistently made, remade, and contested. 
This “edge-work” is more than the physical processes of maintaining coastlines and 
landscapes, but also inspires a “constellation of the new political subjects that have 
formed out of the experience of their changing environment” (Empson 2017: 256). The 
final voids similarly incite new political subjectivities, and as I will now show, inspire 
contests over a political engagement rooted in solastalgia and industry-led speculative 
knowledge (Weszkalnys 2015).   
The voids have become a reputational problem for the mining industry, which 
coal lobbyists with whom I worked call a “legacy issue”. This was the main sticking 
point between the two local environmentalist community members, Sally and Drew, and 
the coal lobbyists. They often brought this up in CCC meetings but it was generally 
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dismissed. It was also broadly acknowledged that it was a larger problem in the region, 
beyond the specific demands of Sally and Drew.  
My first day working with the Coal Community Conference (CCC) was at the 
Coal Lobby Organization’s (CLO) annual health, environment and society conference. It 
was held in a large hotel and convention centre in the middle of the Upper Hunter’s main 
winery tourism area. As this was early in my fieldwork with the CCC, I felt out of place. 
Despite being open about my being here as a researcher, in such a conference, funded and 
run by the state’s main coal industry lobby group, I watched and listened in a space that is 
often the exclusive realm of the industry, with outsiders kept out through high ticket fees 
or self-excluded through general disinterest.  I explored the conference, visiting booths 
with various gimmicks to draw visitors in. An environmental company had a glass tank 
with a large snake that they had removed from a mine site. A health company had a big 
bowl of candy and stress balls emblazoned with their branding. I spent the most time 
visiting the Youth for Mining booth, run by Hamish, the young mine engineering student 
I described in chapter four. I then moved on to the large presentation rooms.  
The conference began with a speech by the head of the CLO. He chose to start his 
presentation by playing a promotional video that had recently been shot. It celebrated the 
work of the CCC. The main participants, including Sam, and the mine representatives 
spoke about the successes they have seen in terms of weather monitoring aimed at 
controlling dust from blasting operations and the success of a trial allowing cattle to graze 
on rehabilitated mine land. They also celebrated the transparency and openness the 
dialogue format inspired.  However, at the end of the video, Drew mentioned that he was 
still unhappy about the industry’s plan to leave final voids, insisting that they be filled in. 
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This was something of an outlier in the very sunny picture the promotional video 
presented. When the video finished, the CEO of the CLO looked slightly annoyed as he 
said: “As you can see, we still have some work to do”. I was impressed that this bit of 
honesty was not edited out of the promotional video, thinking this went a long way to 
proving the transparency and dialogue the video was meant to be celebrating. As I 
learned later, Drew’s demand to fill in the final voids had originally been edited out of 
the video. When Sam showed the first cut of the video to Drew, he refused to be in the 
video unless they included his comments on the voids. They chose to show the video at 
the conference with his comments included, but neither version was ever released 
publicly.  
Drew’s insistence to fill in the voids was a point of particular frustration for the 
coal lobbyists. However, his opposition was only a small part of a much larger demand 
that the industry was facing. At this same conference, the COO of a major mining 
company identified the voids as the main emerging issue for the industry’s community 
relations. Demands to fill the final voids have thus become a significant problem for the 
mining industry. The industry is therefore attempting to shift the narrative about them. As 
Stoler (2008) reminds us, what gets to be counted as a ruin is political, as power dictates 
what losses are recognized and deserve to be memorialized, thus whether the void is 
deemed a ruin, in the sense that it marks a loss that is to be lamented through solastalgia, 
is a matter of contestation.  
This section will show how, although the mine final voids represent ruins for 
some inspiring affects of solastalgia, the material emptiness of the void also makes them 
conducive to incomplete and speculative knowledge (Weszkalnys 2015) which is 
 310 
generated and encouraged by the coal lobby to shift the focus on the void from a marker 
of what is lost to an absence that is full of potential.  The image of the final void as a site 
of potentiality is crafted through speculative knowledge and active encouraging of 
imagination, within the confines of acceptable levels of deviation from a scientific 
grounding.  
Legacy Issues: Shifting the Void’s Absence into Potentiality 
Rehabilitation is a key topic of scientific research, primarily through geology, hydrology, 
and particularly soil science, as revegetation is a difficult process. One manifestation of 
this research agenda is the Tom Farrell Institute based at the University of Newcastle. I 
attended their 2017 annual conference with Sam and Mark because the CCC was a minor 
sponsor. The conference included several presentations on policy and planning reform, 
soil quality issues, acid mine drainage, and ecological monitoring. This small conference 
was held in the event space of the Muswellbrook pub. A powerpoint and podium at the 
front of the large room, with folding chairs were set around roundtables. I was sitting at a 
table with Sam and Mark at the side of the room.  
The voids were a particular frustration for Sam, as he was generally proud of his 
ability to work with the community and compromise with their demands, finding 
outcomes with which both industry and community could be happy. The community 
demand to fill in the final voids was frustrating to him because it was one that the 
industry could not, in the end, afford to meet. Thus it revealed the contradictions between 
the CCC’s goal of community dialogue and its funder’s, the CLO’s, priorities of 
profitability.  
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We sat next to each other and watched these presentations. Sam and I shared 
glances with an unspoken and shared acknowledgement that much of the detailed 
scientific discussion was going over our heads. However, soon a very different speaker 
stepped up to the podium. Penny Dunstan was doing her PhD in Fine Arts and presented 
an interesting argument that drew my friend and I in, although perhaps for different 
reasons. I was intrigued as she explained the importance of human connection to 
landscapes and the critical importance of aesthetics in decisions about land rehabilitation, 
describing the importance of forging human relationships to the post-mining landscapes. 
Penny described the case of Pointy and Flatty, two ironically titled “Cornish Alps”, 
which, as the heaped leftovers from the mining of China clay or kaolin in St. Dennis, 
Cornwall, UK, are actually overburden mountains. Incidentally, she explained that these 
had become an important part of the landscape, something to which people were deeply 
attached. The image of the two ‘mountains’ was even used as the local primary school 
logo. When there was talk about flattening the two overburden heaps back into the 
originally flat landscape, the community protested and organized to protect and save their 
‘mountains’ (Dunstan 2017). Sam looked at me, his eyes wide and with an excited grin 
on his face, he whispered, “That’s what we need to do with the voids, we need to make 
people want them”.  In this, Sam recognized the negative affects that the voids tend to 
evoke but saw an opportunity to channel a sense of loss into one of attachment and 
meaning. This was a clear articulation of what the mining lobby had been attempting for 
the last few years in response to the dual community concerns: the final voids and 
economic diversification.  
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Attempts to channel the void into an opportunity have become a concerted and 
energetic project in the Hunter Valley.  One such attempt was a community workshop 
held by the CCC, in which, according to the workshop report, community members 
gathered to brainstorm potential uses of the final voids. A hydrologist did a presentation 
on the basics of mine final voids. She outlined the basic hydrology and the difference 
between wet and dry voids. As I mentioned earlier, most will be wet in the Upper Hunter 
Valley because they are deeper than groundwater levels. The scientist explained the 
issues of water balance and water quality concerns, and then moved into a discussion of 
mine voids around the world that have been put to use in unexpected ways. She described 
and showed pictures of how dry voids have been used for film sets, and amphitheatres, or 
large sporting grounds such as in the Czech Republic where a void has become a horse 
racing track, a motor racing track, and an 18-hole golf course.  Pointing to the Lusatian 
Lakes in Germany and the Quarry Lakes in Canmore, Alberta, she then described how 
wet voids have turned mined landscapes into beautiful lake districts, used for recreation. 
The final example she presented was the shining Intercontinental Shimao Wonderland, a 
hotel under construction outside of Shanghai. It is to be a 19-storey hotel built inside a 
partially water filled quarry, with 17 of the 19 floors underground and descending into 
the pit. Two of these floors will be under water. The hotel will host a number of extreme 
sports, like rock climbing and bungee jumping off the quarry and water sports in the pit 
lake. It will even include an aquarium in the underwater floors.  
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Figure 6.3 Rendering of Intercontinental Shimao Wonderland Hotel. (Photo courtesy of 
Atkins Global) 
The feasibility of similar plans for the Upper Hunter Valley was beyond the scope 
of the workshop and, as mentioned earlier, the fact that most voids in the area will be 
larger and deeper than the examples, be wet terminal sinks, and take hundreds of years to 
reach an equilibrium, make the practical realization of such ideas questionable. However, 
the unsettled nature of the hydrology and the long-term outlook make such projections a 
form of ‘speculative knowledge’ which is incomplete and partially obscured, in a similar 
manner to that highlighted by Weszkalnys when the finding of first oil is anticipated 
(2015). In Sao Tome e Principe’s oil prospecting, the oil much anticipated has never 
materialized, but an assemblage of legal, scientific and commercial techniques 
nonetheless actively creates and sustains potentiality (Weszkalnys 2015: 624).   
Returning to the workshop, through presenting world examples alongside 
hydrological predictions which make most of these impossible, a carefully crafted 
balance between physical limits and imaginative potential is achieved by the presenting 
scientist and her coal industry backers.  The use of examples from other parts of the 
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world is meant not only to indirectly prove the feasibility of such projects but also to 
inspire community imaginations and displace anxiety about the voids into excitement 
about potentially vibrant and diverse economic futures. The scientist who ran this 
workshop lent further legitimacy to such ideas through her academic credentials and 
appeals to technical expertise. However, the science itself seemed to disprove the 
feasibility of many of these plans, particularly the plans that require dry-voids. Despite 
the questionable applicability of these examples, community members were asked at this 
workshop to vote on which potential uses of mine voids they most favoured, and they 
were presented with a “preliminary suggested list of potential end uses” and asked to vote 
for their favourite. The options with which they were presented included the more general 
options of recreation, entertainment, hydropower/alternative energy, and tourism.  The 
more specific ideas were theme parks, bike trials, rock climbing/abseiling, golf course, 
film set, floating village, and surf park (cf. Scott 2010:115-136).  The less pleasant 
options included abattoir, wool scour, waste management, and algae farm (Golder and 
Associates 2016).  
This coal industry-led program to shift the final voids from a “legacy issue” into 
an “opportunity” reflects how ruins become sites of political contestation over the 
crafting of narratives of the past and projections into the future. The excitement of my 
lobbyist friend Sam about turning the voids into an opportunity represents a challenge to 
the tendency to see the voids as markers of loss. He wants to emphasize, not their 
connection to a past which is lost, but their potentiality as empty spaces. Sam prefers the 
way in which the emptiness of the void can represent promising future prospects. It 
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erases history through overlooking loss, obscuring drawbacks, and emphasizing 
entrepreneurial opportunity.  
Such projects also draw people’s imagination and hopes into them. Particularly in 
conditions of precarity, the potential for new employment opportunities overtakes many 
legitimate concerns. The coal lobby is aware that this framing of the voids as a potential 
source of entrepreneurial opportunities, solves two problems in one. First, it means that 
they don’t have to fill the voids in and they can avoid the economic costs of doing so. 
Secondly it speaks to demands that the mining industry assist with economic 
diversification and preparing the region for when it eventually exists.  However, the 
industry itself is not actively attempting to turn the voids into business ventures of its 
own, or even potential venture it will then sell-on to others to operate. In the 
entrepreneurial framing that the coal lobby is cultivating, it would seem that the voids 
would be a valuable asset and one they would not pass-up. Once the coal has either run 
out or is no longer worth digging up, these spaces would become available again for 
capitalism’s newest spatial fix (Harvey 2001, 2003). However, the fact that the mining 
companies are not actively pursuing these capitalist projects themselves, seems to 
disprove their feasibility. They are only rhetorically enabling these speculative hopes.  
This downplaying of the material limits in favour of imaginative projects is still 
confined within a loose recognition of geology and hydrology, something that the 
industry carefully balances so as not to seem overly unrealistic. For example, there were 
other reports on potential final void uses that have been commissioned by CLO, but they 
have not been publicly released because the carefully-crafted message must not veer too 
far off into impracticability. Releasing the community workshop report, however, was 
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deemed appropriate because it merely reflected community desires, rather than being an 
account of coal industry policy. Such imaginative projects, although refusing to be 
entirely limited by them, still acknowledge the presence of groundwater, rock chemistry, 
and the water cycle, as fundamental limits to what is achievable. Yet despite these limits, 
their potentiality as alternatives is achieved through forms of speculative knowledge 
which maintain hope and aspirations despite the displacement of these projects into a 
temporally far-off future (cf. Weszkalnys 2015). Some of the mine voids will take 
hundreds of years to stabilize.   
 
The Ambiguity of Emptiness 
The same hydrologist who ran the community workshop described above spoke at the 
CLO’s annual health, safety, and society conference. Nearing the end of her presentation 
on the potential uses of the final voids to create a massive lake district, she switched her 
PowerPoint slide to reveal the front cover of a recently released ethnography I had just 
finished reading, Linda Connor’s Climate Change and Anthropos, and which I reference 
repeatedly in this thesis. Connor is an anthropologist and the current head of the 
University of Sydney’s anthropology department. She had helped me from the early 
stages of developing my research project.  The PowerPoint slide included a quote from 
her ethnography of the Hunter Valley where she, in turn, had referred to the work of this 
very hydrologist giving the presentation. The hydrologist put up the slide quoting 
Connor’s ethnography as follows:  
A fantasy elaboration of the myth of coexistence is found in one industry expert’s 
vision of transforming the Hunter’s huge mining voids into recreational lakes, as 
reported in the Newcastle Herald: 
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‘Disused Hunter mines could be transformed into picturesque lakes and used for 
aquatic activities such as boating, fishing, and swimming. This is a practice 
carried out successfully in Europe and North America and is under investigation 
in Western Australia.’ (Thompson 2013) (Connor 2016a). 
The hydrologist referred to Professor Connor’s perspective of the ‘fantasy’ of coexistence 
as being a ‘glass (half) empty’ perspective for only seeing the negative liability of the 
mine voids, rather than the opportunities they might present. The empty glass is a perfect 
metaphor, for it is exactly this ‘emptiness’ that is at the heart of the debate under 
consideration here.  
To many in the local community, the void is a permanent scar on the landscape. It 
evokes solastalgia. It is a reminder of destruction and loss—that which has been taken 
from the land and will not be replaced—which the evocative terminology ‘final void’ 
makes all too clear. It is also a concern about the environmental impact of leaving these 
large holes, most of which will become large lakes and hence permanent draws on 
groundwater supplies or sources of saline or heavy metal seepage that will potentially 
contaminate the area. The debate is as much about hydrology and geology as it is about 
absence, loss, and ruin. But surprisingly, it is also about imagination and perhaps—as 
Linda Connor’s quote above accuses—about fantasy and myth.  
At the heart of the disagreement between this hydrologist and the anthropologist is 
how to read the ambiguity of emptiness (McDonogh 1993; see also Bille et al. 2010; 
Meskell 2010). This emptiness of the final voids can produce affects of loss and 
melancholy but also produce memorialization and space for organizing a political 
reclamation of imagined pasts through calls to fill in the voids. However, the absence can 
also serve as a base for potentiality through the production of speculative knowledge 
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discursively and technically produced around it which generates hope and maintains 
potentiality. This draws from Weszkalnys’ (2010) work on the potentiality of emptiness. 
In reference to Berlin’s empty spaces, she says that:  
Emptiness is a city with potential for investment and economic prosperity in a 
globalized world; it is the European city destroyed and rewritten; a socialist capital 
now reinterpreted as ‘history’ or lack thereof; it is also a city of publics contesting 
and deliberating about the future (2010; 67).  
 The absence represented by the final void is a marker either of what is lost, or of 
opportunity, the potentiality of alternatives and different futures. This resonates strongly 
with Anna Tsing’s recent ethnography on the “possibility of life in capitalist ruins” 
(2015). She attempts to read the ruin as hopeful, productive and filled with possibility. 
Through tracing the assemblages of the matsutake mushroom, Tsing finds opportunities 
for freedom and flourishing within the ruins of capitalism, and she calls on us to look in 
these spaces for life outside the failed progress narratives of capitalist modernity. Tsing’s 
book evokes the disagreement mentioned above regarding the ambiguity of capitalist 
ruins: are they monuments of destruction or sites of hope? This chapter, however, differs 
from Tsing’s project, for in the Upper Hunter Valley the voids are not yet released from 
control by the mining companies, and thus they cannot – or cannot yet—serve to 
reinforce human and environmental mutuality. What is at stake here is a contest over how 
these sites are to be understood, and as a result, what is to be done with them.  
This is more than a landscape issue. The void is evocative because it represents an 
open and unknown future. In its emptiness, it is full of potentialities—good and bad—
benefiting some and not others. In its emptiness it is full of hope and fear. It is 
precariousness metaphorically represented and materially real.   
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One night in the Upper Hunter Valley, I received a coveted invitation to a dinner 
with the head of the larger Coal Lobby Organization.  I previously only had minimal 
interaction with him, so I attempted to manoeuvre my way into sitting next to him. 
However, I was not the only one seeking proximity to power, and my status as the most 
junior and only woman, saw me relegated to the far end of the table. Instead I was sat at 
the end of the table next to Sam.  
Already feeling frustrated at missing my opportunity to talk with the boss, Sam 
then asked me that irritating question, “So, anthropology huh, what are you going to do 
with that? What job are you going to get with that?” I took a deep calming breath and 
gave him my usual well-rehearsed response used to pacify my in-laws. He picked up on 
the frustration underlying my monotone response and replied sincerely, “I only ask 
because I have three sons and I just do not know what to tell them to do with their lives. I 
don’t know what to tell them to study, I mean, what jobs are there going to be in the 
future?”  
 I felt bad about my earlier annoyance as I recognized the sincerity in his voice, 
and I realized that he was trying to genuinely engage with me. We soon began talking 
about automation and the loss of traditional male employment. He didn’t necessarily 
insist that many coal jobs would be around much longer, as we discussed the broader 
trends towards automation in mining. I brought up Universal Basic Income, and to my 
surprise, he was well versed in the policy proposal but voiced his uncertainty regarding 
its success:33  “You see, I used to be a cop in Adelaide. And in Adelaide, they put all the 
public housing together, so you end up with these ghettos. And when I was a cop, we 
 
33 Universal Basic income refers to a variety of policy proposals in which a basic payment would be 
provided to all citizens of a country, regardless of their employment.  
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would get called out to these ghettos all the time.” He paused again, and his face froze in 
thought as if images were flashing before his eyes before continuing in an increasingly 
solemn tone, “and I can’t even tell you, how many suicides we saw. People without work, 
they just didn’t have a sense of fulfilment. Their lives didn’t have meaning. Universal 
Basic Income can’t provide that. People need to work. There just has to be something, 
some work for people in the future. There just has to be!” 
This conversation was one that helped me recognize the values that underlaid his 
lobbying for the coal industry, as I discussed in chapter four, but it also helped bring 
greater nuance to Sam’s desire to turn the voids into hopeful opportunities. Coal jobs and 
industrial forms of social organization around structured male employment were things 
that he actively thought about, and the loss of which, he legitimately feared. A future 
without them was also a void, similarly full of ambiguous potential. He knows about the 
underground hydrology and the threats of casualization and automation, but he hopes 
there will be new jobs to fill this future: “there just has to be!” 
Conclusion 
Exactly how to read these landscapes as sites of hope or destruction is at the centre of not 
only anthropological debates on the arts of living in the Anthropocene (Haraway 2016; 
Hornborg 2017b; Tsing 2015a; Tsing et al. 2017) but also divides the experience of those 
living and imagining futures in the Upper Hunter Valley. For many, solastalgia is evoked 
and the ruins are lamented, and the call to fill the voids in is a desperate attempt to return 
to some familiar landscape, a home currently lost. For others, the final voids are a new 
landscape that is full of potentiality and amenable to the entrepreneurial desires of a 
diversified Upper Hunter Valley economy. 
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It is not my purpose to discount any of the imaginative futures I discuss above. 
Rather I aim to highlight that the ‘legacy issues’ that concern the coal mining industry 
rely more on the maintenance of potentiality than the realization of such futures. 
Solastalgia can only be displaced through hope on an ever-expanding horizon. The 
realization of these projects is limited by the underground hydrology, the geological 
possibilities, despite the carefully managed speculative knowledge of the mining industry 
(Weszkalnys 2015).  
This emphasis on future-oriented speculation reflects what Braun et al. show is a 
fundamental problem in much of scholarly writing on the Anthropocene. That is, through 
the Anthropocene’s future-orientation, much writing emphasizes either “catastrophe or 
redemption”. Braun et al. write: 
On the one hand we find dominant apocalyptic vision of future global environmental 
disaster, figured as inevitable yet always receding political, economic, and ultimately 
biological ruination. On the other hand is a redemptive narrative that poses 
humanity’s eventual salvation (perhaps via ruination) through adaptive technologies 
and governance, geo-engineering, or, more loftily, the success of climate politics. 
…What this means is that there is very little sense in the Anthropocene literature that 
different subjects are positioned in different ways with respect to humans’ geological 
reordering of time and space in the here and now (2015: np).   
What kind of hope can we find in these “blasted landscapes” (Kirksey et al. 2013)? What 
“arts of living” can we use on this “damaged planet” (Tsing et al. 2017)?  And how 
should we live in these “capitalist ruins” (Tsing 2015)?  These might be important 
questions for inspiring reflections on future possibilities, but they do little to help us think 
through the Anthropocene as a crisis we inhabit today and one which we can perhaps still 
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partially address. We must pay attention to the contingent politics through which ruins 
are made and their restoration displaced.  
This chapter thus reveals the danger in celebrating ruins without sufficiently 
paying attention to the ambiguities through which power operates in Anthropocenic 
conditions. I have shown in this chapter and the last, that there are increasing demands 
being put on the coal industry and state government to support economic diversification. 
This derives from the precarity of labour in the mining industry and growing desires to 
find alternative (and more sustainable) sources of livelihoods. There is also a growing 
environmentalism that draws on concepts of human/nature as well as land/water 
entanglements and mutualities (cf. Empson 2017). The call to fill in the voids represents a 
political refusal to accept environmental degradation and is a reassertion of connection to 
lost landscapes. However, of critical importance is how the coal lobby-led effort to shift 
the voids into an opportunity works to displace these dual-anxieties that are beginning to 
form into political demands in the Upper Hunter Valley. These voids when framed as 
entrepreneurial opportunities offer the hope of alternative employment while also 
displacing environmental rehabilitation. Although precarity can lead to an articulation of 
political demands, it can also make people susceptible to such fantasy as the rise of a far-
right populism implies (Berlant 2011).  
The shared precarity faced by coal communities in Australia can be 
metaphorically figured in relation to these voids. The paradoxes and ambiguities of the 
void—what is to fill it, and perhaps should it even be filled to begin with—represent the 
dilemmas that frame and translate the political and moral positions around precarity in 
the Anthropocene. Do we lament a lost settler-colonial past (of 1870 or 1970) or do we 
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look further back and lament the lost times of the aboriginal dreaming? Do these felt 
losses implore us to fill in the voids, to return to these idealized pasts where mining jobs 
supported white fathers with housewives? Or, do we look forward to an alternative future 
built in these emptied landscapes? Then again perhaps our desires make no difference to 
the underground hydrology and natural forces which are reasserting their omnipotence? 
This is a precarity that exists in relation to the unknown and highly contingent future, one 
that is full of ambiguous paradoxes, political, moral, and ecological double binds. This 
precarity is a crisis of labour; it is a crisis of the environment; it is a political contest; it is 
a moral refiguring. It is thus an Anthropocenic precarity that connects the seemingly 
disparate issues into a multiply figured and compounding crisis faced by coal 




In September 2016, a massive storm hit South Australia, which tore down a number of 
powerlines and triggered a blackout that covered the entire state for several hours. In the 
aftermath of the storm, fossil fuel proponents blamed South Australia’s high percentage 
of renewables for the blackout. South Australia has been the state most actively reducing 
its emissions and introducing renewable power generation. Blaming renewables for the 
blackout was inaccurate, as the blackout was caused by transmission issues rather than 
power generation. Nonetheless, the public messaging that blamed renewables for the 
blackout took hold, whereas the linking of the storm’s intensity to climate change did not 
(Slezak 2016).  
Similarly, the move to renewables has been blamed for rising electricity prices, 
which have more than doubled in the last five years. The government’s own reports show 
this has little to do with the rise of renewables. It derives primarily from recent 
investments in transmission infrastructure (Sims 2018). Yet rising energy prices have 
coincided with the closing of coal generators thus fuelling the perception that expensive 
renewables are to blame. South Australia’s plants in Port Augusta and the Hazelwood 
plant in the LaTrobe Valley have closed in recent years. The 2022 slated closure of the 
Liddell power station in the Upper Hunter Valley is the next on the horizon, which has 
seen the national government lobbying the generator’s owner AGL to keep the plant 
operating despite the planned closure date (Murphy 2018).  
These events continued to keep coal politics in the news as I wrote this thesis, 
shifting my attention from the everyday lives of the people I knew to the context in which 
they are mobilized for political interests. The continued blaming of weather outages, 
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rising energy prices, and plant closures on renewable energy appeared to me as an 
obvious tactic; one aimed at depicting the precarity of coal miners as either inevitable 
through changing technologies and their associated economic ‘rationalities’ or intentional 
through acts of malicious ‘greenies’ replacing reliable coal with expensive and 
‘intermittent’ renewables.  
This thesis was in part guided by this frustration. During my time in the field, I 
saw interconnections between the anxieties and the difficulties that my coal mining 
informants were facing and the anxieties that climate change evoked for 
environmentalists. But in urban sites like Sydney and Melbourne to which I occasionally 
travelled and from where I did some writing, coal miners were repeatedly pathologized, 
the loss of their employment and communities celebrated as an inevitable result of the 
march towards progress and away from the dark days of coal and carbon. Similarly, coal 
miners often refused to see that the challenges they were facing were the result not of 
environmentalists but of the relentless commodification of the Anthropocene. Their 
social and communal lives were like the landscapes they transformed into ‘overburden’ to 
be stripped away layer by layer in the service of extractive profits.  
An anthropologist friend also studying the Australian coal industry once joked: 
“It’s almost like we’re doing salvage ethnography”. I understood her invocation, and it 
made me appropriately morose. Although I am concerned about climate change, I cannot 
wish away the lives and livelihoods of the people I have come to know and love. I did 
occasionally feel I was capturing the moments before the fall, the beginning of a decline 
that would eventually lead to extinction.  But regardless of the future of coal itself, the 
truly valued elements of livelihoods around it did not have to be so vulnerable.   
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Lauren Berlant developed the phrase ‘cruel optimism’ to describe a condition in 
which “something you desire becomes the obstacle to your flourishing,” (Berlant 2011: 
1) a mode that is rampant in the precarious present. The established forms of progressive 
modernity are no longer there, yet we still desire them. We hold on to these former 
dreams, without making new ones more amenable to the conditions we face today. I see 
this in many I worked with in Moranbah and Singleton, as well as in the discourse of 
Australian environmentalism.  This makes people vulnerable to manipulation and to the 
kind of interpersonal accusations I describe in chapter three and four, whereby the desire 
to hold onto the familiar leads blame accusations to ricochet wildly, never hitting the 
appropriate targets. People also become vulnerable to intentional misdirection, as in the 
case of the displacement of hopes in the final voids (chapter six), or the Adani 
Carmichael mine (chapter four) where roused hope momentarily displaces the anxiety of 
miners, and environmentalist panic refuses empathy with labour (chapter three).  
 Yet there are also moments of awareness, when these manipulations become 
clear. Such as my discussions with the CFMEU leader in Moranbah who described the 
proposed Adani mine: “Carmichael is the biggest real estate scam ever…. The 
government is just stirring everyone up about it so that we blame the greenies for why we 
don’t have jobs.” 
Witnessing the manipulation of this divisiveness was frustrating but seemed to 
take a broader and more critical significance in November 2016. I was conducting 
fieldwork during the election of Donald Trump. His repeated promise to bring back coal 
jobs to rural America gave a new weight to the ‘jobs versus environment’ rhetoric. 
Trump’s electoral success has inspired a similar nationalist and populist message in 
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Australia which doubles down on climate denial and pits coal mining jobs and associated 
affective communities in direct opposition to global climate action and policy. The 
rhetoric of supporting coal jobs through rolling back environmental regulation hides the 
realities of what is happening to these jobs and the communities which rely on them, and 
it only heightens the double bind that coal communities face as they defend the industry 
that is undermining their livelihoods.  
My fieldwork in Moranbah revealed that it was not climate mitigation that most 
threatens the emplaced communities and the affective and historic identifications and 
values of the coal miners, but the casualisation of the workforce, the rise of long-distance 
commuting, and the technological transformations of automation, all of which serve the 
alienation and commodification promoted by Anthropocenic capitalism (chapter one). 
Yet this process is incomplete and differently gendered (chapter two) and can be quite 
conservative as it calls for a preservation of a former Fordist way of life and sociality.  
But it is not the conservative tendency of such pro-coal politics that makes them 
problematic. The coal industry may draw on conservative rhetoric, but it is always on the 
move in the newest spatial and temporal fix (Harvey 2003).  
The people of the Upper Hunter Valley were less uniformly defensive of the 
status quo.  The presence of already existing alternatives, primarily rural industries, made 
it easier to imagine their home place without coal, crafting local versions of 
environmental engagement that drew on historical narratives and rural belonging. 
However, the institutions through which these imaginations were filtered limited their 
content and resonance. The planning process forced affective attachments into the frames 
of ‘regional economies’ and ignored the global scale of climate concern (chapter five). 
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The mining industry shifted solastalgic lamentations into ‘legacy issues’ and paused 
dreams through speculative technologies (Weszkalnys 2015) that ever shifted the horizon 
of potentiality (chapter six). Thus, the future is still unclear. Desires to map, figure and 
plan fail in the precarious Anthropocene. The techniques for managing contingency, 
mapping, planning (chapter five), and risk (chapter three), fail to bring ethical order in 
these times of uncertainty (Bear 2015).  
Yet the drive is still there. There is a pull to understand and distribute blame, to 
seek moral direction and ethical order. Coal then becomes moralized. A lump of it waved 
around threateningly in Australian parliament serves to mock the vibrant agency 
environmentalists have endowed it in their tagline “coal kills” (Murphy 2017). The coal 
industry has caught onto this moralising itself, emphasizing the benefits that fossil fuelled 
modernity has brought the world’s poor, and the right of third-world nations to buy a bit 
of Australia’s coal and development (chapter four). The scale of the problem of climate 
change lends itself to such moral discourse, the intergenerational and international 
consequences counter modernity’s usual short term and localized decision making 
(Callison 2014; Hulme 2009; Gardiner 2011). Political and legal institutions, techniques 
of modernity, are not set up to deal with these Anthropocenic contingencies, and so we 
appeal to morality.  
  Yet, as coal became entangled in moral debates, I saw only a hardening of 
positions. In fact, I came to see that moral accusations seemed to be the mechanism 
through which the political divisiveness I was so frustrated by was manifest and made 
meaningful. My experience with coal-lobbyists revealed that, although often able to 
recognize problems in the industry, when facing moral accusations that implicated them 
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morally they hardened their defences. They rose to defend the industry as a way of 
defending themselves, which took their lobbying efforts beyond those of their particular 
employment and into projects of ethical self-fashioning (chapter four). Similarly, moral 
accusations of greed saw the figure of the Cashed-up-Bogan, an immoral and greedy 
miner, replace the working-class figure of historical narratives. These ‘CUBs’ then threw 
counter accusations at the greedy investor, the urban elitist who was deemed the true 
threat to the community (chapter three).  Political disagreements and different 
perspectives became irresolvable when translated into morality, embodied and 
pathologized through accusations that distract from structural critiques.  
What are we left with when the institutions of modernity can’t address our 
problems and our appeals to morality seem to only harden our divisions? Perhaps as post-
humanists argue, we need to think with radically new frameworks  (Latour 2013, 2017) to 
draw from indigenous ontologies and radical difference  (Blaser 2009, 2010; de la 
Cadena 2010; Descola 1996; Escobar 2018; Kohn 2013, 2015; Povinelli 2016).  But I 
maintain that we also need to understand the gaps and inconsistencies, the openings and 
opportunities, even within lives embedded in Anthropocenic ontologies.  
This led me to an analytical and methodological perspective to think about the 
Anthropocene as experienced. I am drawn to the concept of the Anthropocene for its 
ability to bring together issues that have often been analysed separately and to recognize 
the interconnections between the crisis of modernity and the ecological crisis (Tsing 
2015). Therefore I do not want to abandon the approach, but to use it strategically to 
highlight these interconnections. However, as I argued in the introduction, an 
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anthropological approach to the Anthropocene should recognize connections without 
assuming a totalizing coherence. This is what I have hoped to do in this thesis.  
 I have highlighted numerous places in which Anthropocenic logics direct action 
but are also inconsistently deployed. This is why I have titled this thesis, ‘Digging 
Deeper’. I have tried to dig deeper into the places that appear particularly typical, to look 
closely at the complexity of power and its contestations, the inconsistencies and frictions 
that continue to exist even within modernist ontologies of extractive industry. 
This is in some ways similar to the argument of Tsing (2015) and others (Tsing et.al. 
2017) that in the Anthropocene we need to cultivate the “arts of noticing” (Tsing 2005: 
17-25). However, this ‘noticing’ does not have to be limited to interspecies relations or 
life in ruined landscapes to make a contribution to the study of the Anthropocene. Even 
those humans seemingly stuck in the constraints of Anthropocenic ontologies inhibit lives 
full of ambiguities, inconsistencies, and thus potentialities.  
We need to find these gaps in the Anthropocene and intellectually dwell in them. 
These include the way in which local environmentalists in the Upper Hunter Valley 
attempt to scale-up their engagement, refusing attempts made in the planning process to 
confine them to a single mine (chapter five). There is also affective power in the concept 
of solastalgia, developed as an analytic in the Upper Hunter Valley to describe the sense 
of homesickness that comes as your home changes around you (Albrecht 2005), but 
which has been taken up locally and spread to environmental engagements around the 
world (chapter six). There is also hope in the women of Moranbah who manage 
competing pressures, living fulfilling lives despite the precarious conditions they face and 
whose desires and pursuits feed back into the forms that extractive capital takes (chapter 
 331 
two). There are emerging demands for diversification and growing environmentalism 
despite attempts to capture these anxieties by the coal industry (chapter six). Finally, 
there is the call to a ‘just transition,’ as organized labour is beginning to develop a 
politics that recognizes the interconnections between labour struggles and those of the 
environment. This is where I hope to take this project next.  
   A recent submission by the CFMEU to an Australian Senate Inquiry on the 
Retirement of Coal Fired Power Stations set up in response to the closure of the 
Hazelwood mine and power station states:  
If we want to achieve major change that mitigates global warming, the social impacts 
must not be treated as a secondary issue. To the extent that climate policy creates 
losers, it will be resisted (and this is especially so if opportunistic politicians seek to 
exploit the fear of loss) (Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union 2016: 28).  
In terms of moving forward with an anthropology of the experienced Anthropocene in 
Australia, there is an obvious opportunity for conducting research in the LaTrobe Valley 
of Victoria. As I mentioned in the introduction, Australia has three major coal mining 
regions, two of which I researched for this thesis. The third, the LaTrobe Valley of 
Victoria, is currently undergoing a transition away from its coal mining and burning past. 
The LaTrobe Valley, outside of Melbourne, was the home to brown (lignite) coal mines 
and associated thermal coal power stations which provided much of Victoria’s electricity, 
but which are some of the most carbon polluting in the world. The main Hazelwood 
power station there was closed in March 2017, and workers were only given five  
months’ notice. In the light of this sudden closure, the state government has promised 
AU$266 million for the transition but, perhaps more profoundly, the community is 
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beginning to make demands on the government and industry for a ‘just transition’ 
(Wiseman et al. 2017).   
The ‘just transition’ draws largely from organized labour’s push for better 
management of the energy transition. The concept was originally developed by the 
Canadian Labour Congress but has now been taken up in many communities. They argue 
for “a social climate change agenda focusing on developing a multi-levelled labour voice 
in the green transformation of jobs and work, with labour and community actively 
involved in planning, deciding and operationalizing all phases” (Lipsig-Mumme 2008:7 
quoted in Goods 2011). Proponents of the just transition argue that as the move from 
fossil fuels to renewables is made, those previously working in these industries should be 
helped to move into new jobs, and that the jobs of the new economies should be stable, 
safe and well-compensated. Of course, as this thesis has shown, the concerns and 
attachments to mining jobs are far greater than an attachment to the wage. Instead, there 
is a whole set of values that are represented through mining labour. This includes its 
relation to Australian history, the environment and community it engenders, as well the 
racial, gendered and intergenerational distributions it enables. All of these complex 
social, moral, and political questions frame what ‘justice’ will variably mean in the 
context of an energy transition.  Nonetheless, environmental organizations are realizing 
the political power that comes from working with these populations rather than against 
them (Wiseman et al. 2017). Perhaps, a new politics of mutual recognition (Smith-
Rolston 2014: 32) may be beginning to emerge through the shared precariousness of the 
experienced Anthropocene. However, many questions remain about how this emerging 
political discourse of the ‘just transition’ will work in practice and be grounded in place, 
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including what and whose imaginations it will privilege or exclude (cf. Smith and 
Tidwell 2016). Therefore, I hope studying the ongoing transition in the LaTrobe Valley 
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